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Abstract 
 
The analysis of inherent role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter 
school boards contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies 
provided quantitative and qualitative perspectives of experienced board members. These 
perspectives included their view of board governance and how responsibilities are 
divided and shared with for-profit private management companies.  
The triangulated analysis included three major sources of data: quantitative 
research, qualitative research, and a qualitative contractual analysis that provided the 
essence of the contracts between charter school boards of directors and their contracted 
for-profit private management companies. The theoretical framework that grounded this 
analysis was inclusive of three theories: agency theory, stewardship theory, and contract 
failure theory. These theories were collectively grounded in economic, psychological, 
and sociological foundations.  The theories synergistically illustrated a framework of 
potentially inherent conflicts in the relationship between the agent and client.   
The charter school boards (client) relationships with the full-service for-profit 
private management companies (agent) encompassed the complexities of non-profit 
entities working side-by-side with private for-profit entities. This relationship creates 
anomalies that contribute to confusion, tensions, and factors that result in governance 
conflicts, which affect the operations of charter schools. The anomalies were a 
phenomenon of parallel governance, which is covertly impacting the governance of 
charter schools.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
 
Introduction  
 
The effective governance and leadership of public schools is imperative to 
achieve academic progress and ensure the transparent, accountable, and the efficient use 
of public tax dollars. As a response to the educational reform challenge, one of the 
strategies was the creation of charter schools in the early 1990s. Subsequently, charter 
schools have become a very heated topic of discussion as it introduces new models of 
governance inclusive of volunteer appointed boards of directors, non-profit management 
companies, full-service, for-profit private management companies, and authorizers. This 
study primarily focuses on two of these major actors: charter school volunteer appointed 
boards of directors and full-service, for-profit, private management companies. Both 
actors have roles and responsibilities for which they were designed and intended. 
However, despite their design and intent, the functional lines of responsibilities are 
blurred due to the overlapping of governance, which perpetuates conflicts. These 
conflicts are prevalent in the state of Michigan due to the amount of charter schools 
managed by full-service, for-profit, private management companies. The overlap and 
conflicts cause great demand for legislative and policy responses to these complex 
circumstances that have developed over two decades. 
These issues were highlighted in the topics of Dixon’s (2014a) investigation for 
the Detroit Free Press entitled, “State of Charter Schools: How Michigan Spends 1 
Billion But Fails to Hold Schools Accountable.” The investigation uncovered role 
conflicts in charter school governance, concerns surrounding for-profit private 
management companies’ operations and performance, and issues of transparency and 
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accountability involving public tax dollars. Challenges in governance have always been a 
part of education reform; however, the overlap in governance between authorizers, 
management companies, and boards of directors increases the probability of conflicts. 
Although the authorizers have primary oversight, the overlap in governance between 
boards of directors and management companies exists and intensifies their conflicts.  
The Detroit Free Press investigation provided multiple examples of conflicts 
inclusive of management companies refusing to provide financial information to the 
boards of directors when requested, financial concerns stemming from the existence of 
excessive management fees, providing minimally required accounting and finance 
information, and the implications of the confusion of governance principles and practices 
that would allow such occurrences. Other role conflicts include the selection process for 
the boards of directors, the managing of bid processes, human resource management, and 
transparency and accountability matters.  Blitz (2011) stated, “The tension that exists 
between authorizer-based accountability and market-based accountability is part of the 
potential conflict facing charter school leaders. Failure to meet either of these types of 
demands could lead to school closure; yet, these demands also come into conflict.” (p. 
358) These conflicting perspectives collide where there is overlap that causes ambiguity 
with governing roles and responsibilities.  
Statement of the Problem  
Despite more than twenty years of charter school existence in the state of 
Michigan, governance has become more challenging, confusing, and conflicting due to 
the overlapping responsibilities between charter school boards of directors and full-
service, for-profit private management companies. More research is needed on the impact 
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of the overlapping of governing bodies that perpetuate role conflicts in Michigan charter 
schools. Effective governance will continue to be problematic without clearly defined 
roles between boards of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management 
companies. The contracting of full-service, for-profit private management companies 
exacerbates role conflicts by diminishing and transferring the boards’ governing power 
and authority to the full-service, for-profit private management companies. The conflicts 
in these relationships become more complex by issues involving the transparency and 
accountability of public tax dollars.  
Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this mixed methodology study is to gain insight into the 
overlapping roles of governance and conflicts in Michigan charter school boards 
contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies and the impact 
these roles and conflicts have on the ability to provide effective and transparent 
governance. 
Justification and Significance of the Study 
Research on charter school governance and leadership is imperative to 
understanding the current challenges of mitigating the overlapping roles of the 
authorizers, management companies, and the boards of directors, and how it may 
improve the ability to provide effective governance and transparency. The research 
provided by the study allows insight into the perspectives of how boards of directors view 
the conflicts resulting from the overlap of governance roles and how such conflicts may 
be decreased, eliminated, and addressed. 
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The study of effective leadership and governance in charter schools is critical in 
order to deliver on the promises for which charter schools were predicated. Currently, 
there is minimal research on the impact of the overlapping of governance that perpetuates 
role conflicts in Michigan charter schools. Appointed charter school board members in 
Michigan have a high probability of experiencing confusion because a universal road 
map does not exist for board members to engage and improve their governing capacity. 
Authorizers oversee differently, management companies manage differently, and board 
governance differs from one charter school to the next. Given the complexities of 
governance, it takes more than a two-hour-per-month meeting to become an informed, 
knowledgeable, and engaged board member. This becomes problematic when boards 
contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies whose main purpose 
is to generate profit. When looking at the complexities of governance in Michigan charter 
schools, it becomes reasonable to expect high levels of conflicts.   
This study has significance to those who lead charter schools in Michigan because 
exploring governance roles and the experiences of charter school board members will 
provide insight through their perspectives. Obtaining such information may provide 
knowledge on how to make charter school governance more effective. In addition, the 
board members’ perspectives of these relationships with full-service, for-profit private 
management companies and how it may cause potential conflicts are important. This 
study may provide impetus for future researchers to further explore strategies to improve 
charter school governance and diminish or prevent inherent conflicts between boards of 
directors and full-service, for-profit private management companies.  
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The perspectives and experiences of charter school board members are factors 
that may provide guidance to better prepare and develop current and future board 
members in their endeavors to become effective leaders and contribute to the critical 
governance component of charter school evolution.  
Research Questions or Hypotheses 
 The research questions the study seeks to answer emanate from general topics of 
charter school leadership and governance. Specifically, investigating the consequences of 
charter school boards of directors contracting for comprehensive services with for-profit 
private management companies in the state of Michigan. The study focused on obtaining 
the perspectives of charter school board members in regards to conflicts created by 
overlapping governance roles with full-service, for-profit private management companies 
and how such conflicts may be decreased or preempted.  
 The three questions of the research study are specific to charter school governance 
and the role conflicts that occurred between charter school boards of directors and the 
full-service, for-profit private management companies. These management companies 
were selected by the charter school boards of directors to comprehensively manage the 
operations of the school. The following questions included:  
1.  Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of 
directors and full-service, for-profit private management companies contribute to 
conflicts in governance? 
2. Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose 
boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management 
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companies contribute to governance conflict, what are the factors in the 
relationship that contribute to conflict in governance?  
3. Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan 
charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private 
management companies?  
Research Design and Methodology  
Methodology 
The research was a mixed methodology approach incorporating quantitative and 
qualitative designs. This dual approach enabled the capturing of experienced board 
members’ perspectives through surveys and interviews. The results from the mixed 
methodology were cross-analyzed for statistical inferences and the identification of 
common themes. A qualitative contract analysis was conducted to assist with the 
development of questions for surveys and interviews. Subsequently, an in-depth review 
of the contracts provided additional data to triangulate with the survey and interview 
results.  
Research Design and Instruments 
 
The research design from a quantitative perspective explored and compared 
elements regarding the participants’ responses to survey questions. This survey 
instrument captured experienced board members’ perspectives on leadership roles and the 
resulting conflicts regarding the governance of charter schools based on their individual 
experiences. (See Appendix A for the survey instrument.) The distribution of surveys 
targeted 40 to 50 respondents of charter school board members who contracted with full-
service, for-profit private management companies for comprehensive management 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	   7	  
services. The boards were purposely selected to have cross-representation from contracts 
with different management companies and different authorizers.  
The research design from a quantitative perspective included a hard copy survey 
for boards of directors who hold an executive position such as president or vice president 
to distribute and collect from their fellow board members. The participants were surveyed 
with questions divided into specific categories based on the guiding research questions: 
Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of directors and 
full-service, for-profit private management companies contribute to conflicts in 
governance? Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose 
boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies 
contribute to governance conflicts, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute 
to conflicts in governance? Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected 
when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit 
private management companies?  
The research design from a qualitative perspective included in-depth interviews to 
provide inquiry to the perspectives of experienced charter school board members. The 
interview respondents had a preferred minimum of fifteen years board experience with 
various roles of leadership appointments. As part of this process, seven participants were 
purposely selected to capture their responses to research questions regarding experiences 
of contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The interview 
candidates served as board members with at least five years and preferably fifteen years 
of experience as members of various charter school boards of directors. A series of open-
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ended questions were utilized to engage the participants and allow subjective detailed 
responses. (See Appendix B for the qualitative interview questions.)  
Each interview respondent was taped with an audio recorder. The tapes were 
transcribed and electronically saved.  
Part of the qualitative portion included exploration and comparative analysis of 
contracts between charter schools and their selected for-profit private management 
companies. Five contracts were selected for analysis. Each contract was unique to a board 
of directors and their contracted full-service for-profit private management company. The 
contracts were analyzed for patterns of content, terms, and conditions that may 
potentially cause overlap and conflicts during the life of the agreement. The analysis of 
contracts assisted with providing insight to the disposition of the contractual parties and if 
it caused overlap and conflicts from the start of the agreement between the boards of 
directors and the full-service, for-profit private management company.    
The results from the mixed methodology approach enabled a cross-reference of 
findings gathered from three separate methods of data acquisition; contract analysis, 
survey questionnaires, and interviews. 
Definition of Terms  
Parallel Governance: Parallel governance structures are defined by Alexia Stainer 
(July, 2010) as,“ Parallel governance is closely related to the concept of institutional 
multiplicity, as both refer to situations where non-state actors perform state functions. 
These are associated with conflict situations and have impact on the processes of state 
formation.” (Parallel Governance section, para. 1). 
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Power relationships: Established among those involved in governance. 
Governance connotes a functional perspective of power, where power is used as a way to 
manage potential or real conflict, to create group cohesion and collaboration to enforce a 
dominant view of the way things ought to be, and to maintain order and regulate 
behavior, both formally and informally through authority and influence (Marshall & 
Scribner, 1991, p. 349). 
Conflict:  Lead in a different direction to focus on the competition over scarce 
resources. People with competing values or competing priorities seek to have their 
priorities and values prevail. They seek social domination (Morgan, 1986). Conflict is 
neither something to be maintained nor to be diffused or integrated. Conflict serves as a 
change function, giving individuals and groups an opportunity to affect existing power 
relationships. Collaboration, cohesion, and maintenance of order occur only when one 
group successfully dominates. The dominance of this group is often reified by the 
structure of bureaucracy, thus disguising power and diffusing conflict under the guise of 
bureaucratic rationality (Marshall & Scribner, 1991, p.349). 
Charter School/Public School Academy: A public school of choice created by a 
motivated individual or group that has designed a model or program guided by principles 
outlined in its charter and agreed to by the home district (Brody, 2009; Carpenter, 2006 
as cited by Horsburgh, 2011, p.10).  
Governance: The set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions by 
which an organization is controlled. It defines the relationships among the many players 
who have stakes in an organization’s activities and outcomes. Formal governance 
arrangements therefore ensure representation of key stakeholders. Governance and 
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leadership are different. The essence of leadership is influencing the behaviors of others; 
governance constrains leadership (Hill and Lake, 2006, p.3). 
Authorizer/Sponsor: The Michigan Department of Education (2012) explains their 
role by stating,  “Pursuant to section 380.502(4): An authorizing body shall oversee, or 
shall contract with an intermediate school district, community college, or state public 
university to oversee, each public school academy operating under a contract issued by 
the authorizing body. The authorizing body is responsible for overseeing compliance by 
the board of directors with the contract and all applicable law” (Michigan Department of 
Education, 2012, p.13). 
EMO (Education Management Organization): A for-profit private management 
company that provides various ranges of educational and operational services to public 
schools and charter schools. 
CMO (Charter Management Organization): A nonprofit management company 
that provides various ranges of educational and operational services to public schools and 
charter schools. 
Market-based Accountability: The dynamics that occur in the market, driven by 
demands on charter schools from parents, communities, students, and any local 
stakeholders of the school and not affiliated with an authoritative position. 
Authorizer-based Accountability: The dynamics that occur from 
authorizer/sponsor demands on a charter school. These demands are based on oversight 
related to school finances, compliance to state and federal rules and regulations, and 
academic outcomes related to the schools’ state performance testing on student 
achievement and growth.  
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Transparency: The ability to reasonably and accurately account for revenues from 
public tax dollars expended for the operations of charter schools. 
Delimitations  
The delimitations of this study included the population of boards of directors and 
full-service, for-profit private management companies limited to operations in the state of 
Michigan and primarily operating in the Metro Detroit area. The other delimitations 
related to the qualitative study where candidates’ responses were based solely on their 
experiences with full-service, for-profit private management companies operating under 
Michigan legislation, compliance, and authorizers. This study does not account for the 
differences in legislation, policy, and law as it pertains to states other than Michigan. 
Limitations 
The mixed method approach allowed for encounters with board members with 
varying years of experience during a period of heavy accountability from federal and 
state agencies. Also, the preparation, capacity, skills, knowledge, and professionalism of 
the boards were collectively unique to each governing body. Every board of directors 
operates within a specific community that presents challenges different from other 
districts. These experiences make the professionalism and composition of each board 
different and therefore varied in how each manages the conflict presented in its district. 
Summary 
 Chapter 1 introduced the challenges of charter school governance in the state of 
Michigan. The study focuses on analyzing inherent role conflicts in the governance of 
Michigan charter school boards contracting with full-service, for-profit private 
management companies in the state of Michigan. With more than eighty percent of its 
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charter schools managed by full-service, for-profit private management companies, 
Michigan has unique governance challenges inclusive of role confusion, accountability 
and transparency of public tax dollars, overlap of responsibilities, and board uncertainty 
around their collective authority, power, and control of the operations of their charter 
schools. These challenges result in conflicts that impact the governance of Michigan 
charter schools.  
The research methodology is fortified by a mixed approach inclusive of 
quantitative and qualitative designs. There is a separate qualitative element in the form of 
an analysis of contracts between boards of directors and for-profit, private management 
companies. The approach provided multiple data sources to address the research 
questions.   
Chapter 1 also provided conceptual frameworks inclusive of the agency theory, 
stewardship theory, and contract failure theory. These theories provided multiple lenses 
to review and help explain the phenomenon of governance conflicts in Michigan charter 
schools that have contracted with full-service, for-profit private management companies. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review based on previous studies on charter school 
governance, board member roles and responsibilities, and the status and effects of various 
models of management available for charter school boards to select. Chapter 3 details the 
mixed methodology approach to provide both quantitative and qualitative data along with 
a subsequent contract analysis and triangulation. Chapter 4 provides the findings and 
analysis resulting from the mixed methodology approach, and Chapter 5 subsequently 
provides a conclusion to the study with recommendations for future research and 
analysis. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework encompasses three theories used to provide context to 
the phenomenon of inherent role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter school 
boards of directors contracting with full-service, for-profit private management 
companies. The theories provided a basis of understanding of the relationship 
mechanisms between the charter school boards of directors (clients) and the full-service, 
for-profit private management companies (agents). The agent-to-client relationship 
included social, psychological, and behavioral implications that define the inter-relational 
dynamics between the two parties. The relationships represented somewhat polarized 
derivatives, such as the nonprofit values of the boards of directors and the for-profit 
values of the management companies in the state of Michigan. The conceptual 
framework included agency theory, stewardship theory, and contract failure theory.  
The dynamics of charter schools are complex, ambiguous, and contentious due to 
rapidly changing circumstances in educationally underserved areas where government, 
community, and business entities attempt to improve student outcomes by providing 
solutions with this alternative model of public education. The problem is magnified with 
these entities working in isolation and not having cohesive planning, development, and 
deployment of resources to systematically resolve pervasive issues that plague public 
school education.  
Three of the main actors in Michigan’s charter education system include the 
authorizers, boards of directors, and full-service, for-profit private management 
companies. The boards of directors may contract with for-profit private management 
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companies, which present situations primed with potential role conflicts that permeate the 
charter school industry in the state of Michigan. The relationship forms an agent-to-client 
scenario wrought with misperceptions, mainly by the boards of directors, as to which 
entity has authority and empowerment regarding charter school governance. The 
challenge of finding a theory that increases understanding and helps explain the relational 
phenomenon falls short and therefore warrants multiple theories to help provide 
perspective. These theories come together to develop the conceptual framework that was 
used in the study. This framework was developed inclusive of the following theories: 
agency theory, contract failure theory, and stewardship theory. These three theories 
provide lenses to view the relationships between charter school boards of directors and 
the entities they contract with to manage the operations of their charter school. The 
concepts apply to the macro-dynamics of any charter school in the country. However, this 
application is specifically for the circumstances of charter schools operated in the state of 
Michigan where more than eighty percent of the charter schools have contracts with full-
service, for-profit private management companies.    
Agency Theory 
In the early 1970s, the concept of agency theory emerged from the desire to 
explain agent-to-client relations and how the objectives of the two parties may conflict 
given various behaviors that reflected in their individual motivations. According to 
Mitnick (2013), 
The first scholars to propose, explicitly, that a theory of agency be created, and to 
actually begin its creation, were Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick, independently 
and roughly concurrently. Ross is responsible for the origin of the economic 
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theory of agency, and Mitnick for the institutional theory of agency, though the 
basic concepts underlying these approaches are similar. Indeed, the approaches 
can be seen as complementary in their uses of similar concepts under different 
assumptions. In short, Ross introduced the study of agency in terms of problems 
of compensation contracting; agency was seen, in essence, as an incentives 
problem. Mitnick introduced the now common insight that institutions form 
around agency, and evolve to deal with agency, in response to the essential 
imperfection of agency relationships: Behavior never occurs as it is preferred by 
the principal because it does not pay to make it perfect. But society 
creates institutions that attend to these imperfections, managing or buffering them, 
adapting to them, or becoming chronically distorted by them. Thus, to fully 
understand agency, we need both streams ---to see the incentives as well as the 
institutional structures. (p. 2) 
Ross (1973) continues the co-explanation of the agency theory from an economic 
perspective with focus on the client. Ross stated: 
The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes 
of social interaction. We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between 
two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or 
as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of 
decision problems. Examples of agency are universal. Essentially all contractual 
arrangements, as between employer and employee or the state and the 
governed, for example, contain important elements of agency. (p. 134)  
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The agency theory describes how the self-interests of different entities permeate 
the motives, behaviors, and actions of two parties that contractually have the same goals 
in mind. Contractual parties may have positive intentions; however, these intentions may 
turn into negative interactions and results when the agent deliberates behaviors that are 
more beneficial to their existence as opposed to exhibit behavior that is congruent with 
the goals of their client. Within the context of this study, the boards of directors are the 
clients in the charter school industry and the full-service, for-profit private management 
companies are the agents contracted to manage the operations of the charter schools. 
The nuances of the agency-to-client relationships may take on many forms given 
the vast applications related to social, psychological, commerce, and business scenarios. 
The common element should be that the agent is supposed to align itself to the benefit of 
the client. It is not a partnership but a unilateral relationship, mutually beneficial for both 
parties given common objectives. The objectives are predicated on the mission of the 
client, which the agent adjusts and adapts to the will and purpose of the client. Deviations 
from this fundamental principal are a philosophical breach of the fundamentals upon 
which such relations have derived. As stated by Shapiro (2005), “In an agency 
relationship, one part acts on behalf of another ”(p.263). The author continued to 
elaborate on the agent to client relationship: 
The assumption that principals are in the driver’s seat ---specifying preferences, 
creating incentives, and making contracts, that agents must follow –-is also 
problematic. When principals seek out agents for their expert knowledge, when 
principals are one-shotters and agents repeat players, when principals are 
unexpectedly foisted into a new role with no time or life experience to formulate 
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preferences, let alone a contract or monitoring strategy (e.g., the new parents of an 
ill newborn, the asymmetry of power shifts from the principal to the agent. (p. 
267) 
Shapiro gives a perspective that highlights issues regarding the experience of 
agents in contrast to the novice disposition of clients. The repetitive nature of the subject 
industry gives agents an advantage, especially when the agent has multiple clients, 
however the client only has one agent. The author continued: 
Agency relationships are enacted in a broader social context and buffeted by 
outside forces –- other agency relationships, competitors, interest groups, 
regulators, legal rules, and the like –- that sometimes right information all 
imbalances, offer or constrain incentives, exacerbate the risk of adverse selections 
or moral hazard, provide cover or opportunity for opportunism, and so forth. 
Relationships endure over time, affording principals and agents occasions to 
gather data about one another. Principals learn better which incentives are likely 
to work. Agents learn more about the preferences of the principals they serve. 
Relationships become embedded as parties develop histories and personal 
relationships and become entangled in social networks. (p. 269) 
The nature of the agency relationship may benefit the agency more so than the 
client over time given the agent’s desire to expand its network of additional clientele. The 
client, on the other hand, may risk becoming more dependent on the agent over time as 
the agent manages the specific duties outlined in the contract. Shapiro (2005) explained: 
Over time, agents acquire constituencies other than their principals that buffer 
them from the contracting, re-contracting, and sanctioning of their principals. And 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	   18	  
as agents (government bureaucrats, corporate managers) outlast their principals 
(legislators, CEOs), the balance of power between principal and agent may shift. 
(p. 269)  
Whereas the agent may develop buffers to leverage it against the risk of losing 
clients, the client does not have such a buffer and must rely on its one agent. The risk of a 
dysfunctional relationship and the negative implications of such are greater for the client 
than the agent. These situations may derive from issues of conflicts in goal attainment or 
conflicts in how to achieve specific goals. Dysfunction due to separations in perspectives 
will result in problematic circumstances that may not have apparent resolution. Shapiro 
(2005) continued: 
The classic agency paradigm, with its eye on the principal, perceives goal conflict 
as the departure of agents from the interests of the principal. Hence, the solution 
to this agency problem is to come up with incentives that will align the interests 
of agents with those of the principal. Keep the agent from shirking by paying her 
a piece rate, perhaps. The agency problem looks quite different from the 
perspective of the agent, though. Conflicts between the interests of the agents and 
those of the principal are the least of the agent’s problems. The real problem is 
that the agent is most likely serving many masters, many of with conflicting 
interests. Even if the agent is able to silence his or her own interests, there is a 
matter of how to maneuver through the tangled loyalties he or she owes to many 
different principals and how to negotiate through their competing interests and 
sometimes irreconcilable differences. (p. 278)  
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The interests of the client must be a priority of the agent if there is to be a 
cohesive relationship focused on achieving the objectives of the client. In the charter 
industry, the clients are the boards of directors and the agent are the full-service, for-
profit private management companies. Bonazzi and Islam (2006) expounded on the effect 
of agency theory on corporate governance. They stated: 
Separation between ownership and control of corporations characterizes the 
existence of a firm. The design of mechanisms for effective corporate control to 
make managers act in the best interests of shareholders has been a major concern 
in the area of corporate governance and finance, and continuing research in 
agency theory attempts to design an appropriate framework for such control. In a 
corporation, the shareholders are working on behalf of, and for the interests, of the 
principals. (p. 7) 
The previous statement ties agency theory to the effectiveness of the boards of 
directors to govern. They illustrate how boards of directors need to have accurate metrics 
to monitor and evaluate the performance of the agents in regards to meeting or exceeding 
the objectives of the client. Bonazzi and Islam (2006) concluded, “The greater the level 
of monitoring, greater the probability of success or enhanced financial performance” (p. 
11). 
Contract Failure Theory 
Contract failure theory provides a view of the complexity of having a consumer or 
client in a position where they cannot adequately monitor or measure the quality of their 
service or product. In regards to the charter industry, the contract failure theory explains 
why the majority of the country has charter schools operated by nonprofit organizations. 
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The reason is primarily due to the high cost of monitoring and the challenges to define 
the product or service in terms of what are successful outcomes. Hansmann (1980) 
explained the contract failure theory, “I am suggesting that nonprofit enterprise is a 
reasonable response to a particular kind of ‘market failure,’ specifically the inability to 
police procedures by ordinary contractual devices, which I shall call ‘contract failure’” 
(p. 845). The author goes onto explain the circumstances that give rise to contract failure. 
Hansmann (1980) stated:  
In some instances, the circumstances that give rise to contract failure are simple 
and reasonably obvious. This is the case, for example, with institutions such as 
redistributive philanthropies and with institutions that provide complex personal 
services. In other instances, the problems of contract failure that give rise to 
nonprofits are embedded in, or with institutions in which contract failure is bound 
with problems of public goods, price discrimination, and imperfect loan markets. 
In considering these latter institutions, it will be necessary to examine in some 
detail the full complex of factors that give rise to the need for nonprofit 
organizations. (p.846) 
It is very difficult for charter school boards of directors in Michigan to understand 
and define quality outcomes relative to the intangibles of the products or services 
provided. Morley (2006) elaborated on Hansmann’s theory of contract failure: 
Hansmann’s theory can explain the dominance of nonprofit firms in the charter 
school market. Several interest groups influence a charter school’s success and 
failure, including parents, government agencies, and donors. Each of these groups 
have goals they want the charter school to meet (generally centering on academic 
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achievement), and each faces significant monitoring costs that prevent them from 
assessing and enforcing the school’s attainment of those goals. These groups face 
common monitoring problems, including perceiving and measuring students’ 
achievement and enforcing the threat of accountability. Hansmann’s theory 
explains nonprofit dominance as a product of these groups’ efforts to reduce 
monitoring costs. These groups prefer nonprofits because nonprofits offer 
assurances that managers will not cut costs and quality in imperceptible ways. (p. 
1797) 
This theory is rationally applicable to the charter industry in most states except for 
the state of Michigan, which has about ten percent of its charter schools managed by 
nonprofit organizations and more than eighty percent of charters managed by full-service, 
for-profit private management companies.  
Morley (2006) continued by explaining the challenges that three significant 
charter school stakeholders have in terms of difficulties to monitor the performance of the 
managerial agent and student performance. The three stakeholders include parents, 
government agencies, and donors. The other stakeholders that may be added are the 
authorizers or sponsors of the charter school. There is not a universal template that 
charter school authorizers deploy to monitor student performance and overall success.  
Parents have challenges with understanding what should be monitored and how may they 
keep informed of important matters relative to their child’s academic, behavioral, and 
social performance. There are not consistent ways that public schools, let alone charter 
schools communicate with parents.  In terms of the government, most policies and 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	   22	  
legislation differs by state. Other than regulated state testing mandated by the federal 
government, there is no consistency of how to test for student performance.  
Government, donors, and authorizers all have challenges related to monitoring 
success indicators for charter schools. All three typically have different metrics they 
would like tracked. These metrics usually serve their own specific interests and their 
interests may not be linked to those of others but specific to their own agendas. 
Stewardship Theory  
The second concept to assist with providing meaning to the governance 
phenomenon between boards of directors and full-service, for-profit private management 
companies is the stewardship theory. Davis, Shoorman, and Donaldson (1997) explained: 
Stewardship theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by 
individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the 
objectives of their principals. Because stewardship theory is relatively new, its 
theoretic contribution has not been adequately established. (p. 21) 
          The authors go on to provide the psychological and sociological roots from which 
the theory derived. Davis, Shoorman, and Donaldson (1997) stated: 
Stewardship theory has its roots in psychology and sociology and was designed 
for researchers to examine situations in which executives, as stewards, are 
motivated to act in the best interests of their principals (Donaldson & Davis, 
1989, 1991). In stewardship theory, the model of man is based on a steward 
whose behavior is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviors 
have higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviors. Given a choice 
between self-serving behavior and pro-organizational behavior, a steward's 
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behavior will not depart from the interests of his or her organization.  Stewards 
will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviors for cooperative behaviors. Thus, 
even where the interests of the steward and the principal are not aligned, the 
steward places higher value on cooperation than defection (terms found in game 
theory). Because the steward perceives greater utility in cooperative behavior and 
behaves accordingly, his or her behavior can be considered rational. (p. 24) 
Stewardship theory provided a conceptual premise based on an agent’s intrinsic 
motivations to align with the corporate goals and objectives of its client. The stewardship 
theory differs from the agency theory in that it bypasses motivation and self-interest 
motivations.  Donaldson and Barney (1990) explained: 
The executive manager, under this theory, far from being an opportunistic shirker, 
essentially wants to do a good job, to be a good steward of the corporate assets. 
Thus, stewardship theory holds that there is no inherent, general problem of 
executive motivation. Given the absence of an inner motivational problem among 
executives, there is the question of how far executives can achieve the good 
corporate performance to which they aspire. (p. 51) 
The stewardship theory presents a possible unique structure that would enable a 
different unit of management structure having top administrative leadership report to the 
board of directors. Such a reporting structure may diminish potential conflicts by having 
a key role reporting to the boards of directors of charter schools. Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) concluded: Stewardship	  theory	  stresses	  the	  beneficial	  consequences	  on	  shareholder	  returns	  of	  facilitative	  authority	  structures,	  which	  unify	  command	  by	  having	  roles	  of	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  CEO	  and	  chair	  held	  by	  the	  same	  person.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  that	  ROE	  (return	  on	  equity)	  returns	  to	  shareholders	  are	  improved	  by	  combining;	  rather	  than	  separating	  the	  roles-­‐holders	  of	  the	  chair	  and	  CEO.	  (p.	  62) 
Such a role in the charter industry would be equivalent to the superintendent and 
principal roles reporting directly to the charter school board of directors. The stewardship 
theory and the agency cost theory both consider the relationship between the agent and 
client from different perspectives. Donaldson and Davis (1991) expounded: 
Although agency theory appears to be the dominant paradigm underlying most of 
the governance literature, researchers have suggested theoretical limits of agency theory 
and proposed stewardship as an alternative theory of management (Davis et al., 1997, p. 
20). Stewardship theory has its roots in psychology and sociology and can be divided into 
two branches (Caers et al., 2006). The first branch also starts from a conflict between the 
goals of the principal and the agent, but assumes that the agent will be motivated to act in 
the interest of the principal (Davis et al., 1997). This implies that, even when the interests 
of the agent and the principal are not aligned, the agent can attain a higher utility level by 
acting in the principal’s interest because doing so might lead to opportunities for desired 
personal outcomes such as achievement, affiliation, and self-actualization (cited from 
Davis et al., 1997; Tosi et al., 2003). The second branch assumes that the agent’s goals 
are perfectly aligned with those of the principal (cited from Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003). Both agency theory and stewardship theory focus on the relationship between 
principals and agents, but start from different assumptions and prescriptions. 
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Organizational identification is defined as, “A perceived oneness with an 
organization and the experience of the organization’s successes and failures as 
one’s owns” (cited from Mael & Ashforth, 1992, p. 103). Agency theory assumes 
that agents have a low identification with the organization and may externalize 
organizational problems to avoid blame. Stewardship theory, in contrast, assumes 
that agents have a high identification with the mission of the organization. The 
attribution of organizational successes to themselves will contribute to their self-
image and self-concept (cited from Davis et al., 1997). Concerning the agent’s 
motivation, it is possible to distinguish two basic classes of motivations to 
perform an activity: intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation (cited from 
Deci, 1972). Stewardship theory stresses the agent’s tendency to be collectively 
oriented and intrinsically motivated (cited from Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).   
(p. 436) 
Muth & Donaldson (1998) cited Perrow (1986) to explain:  
Stewardship theory is an alternative to agency theory and offers opposing 
predictions about the structuring of effective boards. The stewardship model is 
one based on manager as “steward” rather than the entirely self-interested, 
rational economic man of agency theory. Agency theory, with roots in the fields 
of economics and finance, examines the structures of capitalism, finds only self-
interested behavior, and assumes “this is human nature…” and neglects the 
enormous amount of neutral and other-regarding behavior that exists…and the 
structures that might increase. (p. 6)  
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These outlined theories provide conceptual frameworks that help analyze the 
phenomenon of charter school boards of directors contracting with full-service for-profit 
private management companies in the state of Michigan. Table 1 compares these 
theories:  
Table 1  
Comparison Chart of Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory and Contract Failure Theory 
Dimension Agency Theory Stewardship Theory Contract Failure 
Theory 
Theoretical Basis 
 
Economics and 
finance  
 
Psychology and 
sociology 
 
Psychology and 
economics 
 
Approach     Control (distrust) 
 
Collaboration (trust) 
 
Uncertainty (trust) 
 
Principal-Agent        
Relationship 
 
Goal conflict  
 
Compatible or 
aligned goals  
 
Somewhat 
compatible 
 
Agent’s Motivation 
 
Mainly extrinsic 
 
Intrinsic  
 
Somewhat intrinsic 
 
Organizational 
Identification 
 
Low identification 
 
High identification  
 
High identification 
 
Human Behavior 
 
Individualist  
 
Collectivist  
 
Collaborative 
 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
 
Monitoring and 
incentives 
Empowering 
structures 
Monitoring and 
empowering 
Source: Based on Puyvelde, Caers, DuBois, and Jegers (2012) and Morley (2006).  
The charter school boards of directors have governance and oversight 
responsibilities that include fiduciary, compliance, and outcome dimensions. The 
selection of managerial models that boards of directors implement have significant 
ramifications regarding their authority and empowerment to provide effective governance 
as they work with full-service for-profit private management companies.  Figure 1 
illustrates how the conceptual framework is applied to the study’s topic of the 
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relationship between charter schools’ boards of directors and full-service, for-profit 
private management companies.	  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework synthesizing agency theory, stewardship theory and 
contract failure theory.  
For-Profit Private Management Company Operations and Performance 
The issues around the challenges of the governance structure were strongly 
represented in the Detroit Free Press 2014 investigation. An area of conflict that came 
from their examination centers on for-profit private management companies. As 
opportunities for charter schools have grown, so has the interest from full-service, for-
profit private management companies. These entities have appeared on the scene with the 
promise of providing boards of directors with comprehensive educational services to 
manage the academic and non-academic operations of the charter school. Chi and Weiner 
(2008) stated: 
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The role of EMOs (Education Management Organization) can vary widely, from 
contracting a specific service to managing the entire school (cited by author 
Buckley and Fisher 2002). By definition, such privatization detracts from the 
public nature of charter schools (see Molnar 2001 for a more complete critique). 
Notwithstanding some potential advantages to private-sector involvement - 
primarily the infusion of stronger market forces - laws (even those providing for 
public oversight) that allow even greater EMO involvement undermine the initial 
vision of charter policies as a public realm, school-choice alternative to voucher 
policies. (p. 285) 
Wilson (2005) explained how for-profit companies became a part of the charter 
schools movement:  
The last decade has witnessed a new approach to school reform of radical 
promise. New systems of public schools, overseen by a private organization and 
operating under a common “brand,” aim to move beyond the isolated success of 
individual charter schools and bring high-quality schooling to scale. Approaches 
vary, and their proponents insist on unique designations. The first branded 
operators, dubbed education management organizations (EMOs), were generally 
organized as for-profit entities that managed schools, whether charter or district, 
comprehensively. Typically they sought to impose, with varying degrees of 
prescription, a school design (including such elements as school structure, 
schedule, curriculum, instructional programs, and use of technology) on their 
clients. Education entrepreneurs saw an opportunity: Private organizations could 
help start and run public schools, free of many debilitating constraints of the 
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school district. Many organizations managed schools in their entirety, 
implementing their own curriculum, hiring the school staff, overseeing all day-to-
day operations, and assuming responsibility for academic outcomes. (p. 89)  
Wilson (2005) further explains how the business model for education 
management companies (EMOs) work:  
In addition to Edison, other major EMOs include National Heritage (with more 
than twenty thousand students), Chancellor Beacon Academies (seventeen 
thousand students) the Leona Group, K12, Mosaica Education, Charter Schools 
USA, White Hat Management, and Victory Schools. The business of education 
management organizations is to assist school boards in starting and running public 
schools. At first glance, EMOs that manage schools comprehensively all deploy 
the same business model. Each enters into management agreements with the 
boards of either individual charter schools or school districts, under which it 
assumes responsibility for running one or more schools. In exchange for these 
services, it either is paid a fixed management fee (generally between 12 and 15 
percent of the school’s revenues) or retains the surplus of each school’s revenues 
over its costs. With enough schools under management, the individual 
management fees in the aggregate will exceed the costs of running the corporate 
office, and the EMO will realize a profit. (p. 90) 
These full-service, for-profit private management companies are a new part of 
education reform with the emergence of charter schools and this means that they have 
brought with them new challenges and potential areas of conflicts. Interestingly, in many 
instances, EMOs have been contracted to manage all key aspects of school activities, 
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including curriculum design, hiring and professional development of staff, 
administration, and building management. Allen and Mintrom (2009) stated, “The rise of 
EMOs in the charter sector has served to diminish the role of traditional actors in school 
oversight, especially citizen voters who can exercise little or no voice under such 
administrative structures” (p. 458). 
There are generally two sides when it comes to the benefits and drawbacks 
concerning EMOs. According to Hannaway & Sharkey (2004), 
The management of public schools by for-profit firms elicits strong feelings and 
conflicting arguments about the possible merits and risks of such a management 
arrangement. Some reformers see EMOs (Education Management Organizations), 
as for-profit education contractors are commonly called, as a panacea that will 
free schools from deadening bureaucracy, introduce new accountability pressure, 
and bring the presumed efficiency benefits of market forces to public schools, 
especially in urban areas. Others see EMOs as profit-oriented entities that will 
sacrifice education quality for the sake of the bottom line. (p. 27)  
Much of the potential conflict involving for-profit, private management 
companies (EMOs) surround community needs versus corporate needs. This phenomenon 
is explained in the Harvard Law Review (1999): 
Education occupies a lofty position in the United States. Political and judicial 
rhetoric declare educational opportunity for all to be critical in both promoting 
individual and societal welfare. But almost as uncontested as education’s 
importance is the sense of crisis in American public education… A market 
delivery approach, which displaces government control, has even extended an 
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opportunity for-profit seeking enterprises to enter a realm traditionally occupied 
by public and nonprofit providers … This note examines companies that contract 
for full management of public schools and intend to profit by offering education 
more cost effectively than publicly administered schooling. The introduction of 
profit motives into education more sharply raises the concerns about turning 
public schooling into a product privately selected and privately delivered. 
Publicly funded for-profit ventures pose hazards distinct from those of private 
schools because for-profit ventures are paid out of general public funds, and from 
those of public charter schools because for-profit ventures are experiments of a 
larger scale. Because for-profit education companies rely on economies of scale to 
turn a profit, they propose to change the system in its entirety rather than 
accommodate individual opt outs or school by school exit innovations. (p. 695-
696)  
The Harvard Law Review’s article, “Hazards of Making Public Schooling a 
Private Business (1999),” also stated, “Private providers may not balance social and 
individual interest or serve all constituencies equally” (p.700). The article then goes onto 
explain, “Private delivery introduces several risks to that equitable ideal, and an 
additional quest for profit injects uncertainty about the provider’s commitment to 
delivering the best education possible within the constraints of tight budgets and evolving 
community standards of education” (p.704). The Harvard Law Review (1999) clearly 
identifies the inherent conflict between public schooling and corporations:  
The nature of public education may not be amenable to profit which has proven 
elusive in corporate ventures into public education. For-profit contracting 
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amplifies these risks because of its incentive and its scope. The profit motive 
makes schooling a business like any other, not a social enterprise, and elevates 
personal choice over public good. (p. 709) 
 In Michigan, the conflict potential is high according to Morley (2006). In the 
article, “For Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Cost Approach,” the 
author stated: 
More detailed observation supports the story these national statistics tell of deep 
involvement by for-profit firms. A report issued by Western Michigan University 
found that for-profit management companies in Michigan –- a state with an 
unusually high percentage of for-profit schools –- often own charter schools’ 
buildings, equipment and supplies; nominate and cultivate support for board 
members of nonprofit entities that apply for charters; and contribute startup 
capital. In fact, some management companies in Michigan refuse to contract for 
anything other than “full service” agreements that grant them total authority over 
the schools. The existence of a number of for-profit management companies 
serving only one school suggests that the line between nonprofit charter holding 
entities and their for-profit management companies is thin. (p. 1791)  
The practice of contracting comprehensive educational services places the 
advantage with the management company and makes the board of directors extremely 
vulnerable and dependent on the management company for just about everything. This 
makes it very difficult for a board to consider terminating, not renewing, negotiating, or 
even augmenting its management agreement with full-service, for-profit private 
management companies. Harvard Law Review (2009) explains,  
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This “full service agreement” often makes it difficult for boards to govern over 
areas that would be within their rights in a different arrangement, such as human 
resources, resource allocation, and other areas that the management companies 
feel falls within their jurisdiction as outlined in the contract. Disagreement about 
performance measures can prove fatal to contracts. Private providers may be 
especially nervous about basing compensation on student performance that is 
partially dependent on inputs beyond its control. (p. 704) 
 An exemplary example of potential conflict lies in the area of hiring and firing 
staff. The school principal may be terminated, removed, or demoted without any input 
from or notice to the charter school board of directors. The potential areas of conflicts 
between governing boards and for-profit private management companies can also center 
on the services provided due to the corporate mindset of these companies. Harvard Law 
Review (2009) further explained:  
Private for-profit providers introduce an additional concern because they 
invariably wrestle with a conflict of interest between shareholders and customers. 
Profits depend on the extent to which costs are lower than revenues. But revenues 
are fixed in management contracts, which are set by the school districts.  
Especially when the product is undefined, maximizing profitability may cut cost 
at the expense of student needs. (p.705)  
 The maximization of profit is a complex phenomenon within the social dynamics 
of American education. Nonetheless, as opportunists made promises to improve 
education and close gaps between classes and races, the door opened. Bennett (2008) 
explained this new transition in education:  
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Beginning in the late 1990’s, for-profit education management organizations 
(EMOs) like New York City-based Edison began expanding at what Steven F. 
Wilson, author of Learning on the Job, called a “dizzying pace.” Edison, founded 
by publishing millionaire Christopher Whittle in 1992, grew to 51 schools in just 
four years; Advantage, which Wilson started in 1997, was managing 16 charter 
schools within two years. But even that pace was not good enough, and only a 
handful of EMOs became profitable before their capital ran out and they had to 
close some of the schools they had just opened. Edison spent a disastrous two 
years as a public company and now operates 31 schools and provides 
management services to 54 district schools. Advantage was merged into Mosaica, 
which runs 35 charter schools in eight states and the District of Columbia. 
According to the National Charter School Research Project (NCSRP), the country 
now has 24 EMOs and about 30 CMOs. Most of these organizations are 
controlled from a front office and are growing slowly because their headquarters 
staff can only manage the complicated task of opening one school at a time. 
Those who thought that proven models could be rapidly scaled up have concluded 
that they underestimated the difficulty of creating substantially better schools 
from scratch,” the NCSRP report explains. The entire charter movement, once 
hailed as a vehicle for transforming education, serves less than 3 percent of the 
nation’s schoolchildren, less than the percentage that are schooled at home. (p. 
30) 
In 2013, the National Center for Education Statistics reported that the national 
average of schoolchildren attending charter schools has grown to 5.1% (2016, April). 
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Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgb.asp. Even though the 
macro-perspective of charter school growth seems marginal; the infiltration of full-
service, for-profit private management companies in the state of Michigan has been 
prolific. In Detroit, for example, more students attend charter schools than public and 
private combined.  Some concerns from critics include the trade-off of quality versus 
cost. Robertson and Dale (2013) found that:  
For-profit charter schools tended to ‘crop off’ services to students who were 
difficult to educate, thus minimizing their costs so as to maximize quality gains. 
And it is here that profit as a driving motivation (both necessary and inevitable 
when private providers are involved) will tend to override concerns for education 
quality in all of its complexity (reducing teacher salaries; staffing ratios, non-
unionized labor and so on). (p. 439-440) 
Transparency and Accountability Involving Public Tax Dollars 
Some of the primary actors in Michigan charter schools include authorizers, 
boards of directors, and full-service, for-profit private management companies. The 
dynamics of their relations significantly impacts the success or failure status of individual 
and collectively charter schools. Each actor has a critical role in the complex forums that 
determines the performance, continuation, and progression of the charter schools as the 
viable academic entities for the constituents they serve. All players are important; 
however, research indicates that the ultimate power lies with the authorizer. Their range 
of power to grant and terminate charters clearly distinguishes authorizers from the boards 
of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management companies. Management 
companies may come and go, board members may change, but for the life of most 
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charters, the authorizer is there from beginning to end. The authorizers therefore have 
tremendous responsibilities when it comes to holding the boards of directors accountable. 
In the same respect, the boards of directors have the responsibility of holding the 
management companies accountable. Sometimes the lines of accountability become 
blurred and conflicts result. Bulkley (1999) supported this position with research on the 
various types of accountability:  
Sponsors are also responsible for “holding schools accountable” –- however, what 
it means to hold a school accountable is not always clear. Three types of 
accountability are commonly used by charter school authorizers: fiscal 
accountability, which involves the proper use of public funds; compliance 
accountability where sponsors look at whether schools are in compliance with 
state and federal regulations, as well as specific procedural portions of their 
charters (e.g. are they using curriculum they said they would, are they following 
the appropriate governing board procedures); and outcome accountability, which 
emphasizes the school’s success in increasing student performance. (p.676) 
The state of Michigan is more unique than most states given the high penetration 
of full-service for-profit private management companies in charter school districts. The 
for-profit companies do wield power and influence given their level of entrenchment in 
the charter school movement. Bulkley (1999) explained, “ 
In Michigan, the traditional idea of government control and governance assurance 
of quality remains an important influence on charter school sponsors. As such, 
pressures to be legitimate in the eyes of the public and political actors have [sic.] 
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created more uncertainty in Michigan and thus pushed Michigan sponsors to 
mimic existing institutions more than Arizona sponsors. (p. 695) 
All parties in the oversight, governance, and management of charter schools 
should all be held accountable. It is sometimes unclear how this is carried out and how it 
can be addressed through legislation and policy. Even though the concept of 
accountability rings loud in public forums and written documents, it continues to be 
evasive and warrants attention, discussion, clarity and improvement. Mintrom and Vegari 
(1997) summarized it by stating, 
It is interesting to consider whether a reform intended to promote greater 
accountability may, in some ways, result in diminished accountability for the 
public dollars spent. In contrast to local school district boards, charter school 
boards are not elected. Thus, some analysts wonder whether charter school 
decision makers may prove even less accountable to the taxpaying public than 
traditional school boards. Further, as charter schools engage in varying amounts 
of contracting with private entities, questions may arise over whether given 
service providers were chosen properly. Finally in cases where public entities 
with appointed governing boards may sponsor charter schools, issues of adequate 
charter school oversight and public accountability again arise. Charter school 
advocates address such issues by noting that parents of charter school students 
will ultimately ensure accountability. However, others maintain that the 
accountability issue extends beyond the students who attend charter schools to the 
general citizenry whose tax dollars fund such schools. (p. 159) 
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Frazier (2011) elaborated on some of the issues regarding charter school 
authorizers (sponsors) and boards of directors and supported further research in an area 
that has not emphasized their roles:  
However, charter school board accountability continues to be a problem in charter 
schools in part because sponsors and boards are making up the rules as they go 
along. Since their inception in 1991, many charter schools have closed due to 
administrative and fiscal oversights (Center for Education Reform, 2002). These 
oversights have focused attention on the capacity of charter school boards to 
successfully govern their schools. This focus is important because boards have 
been generally overlooked in charter school research. (p. 1) 
Inherent Role Conflicts  
 
Graham (2004) explains the inherent conflict when it comes to management 
companies and accountability. He stated,  
Some people and politicians alike would like to create a smokescreen to hide the 
fact that they are not providing resources, financial or otherwise, to predominantly 
urban, minority and low achieving school districts. Any meaningful discussion of 
this endemic problem must be couched and wrapped in language of competition, 
academic achievement, and accountability. (p. 1)  
Frazier (2011) supported this by stating,  
Public school boards receive considerable attention from diverse stakeholders 
such as the general public and elected officials. However, charter school boards 
have remained out of the limelight even though the number of charter schools in 
the nation has significantly increased since 1991. The lack of substantive 
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information about charter schools’ boards of directors contributes to the 
ambiguity surrounding charter schools and has raised questions about 
accountability. (p.3) 
Typical management company contracts contain management fees, which are 
normally based on a percentage of aggregate state per pupil funding ranging from 5% to 
amounts above 10%. Other provisions may allow the full-service, for-profit private 
management company to retain fund balances or obtain sub fees from managing grant-
related financial and in-kind resources. Some of the EMOs require a percentage of 
vending and fundraising because the revenues fall under their financial management. The 
role of the governing body becomes ambiguous, if not compromised, with unavoidable 
inherent conflict as the power and control of the for-profit private management company 
increases. The relationship is also fraught with potential minefields as the volunteer spirit 
upon which the board was formed conflicts with the entrepreneurial premise for which 
the for-profit private management company exists: to make a profit.  Conn (2002) 
elaborated: 
In the euphoria of “solving” America’s educational woes, a basic inconsistency in 
the notion of private, for-profit corporations controlling public education escaped 
serious consideration. Private corporations are legal entities established within a 
paradigm of maximization of profits. For those who provide the working capital 
of the organization: the shareholders. The directors of such organizations owe 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the shareholders. They owe, under the law, 
no concomitant duties to other constituencies. (p.129) 
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Issues regarding accountability and transparency surface as boards try to enforce 
their governance responsibilities, while some management companies try to legally 
provide as little information as possible. Sometimes for-profit private management 
companies say they do not have to provide information because they are private 
companies. Dixon (2014b) explained in her article entitled, “Charter School Board 
Members Found Themselves Powerless,” that at a board meeting there was discussion 
about the amount of the EMO’s management fee: 
A representative of the EMO clarified that the entire amount received by the 
management company was the management fee according to the contract and that 
there was no separate line item for a “management fee.” He stated that he would 
not disclose a specific dollar amount for management fees. The appropriateness of 
this position was questioned since public money was involved. The EMO 
representative stated that the public dollars became private when they were 
received by the EMO. He further indicated that because the EMO is a private 
company; the information needs not be disclosed. (p. 2) 
 This area of conflict between public interests versus corporate interests, which 
presents itself in discussions over transparency in decision-making and profitability are 
exacerbated by the role of the authorizer. Wilson (2005) explained:  
Entering into management contracts with local school boards, whether district or 
charter, proved more often a hindrance than an efficient means of running schools 
and systematically implementing an educational program. The school’s board 
remains a legally separate entity from the management company and retains by 
statute ultimate oversight over all aspects of the school. In many cases, school 
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staff are required to be public employees of their charter school or district. This 
structure gives rise to enormous problems. The organization, its client board, and 
the school director vie for control over the school. When the school’s board lays 
claim to the school as truly its own, the law is in its favor…The organizations 
naturally seek as much authority as possible to ensure that they can generate 
financial and academic results and protect their financial investment. Even when a 
local board was willing to delegate much of its day-to-day management to the 
education contractor, state regulators and charter authorizers often prevented it 
from doing so. Authorizers took the position that boards could not delegate 
powers assigned to them by the charter statute to contractors. (p. 100)  
Two types of management services generally offered include non-profit charter 
management organizations and educational management organizations (EMO), which are 
for-profit corporations. As stated earlier, the EMOs dominate the educational service 
provider market in Michigan. Lacireno-Paquet (2005) explained, “And although these 
differences in charter school type are beginning to be explored, some have voiced 
concern that for schools associated with EMOs the profit motive might become the 
primary focus, with quality and equity lost by the wayside” (p. 81).  Wood (2013) further 
elaborated,  
EMO opponents are also concerned about cost. They worry that the same 
incentives compelling EMOs to operate schools more efficiently might cause 
EMOs to sacrifice quality and effectiveness. Opponents assert that the cost-
minimizing incentive will leave EMOs to cut spending in ways harmful to student 
achievement. (p.4)  
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All of these dynamics result in many areas of conflict beyond the public and 
corporate interests. Wilson (2005) further explained:  
With such a muddled chain of command, it was probably inevitable that some 
boards and EMOs would fight, from the earliest days of their marriage, over the 
most basic components of the new schools. Where should the school be housed, 
and at what cost? What instructional programs should be used? Who should lead 
the school? Once the school was launched, new opportunities for conflict arose, 
often more personal and bitter. One common area of conflict was the hiring of 
school staff and the letting of contracts. Education management organizations 
knew charter authorizers wanted to see “community members” on the boards of 
charter schools they approved, so EMO staff recruited –- often with little 
diligence –- parent activists, local church leaders, and their friends and colleagues 
to serve on the new boards. Many such trustees were well intentioned but 
unsophisticated when it came to their ethical responsibilities as public fiduciaries. 
Some saw nothing wrong with lobbying the principal to hire a friend or decreeing 
that a male kindergarten teacher could not be hired.  
When tensions arose between the board and the management, the board 
naturally sought to enlist the principal to its side. It took courage to defy trustees 
who were in and out of the school every day, disparaging the management 
company, and telling you what to do. Soon enough the relationship between all 
three parties running the school –- board, EMO, and principal –- all deteriorated. 
Avoiding conflict with his customer boards was the “single biggest problem 
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we’ve had,” Mosaica’s chief executive officer, Michael Connelly, reports. Other 
CEOs say the same.  
Some boards threatened to terminate their management contracts when the 
relationship deteriorated or the school struggled to live up to its promises. If state 
officials were unwilling to hold trustees of charter schools to their contracts, the 
only alternative for EMOs was to litigate. Most found this option unattractive. 
Entering such a public fight could prove to be a public relations’ nightmare. Faced 
with these options, most EMOs chose to do everything possible to maintain their 
engagement with the school. With the contract on the line, they often agreed to 
renegotiate, resulting in a lower fee, elimination of contract renewals provisions, 
lost of supervisory authority over school personnel, reduction in responsibilities, 
and shortened contract terms. (p. 100) 
Maximizing Profitability: For-Profit Versus Non-Profit Models   
 
Kohn (2002) explained this difficult relationship in the following excerpt:  
In the final analysis, the problem with letting business interests shape our 
country’s agenda for education isn’t just the executives’ lack of knowledge about 
the nuances of pedagogy. The problem is with their ultimate objectives. 
Corporations in our economic system exist to provide a financial return to the 
people who own them: they are in business to make a profit. As individuals, those 
who work in (or even run) these companies might have other goals, too, when 
they turn their attention to public policy or education or anything else. But 
business qua business is concerned principally about its own bottom line. Thus, 
when business thinks about schools, its agenda is driven by what will maximize 
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its profitability, not necessarily by what is in the best interest of students. Any 
overlap in those two goals would be purely accidental –- and in practice, turns out 
to be minimal. What maximizes corporate profits often does not benefit children 
and vice versa. (p. 118) 
With all of these areas of conflict, the question arises as to the reason that these 
companies are able to survive and flourish. Morley (2006) explained:  
Given that monitoring costs in for-profit charters are so high, it seems strange that 
any parents, agencies, or donors would prefer for-profits. Since nonprofits control 
agency costs more efficiently than for-profits do, why do for-profits exist at all? 
The answer lies in for-profit schools’ superior ability to raise capital and to 
exploit economies of scale.  
There is ample evidence to suggest that most for-profit charters schools 
operate at a larger scale than nonprofits do. Scale in schools can be measured both 
in individual school size and in school network size. For-profit schools’ ability to 
run large networks stems largely from their superior access to capital, the most 
essential ingredient in economies of scale. There are many potential economies of 
scale in education, both on the individual and network levels. Large individual 
schools experience economies of scale because they can spread fix costs –- such 
as football fields, administrators, libraries, classrooms, driver’s education practice 
ranges, and cafeteria equipment –- across many students. They accomplish this by 
using these resources intensely.  
Large schools may also allow more subject specialization among teachers. 
Large school networks experience similar economies of scale. For example, they 
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allow managers to centralize decision-making, eliminating the need for each 
school’s principal to invest time into becoming fully informed and weighing the 
options for every decision facing the school.  
Networks can also centralize data collection, reporting, and accounting, 
which may become major burdens for small schools. Additionally, networked 
schools can centralize purchasing, perhaps obtaining volume discounts from 
suppliers.  
Finally, large networks diversify risk and provide additional security for 
creditors. There is undoubtedly a tension between the efficiencies gained from 
scale and the harmful effects of large schools on achievement. Large classrooms 
or perhaps even large schools arguably hurt achievement. Indeed, one of the more 
subtle goals of charter policy is to reduce school size. How for-profit schools 
balance this concern against the disadvantages of school is not clear. It appears, 
however, that the benefits of scale are sufficiently large to create spots for at least 
a significant minority of for-profit schools. (p. 1081) 
Morley’s excerpt illustrated why the potential for conflict is so high in the state of 
Michigan. The majority of the states have an inversed ratio, with non-profit companies 
dominating their charter schools’ management. Since for-profit companies dominate the 
Michigan educational landscape, there is a greater need to address these areas that could 
lead to conflicts between these corporate entities and the public that the school boards 
serve.  
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The Challenge of Transparency with Public Tax Dollars 
  
In addition to issues including governance and the financial management by for-
profit private management companies, important areas of conflicts exposed in Dixon’s 
(2014a) article in the Detroit Free Press were around accountability and transparency 
with the use of public tax dollars. The issues surrounding the use of public tax dollars in 
the charter world is under major scrutiny. Transparency and accountability become 
confusing when it is not clear who is in control of financial planning, monitoring and 
reporting. The boards of directors’ roles become more ambiguous as for-profit 
management companies are hired to manage all aspects of the public school academy 
including operations, curriculum, hiring, recruitment, finances, and budgets. 
As we proceed into the third decade of charter school reform we see trends that 
are both negative and positive. Positive trends reveal evidence of creativity and autonomy 
that was hoped for in the beginning of the movement. However, just as there have been 
some successes, critics provide evidence that many charters are not producing any better 
results than traditional public schools. Some charters are being closed based on the 
legislation metrics of academic performance such as No Child Left Behind and school 
rankings from Race to the Top legislation. The complexity has been magnified, especially 
in Michigan as it boasts the greatest penetration and number of full-service, for-profit 
private management companies; more than any other state in the country. The high 
penetration of for-profit management companies complicates the dynamics of the 
Michigan Education landscape given its already historic challenges related to economics, 
urban decline, funding, union battles, and the inability to diminish poverty. On the 
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contrary, growing concerns have germinated around transparency, accountability, and the 
effective monitoring and ethical management of taxpayers’ dollars.  
Toch (2010) explained these issues and how they are more complex with the 
involvement of for-profit companies: 
Charter schools have brought many talented people to the cause of public school 
improvement. This new generation of social entrepreneurs includes Ivy League 
graduates and Rhodes Scholars committed to helping the disadvantaged and 
drawn to public schooling by the independence offered charter schools. The 
charter movement has also attracted bad actors more [sic.] interested in enriching 
themselves than students. There [sic.] are stories of educational failure and 
financial malfeasance in charter schools just as unscrupulous trade schools fed off 
the federal financial aid system for years. But accountability remains weak in a 
number of states, and the charter world remains deeply divided over whether the 
locus of accountability should rest with consumers or regulators. (p. 70) 
This need for accountability is hampered by a lack of resources dedicated to 
charter school oversight. As Morley (2006) explained:  
Government monitoring has also been hampered by a wide range of failings that; 
though not inherent in charter theory, arise frequently in practice. For example, 
charter schools and government agencies are often uncertain about the scope of 
the government’s monitoring authority. The most recent study of the Public 
Charter School Program found that charter school legislation in the states has 
provided virtually no guidance on how authorizers should approach the 
accountability processes. Monitoring agencies also frequently lack adequate 
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resources. In fact, most monitoring bodies have no staff specifically devoted to 
charter school issues at all. The symptoms of this problem have included limited 
communication between agencies, poor information gathering, and in some states, 
the failure of any agency to take responsibility for assessing charter school 
performance. What few resources agencies devote to charter schools may have 
limited effect because charter schools often fail to set clear and measurable goals 
for themselves. (p. 1081) 
In the Annenberg Institute for Charter School Reform report (2014) entitled, 
“Public Accountability for Charter Schools,” they explained that there is an inherent lack 
of transparency in charter school governance: 
Charter schools, authorizers, and management organizations are sometimes 
exempted from transparency and public accountability regulations that other 
publicly funded institutions must adhere to. Lack of transparency has been a 
significant challenge for authorizers as well as parents and policymakers and 
opens the door to malfeasance (p.5).  
Resnick (2010) contended that, “The public wants their voices heard inside the 
schoolhouse wall. They want to know that their tax dollars are being spent effectively and 
responsibly.” He also explained that accountability does not only revolve around 
financial matters. “Increasingly, local school boards are charged with ensuring that 
broader state and federal education requirements are met while translating local values 
and priorities into policies to meet the goal and aspirations of parents, taxpayers, and 
local businesses. By engaging their communities, school boards create a culture that 
supports schools in their main mission: raising student achievement” (p. 11). 
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Resnick (2010) made it clear along with the Detroit Free Press investigation, that 
the lack of accountability and transparency in charter schools is a primary source for 
oversight and governance conflicts. The unique quality with this category of conflicts is 
that all three actors (charter school boards of directors; full-service, for-profit 
management companies; and authorizers) previously mentioned contribute to the 
concerns of transparency and accountability. According to the Annenberg Institute on 
Charter School Reform (2014), management contracts are a source for issues around 
accountability and transparency:  
Many of the most significant concerns around governance and transparency relate 
to external charter management companies. Nearly every state allows charter 
school governing boards to subcontract with a non-profit charter management 
organization (CMO) or a for-profit management organization (EMO) for virtually 
every facet of school management. Some of these EMO/CMOs have steadfastly 
refused to open their financial books to the public, even though they are receiving 
– or are nearly wholly supported by public funds. (p. 6) 
In the relationship between all three actors, the authorizer has the main task of 
providing oversight and accountability. The Annenberg Institute on Charter School 
Reform (2014), further explained that this is often a challenge:  
In most states, charter authorizers are tasked not just with granting charters, but 
with providing oversight and technical assistance to schools that they authorize, 
ensuring that each school is in compliance with state and federal law as well as 
with its individual charter agreements. The rapid expansion of the charter sector 
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has left authorizers in many states woefully understaffed and unable to 
appropriately monitor the schools they have chartered. (p. 12) 
In conclusion, all of these areas of conflict, which culminate in the requirements 
for greater accountability and transparency, lead to a reason to review and perhaps revise 
the charter school laws. The Annenberg Institute on Charter School Reform (2014) 
makes this recommendation:   
Most state charter school laws were written in the 1990s, when the charter schools 
were expected to only be a small component of state systems of public education. 
There was little concern that ineffective or unethical charter operators would use 
schools as nightclubs, or that for-profit corporations would buy up property and 
lease it back to schools at a substantial profit. Regrettably, the exponential growth 
of the charter industry over the last twenty years has not coincided with increased 
oversight. It is time to revisit state charter laws to monitor and ensure the 
appropriate and effective use of public dollars. (p.12) 
Charter School Autonomy and Accountability 
 
Barghaus and Boe (2011) explained that there is a trade-off with charter schools 
being able to have greater autonomy:  
Charter schools fundamentally represent a trade-off--- greater autonomy for 
increased accountability (Finnigan 2007). Curiously, 72 percent of states with 
charter school legislation specify more accountability as an objective, while only 
27 percent of such states specify increased autonomy (Smarick 2005). (p. 78)  
Autonomy and accountability are essential to improving education. Legitimacy 
has still not been achieved for charter schools; it is currently in a state of mixed reviews. 
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But the goal must still be pursued given the high level of importance of public education 
and what it means for the future for the state of Michigan and the country. The National 
Conference of State Legislature (2015) explains in their website article entitled, “Charter 
Schools in the State,” the important role that policy and legislation have in ensuring the 
quality of these organizations:  
Charter schools are publicly funded, privately managed and semi-autonomous 
schools of choice. They do not charge tuition. They must hold to the same 
academic accountability measures as traditional schools. They receive public 
funding similarly to traditional schools. However, they have more freedom over 
their budgets, staffing, curricula and other operations. In exchange for this 
freedom, they must deliver academic results and there must be enough community 
demand for them to remain open. 
The number of charter schools has continued to grow since the first charter 
law was passed in Minnesota in 1991. Some have delivered great academic 
results, but others have closed because they did not deliver on promised results. 
Because state laws enable and govern charter schools, state legislatures are 
important to ensuring their quality. (“Charter Schools In the State,” 2015) 
Conclusion  
Charter schools have become entrenched into the fabric of American education. 
For the foreseeable future, charters are here to stay.  Once their permanence is accepted, 
we can hopefully move forward with authentically pursuing better education for the 
masses including those in less wealthy districts. We have a very long way to go and the 
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areas to start with include better governance, authorization, and management. The actors 
who directly impact the regulation and delivery of education to children must not only 
create, but also promote collaborative policies, legislation, and laws. Michigan has a 
unique challenge in the charter realm given the high penetration of full-service, for-profit 
private management companies. The challenge is elevated because of the volunteer spirit 
of board governance and the profit mission of for-profit management companies. Making 
a profit is not a bad thing; however, it has not historically been the basis of American 
education. It does become a problem when issues surface regarding accountability, 
transparency, financial management, exorbitant charges, and lopsided contracts that favor 
the management company.  
Charter schools will hopefully revisit their reasons of origin. Graham (2004) 
states,  
Charter schools by their very design embody many of the qualities that 
lawmakers, parents, and concerned citizens are desperately searching for in a 
reform and governance model. They were created to improve student 
achievement, provide accountability, and provide expanded choice which was a 
missing ingredient in public schools (p.5).” Frazier (2011) explained, “Charter 
schools’ boards are accountable to stakeholders and the general public who 
entrust public education and public dollars to charter schools. (p. 4) 
Frazier (2011) contributes to the research study by providing recommendations 
for future research regarding governance:  
Perhaps the most needed recommendation for future research is that policymakers 
take a closer look at the lack of information about charter school boards, and 
begin collecting and analyzing data about charter school board members, their 
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roles, responsibilities and practices to identify successes and opportunities for 
improvement. There is not much evidence that charter school boards are operating 
well, and they may need to develop additional or improve their governance skills. 
Hence, policymakers should also look at providing opportunities for mandatory 
board development activities around leadership, communication, and 
administrative and fiscal management. (p. 82-83) 
This need for more information about charter school boards of directors and 
identifying factors that will lead to their improvement have lead to exploration of what 
prevents effective governance as it relates to the relationship with full-service, for-profit 
private management companies with a focus on improving accountability and 
transparency. The charter school experiment was designed to provide autonomous 
creativity and innovation, but something has gone awry and conflicts have infiltrated the 
pursuit of education excellence, thus far preventing Michigan and our country from 
providing education equality for all children. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
The research questions of the study emanate from the general topic of charter 
school leadership and governance. Specifically, investigating the consequences of charter 
school boards of directors contracting with full-service, for-profit private management 
companies in the state of Michigan. The study focuses on obtaining the perspectives of 
charter school board members in regard to role conflicts created by overlapping 
governance with full-service, for-profit private management companies and how such 
conflicts may be at least mitigated if not eliminated.  
Research Questions  
The three questions of the research study are specific to charter school governance 
and the role conflicts that occur between charter school boards of directors and the full-
service for-profit private management companies. These management companies are 
selected by the charter school boards of directors to comprehensively manage the 
operations of the school. The questions include the following:  
1.  Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of 
directors and full-service for-profit management companies contribute to conflict 
in governance? 
2. Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose 
boards of directors contract with for-profit management companies contribute to 
governance conflict, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute to 
conflict in governance?  
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3. Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan 
charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service for-profit private 
management companies?  
Methodology 
 
The proposed research is a mixed methodology approach incorporating 
quantitative and qualitative designs. The results from the mixed methodology were cross-
analyzed for statistical inferences and the identification of common themes. According to 
Creswell (2014), 
The key assumption of this approach is that both, qualitative and quantitative data 
provide different types of information-often detailed views of participants 
qualitatively and scores on instruments quantitatively-and together they yield 
results that should be the same. It builds off the historic concept of multi-method, 
multi-trait idea from Campbell and Fiske (1959); who felt that a psychological 
trait could be best understood by gathering different forms of data. Although the 
Campbell and Fiske conceptualization included only quantitative data, the mixed 
methods researchers extended the idea to include the collection of both 
quantitative and qualitative data. (p.219)  
This dual approach enabled the capturing of experienced board members’ perspectives 
with quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews. 
Research Design and Instruments 
 
The research design from a quantitative perspective was explored and compared 
elements regarding the participants’ responses to survey questions. This survey 
instrument captured experienced board members’ perspectives on leadership roles and the 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	   56	  
resulting conflicts regarding the governance of charter schools based on their individual 
experiences. (See Appendix A for the survey instrument.) The distribution of surveys 
targeted 40 to 50 respondents of charter school board members who contracted with full-
service, for-profit private management companies for comprehensive management 
services. The boards were purposely selected to have cross-representation from contracts 
with different management companies and different authorizers.  
Creswell (2014) explained, “A survey design provides a quantitative or numeric 
description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that 
population. From sample results, the researcher generalizes or draws inferences to the 
population” (p. 155). The research design from a quantitative perspective included both 
hard copy surveys for board members who hold an executive position, such as president 
or vice president, to distribute and collect from their fellow members, and electronic 
surveys were sent to eligible board members with permission from their board officers. 
The participants received survey questions divided into specific categories based on the 
guiding research questions: Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter 
school boards of directors and full-service, for-profit private management companies 
contribute to conflicts in governance? Assuming that parallel governance systems created 
in charter schools whose boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private 
management companies contribute to governance conflicts what are the factors in the 
relationship that contribute to conflicts in governance? Finally, are accountability and 
transparency of public funds affected when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors 
contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies?  
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The research design from a qualitative perspective included in-depth interviews 
that provided inquiry to the perspectives of experienced charter school board members 
(preferably with a minimum of ten years board experience) with various roles of 
leadership appointments. As part of this process, seven participants were purposely 
selected to capture their responses to research questions regarding experiences of 
contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The interview 
candidates served as board members with at least five years and preferably ten to fifteen 
years of experience as members of various charter school boards of directors. A series of 
open-ended questions were utilized to engage the participants and allow subjective 
detailed responses. (See Appendix B for the list of interview questions.) Each interview 
respondent was taped with an audio recorder. The tapes were transcribed and 
electronically saved. Bloomberg and Volpe (2016) explained,  
Qualitative research is suited to promoting a deep understanding of a social 
setting or activity as viewed from the perspective of the research participants. 
This approach implies an emphasis on exploration, discovery, and description. 
Quantitative research studies cause-effect phenomenon. Both research approaches 
involve complex processes in which particular data collection and data analysis 
methods assume meaning and significance in relation to the assumptions 
underlying the larger intellectual traditions within which these methods are 
applied. (p.38) 
Part of the qualitative portion included exploration and comparative analysis of 
contracts between charter schools and their selected full-service, for-profit private 
management companies. Five contracts were selected for analysis. Each contract was 
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unique to a board of directors and their contracted full-service, for-profit private 
management company. The contracts were analyzed for patterns of content, terms, and 
conditions that potentially caused overlap and conflicts during the life of the agreement. 
The analysis of contracts assisted with providing insight to the disposition of the 
contractual parties and if it caused overlap and conflicts from the start of the agreement 
between the boards of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management 
companies.    
The results from the mixed methodology approach enabled a cross-reference of 
findings gathered from three separate methods of data gathering; survey questionnaires, 
interviews, and contract analysis. 
Sample Size and Composition  
 
The perspectives of board members were obtained from a survey questionnaire 
provided directly to active and former board members who met the candidate criteria. A 
sample size of forty to fifty board members was targeted for charter schools working with 
full-service, for-profit private management companies (EMOs). The definition of 
acceptable candidates for both populations (1 and 2 as defined below) were individuals 
who served on a charter school board, either currently or within the last five years: survey 
candidates for a minimum of one or more years and interview candidates for a minimum 
period of five years (preferably ten to fifteen years). Candidates were also required to 
have contracted with a full-service, for-profit private management company operating in 
the state of Michigan.  
Population 1 is composed of survey participants whose charter school boards 
contracted with an EMO for comprehensive management services. The sample size and 
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composition of the perception survey candidates were as follows: forty to fifty completed 
surveys from board members preferably with at least one or more years of appointed 
service regardless of their role on the board, gender, race, and ethnicity; and regardless of 
geographic boundaries (urban, suburban, and rural).  
Population 2 was defined as interview participants who met the criteria for 
eligible charter school board members and contracted with an EMO for comprehensive 
management services. A total of seven interviews were conducted to obtain their 
subjective governance experiences and perceptions in regards to both contracting and 
working with EMOs. These board members preferably had at least five years (preferably 
ten to fifteen years) of appointed service regardless of their role on the board, gender, 
race, and ethnicity; and regardless of geographic boundaries (urban, suburban, and rural). 
Proposed Analysis of Data 
 
An analysis was done through comparing the findings of the survey responses. 
The surveys were formatted in a Likert Scale providing numerical statistical 
representations of the perspectives of the various board members who contracted with 
EMOs. The statistical results provided quantitative metrics with a given rating for each 
survey question.  
Respondents were provided their responses on two Likert Scales, part one with 
ranges of responsibility polarized by full-service, for-profit private management 
companies’ responsibility (Option 1) to the boards of directors’ responsibility (Option 5): 
1 – Management companies’ responsibility 
2 - Mostly the management companies’ responsibility and some of the boards of 
directors 
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3 – Share responsibility equally between the management companies and the 
boards of directors 
4 – Mostly the boards of directors’ responsibility and some of the management 
companies 
5 – The boards of directors’ responsibility 
And part two, a Likert Scale ranging from 1 to 5 with the following designations: 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Disagree 
3 – Neutral 
4 – Agree 
5 – Strongly Agree 
 
The results were aggregated to determine the quantitative ratings per question and 
aggregated for each participant and as a group. The data gathered from the qualitative 
interviews was transcribed, analyzed, and decoded to search for threads of common 
themes. The survey results and interview findings were cross-referenced and analyzed for 
patterns, commonalities, and themes.  
Measures to Ensure Safety, Confidentiality, and Anonymity for Human Subjects 
The quantitative surveys were sent directly to board presidents to facilitate with 
their members. If the routine board meeting schedule for the charter schools participating 
was timely, then the time frames were leveraged accordingly. The board presidents (or 
designees) were asked to disseminate the surveys to each of their fellow board members.   
The returned anonymous surveys were numbered, coded, and secured.  
In terms of the qualitative interviews, the participants were asked where they were 
most comfortable meeting to which accommodations were made accordingly. The 
interviews were recorded via an audio device and later transcribed. Notes and their 
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recordings were electronically stored in a laptop with a pass code for access. (See 
Appendix C and D for the IRB Letter of Approval and for Human Subjects Review 
Board (CITI) training and certification) 
Timeline 
The following timeline illustrated the cadence of research activities:  
Step 1: Submit appropriate information and documentation to the Human Subjects 
Review Committee for their review and approval.  
Step 2: Implement a query of the research instruments, quantitative surveys, and 
qualitative questions with a selected board for testing. 
Step 3: Upon the Human Research Review Committee’s approval, contact the 
board presidents of the sample charter schools to ask if they are willing to 
participate in a study on board leadership and governance. 
Step 4:  Identify and contact potential candidates for qualitative interviews.   
Step 5: Distribute surveys to board presidents with directions to implement 
surveys and later collect for pick up.  
Step 6:  Conduct qualitative interviews.  
Step 7: Synthesize data for analysis.  
Step 8: Draw conclusions of the collected data from both surveys and interviews. 
Decode interviews and search for common themes within the data.  
Step 9: Cross analyzing (triangulation) of the results from all methods of research 
and data collection.  
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Summary 
 
Chapter 3 provided the cadence for the research design and methodology to 
explore the phenomenon around governance conflicts when charter school boards of 
directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies in the state 
of Michigan. The research was a mixed methodology inclusive of quantitative and 
qualitative designs. The dual approach was selected to provide a wealth of findings to 
subsequently enable data convergence and triangulation. A general contract analysis was 
also implemented to provide insight for the development of survey questions and 
interview questions. Subsequently, a more in-depth contract analysis was completed to 
provide qualitative data around the similarities and differences of contract agreements 
and its implications on the relationship between the charter schools' boards of directors 
and the chosen for-profit management company. The findings provided an opportunity 
for analysis and set the stage for conclusions presented in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Data 
 
Introduction 
 
Three questions provided the framework for this mixed methodology study and 
were specific to charter school governance in the state of Michigan and the role conflicts 
that often occur between charter school boards of directors and the full-service, for-profit 
private management companies selected to comprehensively manage the operations of 
their school. The three research questions that guided this examination were as follows:  
1.) Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of 
directors and full service, for-profit management companies contribute to conflict 
in governance? 
2.) Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose 
boards of directors contract with for-profit management companies contribute to 
governance conflict, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute to 
conflict in governance? 
3.) Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan 
charter schools boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit 
management companies? 
The data is first presented in a quantitative format followed by an illustration of 
data findings with a subsequent analysis. The second part of the data presentation is a 
qualitative format inclusive of summaries of transcripts from interview participants and 
codification of data to generate patterns and themes for subsequent analysis. The 
quantitative and qualitative analysis was converged and triangulated with the data from 
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an analysis of contracts between charter school boards of directors and for-profit private 
management companies.  
Quantitative Methodology  
 
The quantitative surveys were obtained in two ways. First, board presidents were 
provided with hard copy surveys to distribute to their board members who met the 
criterion of having served on a charter school board for at least one to two years. In some 
instances, the researcher attended board meetings to clarify the research requests and 
respond to participants’ questions. Secondly, an electronic version of the survey was 
provided with a link that enabled board presidents and their members to access, 
participate, and submit their responses at their convenience. The survey is comprised of 
two parts both in Likert Scales; Part 1 contained twelve questions seeking to obtain the 
charter school board respondents perspective as to whether the board of directors or the 
for-profit management company is responsible for certain duties related to the operations 
of charter schools. Part 2 contained four questions which gauges the board respondents’ 
level of agreement or disagreement to questions regarding the impact of managing state 
funds, accountability, transparency, and the boards’ understanding of their contract with 
for-profit private management companies.  
The goal for the number of survey responses was 40, which was exceeded by 15 
for a total of 55 surveys responses. Of those 55 surveys that were submitted, 48 were 
complete and 7 were incomplete. The total number of surveys sent out to eligible board 
members was 130 with 48 completed, which resulted in a completed response rate of 
37% for the quantitative research. 
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Qualitative Methodology 
 
The rationale for using the qualitative design included purposefully selected 
participants from a pool of potential candidates based on the criterion of having fifteen 
years of experience of contracting with a full-service, for-profit private management 
company; in addition, the potential participants will have served most of their time in key 
board member positions such as president, vice-president, or treasurer. The participants 
were selected from the pool of candidates who were recommended by various sources. 
The researcher knew three of the participants by professional affiliations and some 
authorizers and management companies recommended others. The researcher also 
wanted to consciously mix the boards, management companies, and authorizers in order 
to have a wide span of different experiences.  
Contacting potential interview candidates based on specified criteria facilitated 
the qualitative interviews. Candidates were selected based on the following criteria: 
having charter school board experience; contracting with a for-profit private management 
company; having served in significant board positions such as president, vice president, 
and treasurer; and having a minimum of five years, and preferably ten to fifteen years of 
service, as a charter school board member. Table 2 illustrates the board member 
participants’ profiles that met the candidate criteria and includes their gender, race, years 
on the board, and profession.  
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Table 2 
Demographics of Charter School Board Members Participation in the Qualitative 
Interviews 
Participant Gender Race Years on 
Board 
Profession 
Participant A Male African American 17 Manager MIS 
Participant B Male African American 18 Finance Director 
Participant C Female White 13 Health Care 
Participant D Female African American 6 Retired 
Participant E Female African American 13 Medical Research 
Participant F Male White 19 Lawyer 
Participant G Male White 12 Entrepreneur 
Years on Board  Mean: 14 Median: 13    Mode: 13     Range: 13 
The qualitative interview subjects consisted of a demographic mix of charter 
school board member participants who had an average of 14 years of experience serving 
on a charter school board in the state of Michigan. The least number of years of 
experience was six and the most years of experience was 19. The group consisted of four 
males and three females and consisted of four African Americans and three White 
participants. The group also represented varied professional and education profiles.  
 The researcher analyzed the interview responses by identifying common phrases 
that appeared frequently in the individual respondent’s transcripts. Descriptors is the term 
used in the study to describe words and phrases that were frequently found in the 
transcripts and were a common topic of discussion, even if they were not explicitly 
stated. These identified descriptors were indexed and then compared in order to 
determine summative common themes among all of the interviews.  
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Supplemental Comparative Contractual Analysis  
 The contractual analysis explored five contracts between charter school boards of 
directors and for-profit private management companies. The contracts were analyzed to 
provide data on possible patterns related to content, terms, obligations, and conditions 
that may potentially cause role confusion and conflict between the two parties during the 
life of the agreement.  
 The results from the three methodologies enables a triangulation of data to 
supplement findings and strengthen the analysis of potential role confusion and conflicts 
as it relates to charter school boards of directors contracting with for-profit private 
management companies. 
Quantitative Findings: Analysis of Part 1 Survey Questions  
The quantitative findings that came from the results of the survey responses are as 
follows and are organized by their alignment to one of the three research questions. The 
survey questions will not be sequential; however, they are a part of the item analysis with 
the survey questions in part one germane to the three research questions. Survey 
Questions 1, 3, 4, 7 and 11 relate to Research Question 1. Survey Questions 5, 8, 9, and 
10 relate to Research Question 2. Survey Questions 2, 6, and 12 relate to Research 
Question 3. The analysis of part two of the survey is organized in the same manner.  
Research Question 1: Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter 
school boards of directors and full-service for-profit management companies 
contribute to conflict in governance? 
Part 1 Survey Question 1: The responsibility for hiring key personnel such as, 
superintendent, principals and teachers should be…  
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Figure 2. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 1.  
As the results of each group are shown in Figure 2, nearly 40% of the board 
members responded that hiring school personnel is the responsibility of the management 
company, while 29% responded that it is mostly the management company’s 
responsibility. Nearly one quarter of the respondents believed that the responsibility is 
equally shared, and a little over 10% responded that it is mostly or all of the board of 
director’s responsibility.  
There is clearly role confusion as to who has the responsibility for this function. 
This is a potential source of conflict because more than half of the board respondents did 
not think that the management company had sole responsibility for hiring school staff. 
Other responses ranged from the board having sole responsibility for hiring to the 
responsibility being equally shared with the management company. These findings are 
contrary to the contract analysis, which clearly states that the management company has 
complete responsibility for the employment of personnel working at the school and for all 
human resource functions.  
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Part 1 Survey Question 3: The responsibility for managing the day-to-day 
operations of the school should be… 
Figure 3. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 3.  
Although nearly three quarters of the respondents indicated that it is the 
management company’s responsibility to manage the day-to-day operations of the charter 
school, nearly 30% think the responsibility for the day-to-day should be shared to some 
degree with the board of directors. (See Figure 3)  
The responsibility for managing the day-to-day operations of the school is a 
source of role confusion given that more than a quarter of the board respondents chose 
survey options that indicate a level of management responsibility other than solely the 
management company. This is a source of conflict because consensus is not reached for 
what entity is responsible for the day-to-day operations. Although board governance 
contractually does not include managing daily operations, some board members still 
indicated that managing the day-to-day operations is solely the responsibility of the board 
of directors. The daily operations is not typically in the realm of responsibility for charter 
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boards who have chosen to contract with full-service, for-profit private management 
companies and is contrary to the rationale of hiring such services.  
Part 1 Survey question 4: The responsibility for awarding contracts should be… 
Figure 4. Percentage of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 4.  
As shown in Figure 4, approximately 37% of board respondents indicated that the 
responsibility of awarding contracts should solely rest with the board of directors. 
Exactly one-third, however, responded that it should be a shared responsibility between 
the board of directors and the management company. A minimal percent of respondents 
(2%) agreed that awarding contracts should be solely the responsibility of the 
management company.  
The previous data indicated that there is not consensus on what entity should 
award contracts for various services required by the school. Also, exactly one-third of the 
survey respondents selected the option that awarding contracts should be a shared 
responsibility between the boards of directors and the for-profit private management 
companies. The lack of consensus and commensurate spread of responses indicates a 
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presence of confusion and resulting propensity for conflicts. Awarding contracts to 
vendors and suppliers is an important component to operating a successful charter school 
program. The systems for awarding contracts may yield returns, positive or negative, 
based on the processes implemented and how procedurally the board of directors and the 
management company are involved. It needs to be clear to all stakeholders who is 
responsible for awarding contracts or if there is a range to where the management can 
handle smaller contracts and at what dollar amount the board has responsibility. It is also 
important for the contractors to know to whom they are accountable. Any confusion in 
this critical area to the charter school’s operations may generate conflicts between the 
board of directors and the for-profit management company in addition to the conflict 
implicated with the vendors and suppliers that awarded the contracts from the charter 
schools. 
Part 1 Survey Question 7: The responsibility for determining curriculum and academic 
programs should be… 
 
Figure 5. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 7.  
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As illustrated in Figure 5, nearly one-third of the survey respondents indicated 
that the curriculum and academic program responsibility should be solely with the 
management company. The mix of responses varied by choice with 6% indicating that 
the board of directors should be responsible for curriculum and academics, 6% also for 
mostly the board, 19% indicated it should be shared equally between the two parties. The 
balance of the responses show 38% thinks it should be mostly the management company, 
and 31% indicated that the management company should solely determine the curriculum 
and academic programs. 
The responses indicated confusion on who has the responsibility for determining 
curriculum and academic programs in charter schools and are a source of conflict, given 
the difference of opinion of respondents regarding the survey question. Sixty-nine percent 
of the respondents selected responses not inclusive of the board of directors. The core 
service of every school, whether a traditional public school or charter, provides an 
academic program that effectively serves its community. Decisions about curriculum and 
academic programs impact every aspect of a school’s success. The contract analysis also 
indicates, in the section of obligations for the management company, that the charter 
school’s boards of directors adopt the curriculum and academic programs of the 
management company. These findings suggest yet another example where specific 
provisions in the management contracts are not well understood by the boards of 
directors.  
Part 1 Survey Question 11: The development of the contractual agreement 
between the board and the management company should be…  
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Figure 6. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 11.  
As illustrated in Figure 6, the responses for the development of the contractual 
agreement showed 56% think the responsibility should be shared equally between the 
board of directors and the management company; the remaining 44% was distributed 
among the other possible survey responses, inclusive of 23% who chose the 
responsibility is solely the board of directors, and 15% who chose mostly the board of 
directors. Less than 7% chose the option of the management company developing the 
contractual agreement, while 2% responded that it should be solely the management 
company. 
The responsibility for the development of the contractual agreement between the 
board and the management company is contested and is a source of conflict given the 
range of responses to the survey question. Contracts are typically at the heart of any 
business arrangement. It sets the parameters for interactions, recourse, and most of all 
expectations of the parties who enter into contractual agreements. As previously referred 
to in the literature review, the state of Michigan has approximately 82% of their charter 
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schools that are managed by full-service for-profit private management companies. 
Figure 6 illustrated the levels of responsibility for the development of the contract from 
the perspective of boards of directors. This also provided insight into how the board of 
directors perceived the management company. It brings to mind the question of do they 
see the management company as the superior partner, an equal partner, or as a contractor 
similar to food services, auditors, consultants, and other significant vendors. The board of 
director’s perspective of the management company impacts how the board will approach 
contract development and negotiations for the contractual agreement. The development 
of the contract between the two parties has significant implications on the interactions 
and restrictions of each party. A board’s lack of understanding the contract will result in 
role confusion and conflicts regarding operating the charter school that could last for the 
duration of the agreement. 
Research Question 2: The second research question states: Assuming that parallel 
governance systems created in charter schools whose boards of directors contract 
with for-profit management companies contribute to governance conflicts, what are 
the factors in the relationship that contribute to conflicts in governance? 
Part 1 Survey Question 5: The responsibility for recommending board 
candidates should be… 
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Figure 7. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 5. 
The graph of Survey Question 5 as illustrated in Figure 7, the results show that 
65% of board respondents think that board members should solely recommend board 
candidates. The other 35% was composed of 23% mostly selected the board of directors, 
10% selected equally shared between the two parties, and 2% think mostly the 
management company. None of the survey respondents think that the management 
company should have sole responsibility for recommending board members. 
The responsibility for recommending board candidates is a source of conflict 
given the percentage of survey respondents who indicated some level of shared 
responsibility between the charter school board of directors and the management 
company. The lack of consensus in this critical area of governance is pertinent because it 
is not clear to these board members who has responsibility for recommending board 
candidates. The literature review provided various sources for recommending board 
candidates inclusive of other board members, the management company, the charter 
school office (CSO), vendors, community groups, community businesses, and parents. 
Even though these are voluntary appointed positions, the impact and importance of 
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selecting effective board members has significant implications on the charter school, 
students, parents, community, and all of the school’s stakeholders. Board candidates 
sourced from any entity other than the board of directors lends itself to role conflicts 
between the board of directors and the full-service for-profit management company 
leading to conflicts of interest.  
Part 1 Survey Question 8: The responsibility for conducting student expulsion 
hearings should be… 
Figure 8. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 8.  
As shown in Figure 8, nearly 44% of surveyed board members selected that it is the 
board of directors who is solely responsible for conducting student expulsion hearings. 
While nearly half of the survey respondents indicated that student expulsion 
responsibility should be shared to varying degrees between the board of directors and the 
management company, 6% selected that the responsibility should be solely with the 
management company. 
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The responsibility for recommending student expulsions is a source of conflict 
given the percentage of survey respondents who indicated some level of shared 
responsibility between the charter school board of directors and the management 
company, as well as the polarized responses that indicated that it should be solely the 
board or solely the management company.  Consensus is not even close and therefore is 
an indication of potential conflict, which is exacerbated by role ambiguity in terms of 
student expulsions. 
Areas around student discipline are very sensitive. This is partly because it 
involves discussions about children and the decisions that tremendously impact their 
future; expulsions are included in this category. There was ambivalence as to who is 
responsible for conducting expulsion hearings that has procedural and legal implications 
that further exacerbates potential role conflicts regarding student expulsions. 
Part 1 Survey Question 9: The responsibility for special education policies of the 
school should be… 
Figure 9. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 9.  
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As illustrates in Figure 9, the special education question showed double-digit 
percentages for all of the survey responses. The polarized responses for solely the board 
being responsible was 12.5%, and for solely the management company was 29%; the 
three possible shared responses totaled approximately 59% inclusive of 10% selecting 
mostly the board’s responsibility, 23% selecting equally shared, and 25% thinks mostly 
the management company. All possible responses received double-digit percentages.  
The responsibility for special education policies is a source of role confusion and 
conflict given the double-digit percentages for all five of the survey options. The role 
confusion begins with the comprehensive contracts between the board of directors and 
the management company. It is typically in the third article of most contracts and it states 
that the services for students with disabilities are under the obligations of the 
management company. It also shows a significant lack of consensus indicated by the 
spread in percentages across the survey responses. The complexities of special education 
have legal, social, and medical implications that are difficult to comprehend. Special 
education is also an area that requires high levels of experience, knowledge, expertise, 
and certification. 
Special education generally is an area of contention in education, partly because 
of all of the laws that seek to protect the rights of families and their children with special 
needs. These laws have proliferated as the growing needs of the collective special 
education cases have increased, such as an increase in diagnoses of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum disorder, and oppositional defiant 
disorder (ODD) to name a few. This complex area of education in the charter school 
world has strong probability for role conflicts given the lack of understanding by most 
boards of directors and the intense level of learning required to become knowledgeable in 
the complexities and legalities of special education. 
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Part 1 Survey Question 10: The responsibility for developing board meeting 
agendas and board minutes should be…  
 
Figure 10. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 10.  
As referenced in Figure 10, more than one-third of those surveyed selected the 
board of directors as solely responsible for the board meeting agendas and board meeting 
minutes. More than 60% think the responsibility should be shared to varying degrees 
inclusive of 27% indicated that mostly the board is responsible for board meeting 
agendas and minutes, 15% selected shared equally between the two, and 19% selected 
mostly the management companies’ responsibility. Four percent think it is solely the 
management companies’ responsibility. 
There is not consensus for who is responsible for developing board agendas and 
minutes. This perpetuates role confusion and conflict because it is the boards’ public 
meeting and all other attendees are guests or participants. The responsibility for 
developing the board meeting agendas and minutes is often overlooked as simply a 
necessary task. However, the relevance and repercussions of the board agendas and its 
complementary board minutes are extremely important. It is a legal document that may 
0" 5" 10" 15" 20" 25" 30" 35" 40"
Management Company 
Mostly Management Co. 
Shared between both 
Mostly Board of Directors 
Board of Directors 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	   80	  
be used to clarify positions, policies, resolutions, budget decisions, attendance, and 
contracts. If the management company takes charge of developing the agenda and doing 
the minutes of the board meeting, they may see the agenda through the lens of the 
management company and not the perspective of the board of directors. The board 
meetings may be generally only month-to-month; however, the implications of the 
agenda and minutes are far reaching given their importance as public documents 
summarizing a public meeting. Given the level of importance of agendas and minutes, 
and varied responses of the survey respondents, this is an area with governance conflicts 
where negative implications could have major impact on the charter school and its 
governing body. 
 
Research Question 3: Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected 
when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service, for-
profit management companies? 
Part 1 Survey Question 2: The responsibility for managing finance and budget 
matters should 
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 Figure 11. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 2.  
As shown in Figure 11, approximately 90% of the board respondents indicated 
that the responsibility of managing budgets and finances should be shared to some degree 
between the board of directors and the for-profit management company. The 90% is 
inclusive of 48% chose equally shared, 10% chose mostly the board, and 31% thinks 
mostly the management company. The polarized options make up 6% for those who 
selected solely the board of directors, and 4% who chose solely the management 
company. 
The responsibility of managing budgets and finances does not have consensus and 
is a source of role confusion and conflicts given the importance of financial functions. 
The role confusion begins with the comprehensive contracts, which explains that finances 
and budget management falls under the responsibility of the management company and 
not the boards of directors. The finances and management of the budget typically falls 
under Article III of most contracts, under educational and administrative services which 
says, “All aspects of the school’s accounting operations, including general ledger 
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management, financial reporting, payroll, employee benefits, and payroll tax compliance” 
are under the obligations of the management company. In examining the contracts, there 
should be no confusion as to who holds the responsibility for managing finances. The 
management of the budget and allocation of resources is significant for any entity 
regardless of industry. The budget is central to the operations of the school. The 
appropriate allocation of resources is critical to the school’s delivery of its mission and 
vision. When the management company and the board are not aligned with budgetary and 
financial management, in addition to board members not fully understanding their 
fiduciary responsibility for the charter school, these circumstances perpetuate role 
confusion and conflict. 
Part 1 Survey Question 6: The responsibility for state and federal compliance 
should be…	  
Figure 12. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 6. 
The range of survey responses shown in Figure 12 indicates a lack of consensus 
regarding who is responsible for state and federal compliance and is therefore a potential 
for role confusion and conflicts. Nearly one-third of the board member respondents’ 
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chose the survey option of an equally shared responsibility between the board of directors 
and the management company. More than 60% indicated some level of equally shared 
responsibility between the two parties, and nearly 40% indicated the polarized options of 
11% choosing solely the board of directors and 28% choosing solely the management 
company. 
Boards of directors are held accountable by their authorizers for three areas, 
which include fiscal accountability, outcome accountability, and compliance 
accountability. The last accountability factor includes making sure the charter school 
meets the requirements of federal and state regulations. Charter school compliance 
includes a myriad of tasks that if not met results in financial penalties and fines. This is 
due to the fact that they are public entities and the primary sources of funding come from 
the state and federal governments. The receipt of funding has compliance requirements 
related to a wide range of operational demands inclusive of, but not limited to academic 
reporting, expulsions, attendance, audits, asbestos, staffing credentials, health 
inspections, fire drills, board meeting minutes and agendas, school calendars, and annual 
reports. These components are part of school operations, which come under the 
obligations of the management company; however, it is the board that is held responsible. 
Such matters perpetuate role confusion and conflict between the charter school boards of 
directors and the for-profit management companies because much of the facilitation of 
the requirements is day-to-day, which is under the management company; however it is 
the boards of directors who are held accountable by the state and federal governments. 
Part 1 Survey Question 12: The acquisition of real estate, facilities, and capital 
projects for the school should be…	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Figure 13. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 12. 
As illustrated in Figure 13, close to two-thirds of the survey respondents indicated 
that the responsibility for capital expenditures should be shared at various levels between 
the board of directors and the for-profit management company inclusive of 33% selecting 
mostly the board of directors’ responsibility, 17% selecting equally shared responsibility, 
and 13% selecting mostly the management company. The polarized responses indicated 
33% for solely the board of directors, and 4% felt the management company should 
solely manage the acquisition of capital expenditures and projects. 
There is not consensus regarding the acquisition of real estate, facilities, and 
capital projects for the charter school and therefore resulting in role confusion and 
conflicts.  The state of Michigan provides provisions regarding expenditures that exceed 
approximately $20,000.00. These expenditures usually require some kind of bid process 
to promote transparency and cost efficiency. These include transactions for assets such as 
buildings, property/real estate, technology, major renovations and repairs. Role confusion 
and conflict persists given that the comprehensive contracts do not specify limits to 
0" 5" 10" 15" 20" 25" 30" 35"
Management Company 
Mostly Management Co. 
Shared between both 
Mostly Board of Directors 
Board of Directors 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	   85	  
transactions without board approval and clauses included that allude to the management 
companies’ obligations with reasonable effort to provide or secure facilities on behalf of 
the board of directors. When for-profit management companies provide the facilities for 
the charter schools it manages, it places the board in a vulnerable position with weak 
leverage when it comes to contract negotiations.  These circumstances add to role 
confusion and increase the probability of role conflicts between the board of directors and 
the full-service, for-profit private management company. 
Quantitative Findings: Analysis of Part 2 Survey Questions 
The questions in the second section of the survey will also not be sequential; 
however, they are a part of an item analysis with the survey questions germane to one of 
the three research questions. In part two of the survey, Survey Question 1 relates to 
Research Question 1. Survey Questions 2, 3, 4 relate to Research Question 3. There are 
no questions in part two of the survey that directly relate to Research Question 2.  
Research Question 1: Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter 
school boards of directors and full-service for-profit management companies 
contribute to conflict in governance? 
Part 2 Survey Question 1: The management of funds and resources is affected 
when boards of directors contract with full-service for-profit management 
companies… 
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Figure 14. Percentages of responses to Part 2 Survey Question 1.  
Figure 14 illustrates the responses to Part 2 Survey Question 1, which asks if the 
management of funds and resources are affected when boards of directors contract with 
full-service for-profit management companies. The majority of respondents (55%) chose 
either strongly agree (21%) and agree (34%), and comparatively, 4% chose strongly 
disagree, while 21% selected disagree, and 19% were uncertain.   
The responses for the question, if the management of funds and resources are 
affected when boards contract with management companies, indicated a lack of 
consensus given the distribution of the responses. The survey respondents who chose 
strongly agree or agree think that funds and resources are impacted. Those who disagree 
and strongly disagree believe that funds and resources are not impacted by the 
management companies’ skills and knowledge to effectively manage the assets of charter 
schools. The balance of respondents is uncertain (19%), which is an indication that they 
are unsure that the funds and resources are affected either way when boards contract with 
a for-profit private management company.  
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The results indicated a lack of consensus and therefore role conflicts emerged as it 
relates to the effect of the management of funds and resources when boards contract with 
a for-profit private management company.  The variability of responses is not an 
indication of the boards’ positive or negative feelings of the management company, 
however, it is an indication that board members have varying perceptions related to how 
and if the funds and resources of the charter school are affected when boards of directors 
contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The management of 
public funds is more complex given the management and handling of taxpayers’ dollars 
by for-profit private management companies.  
Research Question 3: Are accountability and transparency of public funds 
affected when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-
service for-profit management companies? 
Part 2 Survey Question 2: Accounting of Public Funds is Affected When 
Boards Contract with Full-Service For-Profit Management Companies… 
 
Figure 15. Percentages of responses to Part 2 Survey Question 2.  
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  Figure 15 illustrated the responses to the question about the perception of the 
board members on if the accounting of public funds is affected when contracting with 
full-service, for-profit private management companies. The distribution of the selected 
responses yielded double digits for each possible answer; 19% agreed that the accounting 
of public funds are affected when boards contract with for-profit management companies, 
and 31% strongly agreed. This combined for 50% of the responses agreeing to some 
degree that accountability of public funds is affected. Ten percent of the respondents 
strongly disagreed, 25% disagreed, and 15% were uncertain to this statement.  
 The results indicated a lack of consensus, given the varied distribution of 
responses, therefore causes role confusion that leads to conflicts between the board of 
directors and the for-profit management company. The variability in responses is in 
double-digits, including those that chose uncertain as a response. This level of variability 
in responses displays a lack of consensus, which is an indicator of board confusion that 
leads to conflict in the accounting of public funds. This ambiguity is increased given the 
management companies’ private status, which gives the option of not having to report on 
the accounting of funds that originated from public tax dollars. These dynamics add 
further to role confusion and conflicts given the lack of accountability and transparency 
under the guise that management companies have the designation of a private company. 
Part 2 Survey Question 3: Transparency of public funds is affected when 
boards of directors contract with full-service for-profit management companies…  
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Figure 16. Percentages of responses to Part 2 Survey Question 3.  
 Figure 16 demonstrated that the majority of respondents believed that the 
transparency of public funds is affected when boards of directors contract with full-
service, for-profit private management companies with 27% selected agreed and 19% 
strongly agreed, combining for 46%. The responses for not agreeing that transparency is 
affected indicated 15% strongly disagreed, 27% disagreed, and 12% were uncertain 
regarding the transparency of public funds. 
The lack of consensus indicated role confusion and conflicts given the distribution 
of responses to the survey question on transparency. The transparency of public funds is 
just as complex as accountability, if not more complex, given the management and 
handling of taxpayer’s dollars by for-profit private management companies. Also, 
whereas accountability is generally on the back end of financial and audit-related 
processes, transparency spans the full spectrum of processes such as bidding, capital 
acquisitions, and routine purchases. Role confusion and potential conflicts may also 
surface given the opportunities of for-profit management companies to legally not 
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disclose information once monies are transferred to their stewardship. The opportunities 
for non-disclosure by private management companies magnify with various operational 
functions such as budgeting, hiring and compensation practices including bonus pay, 
leasing facilities to the boards of directors, and administrating federal and state grants.  
Part 2 Survey Question 4. The board of directors understands the articles, 
terms, and content of the management contract between the board of directors and the 
management company…  
 
 
Figure 17. Percentages of responses to Part 2 Survey Question 4.  
As shown in Figure 17, more than two-thirds of the board member respondents 
indicated that they understand the articles, terms, and content of the contract between the 
board of directors and the management company; this consisted of 42% indicated that 
they strongly agree, and 29% indicated agree, which combined for 71%. On the contrary, 
10% selected disagree, and 4% indicated strongly disagree, while 15% selected uncertain 
regarding understanding the articles, terms and content of the contract.  
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The distribution of responses and the lack of consensus provided impetus for role 
confusion and resulting conflicts given the disparity. The contract is the foundation of the 
relationships between the boards of directors and the for-profit private management 
companies.  Understanding the contract as board members is imperative, individually and 
collectively, to effectively govern. The varied distribution of responses shows various 
board members’ understanding of the contract, which ultimately reflects their perception 
of both their roles and the role of the management company. The degree of the boards’ 
understanding of the contract, sets the dynamics for role insight or confusion, which the 
latter adds to conflicts due to lack of contractual awareness and understanding.  
Summary of Presentation and Analysis of Data 
Table 3a and 3b summarize the results of the survey responses from charter 
school board members who met the criterion for participation. The data collection 
element was a key component of the quantitative portion of the mixed methodology 
study.  
The summary illustrates the responses to the survey questions and provides data 
that reinforces the multiple degrees of discrepancy and lack of consensus for all of the 
survey questions. The lack of consensus is an indication of confusion and implicates 
potential conflicts in board governance when they contract with full-service for-profit 
private management services. 
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Table 3a.  
Summary Table of Percentages of Responses to Survey Questions Part 1 
 
 
 
Questions 
Range of response polarity and applied percentages based on quantitative survey 
responses. 
Total and 
Weighted Average 
 Management 
company’s 
responsibility  
Mostly the 
management 
company’s 
responsibility 
and some of 
the board of 
directors. 
Shared 
responsibility 
equal between 
the board of 
directors and 
the 
management 
company. 
Mostly board 
of directors’ 
responsibility 
and some of 
the 
management 
company  
Board of 
Directors’ 
responsibility  
Total Weighted 
Average  
1. The responsibility for 
hiring key personnel 
such as superintendent, 
principal and teachers 
should be… 
37.50% 
 
18 
29.17% 
 
14 
22.92% 
 
11 
6.25% 
 
3 
4.17% 
 
2 
 
 
48 
 
 
2.10 
2.The responsibility for 
managing finance and 
budget matters should 
be… 
4.17% 
 
2 
31.25% 
 
15 
47.92% 
 
23 
10.42% 
 
5 
6.25% 
 
3 
 
 
48 
 
 
2.83 
3.The responsibility for 
managing the day-to-
day operations of the 
school should be… 
72.92% 
 
35 
16.67% 
 
8 
0.00% 
 
0 
2.08% 
 
1 
8.33% 
 
4 
 
 
48 
 
 
1.56 
4. The responsibility for 
awarding contracts 
should be… 
2.08% 
 
1 
12.50% 
 
6 
33.33% 
 
16 
14.58% 
 
7 
37.50% 
 
18 
48 3.73 
5. The responsibility for 
recommending board 
candidates should be… 
0.00% 
 
 
0 
2.08% 
 
 
1 
10.42% 
 
 
5 
22.92% 
 
 
11 
64.58% 
 
 
31 
48 4.50 
6.The responsibility for 
state and federal 
compliance should be… 
27.66% 
 
13 
19.15% 
 
9 
31.91% 
 
15 
10.64% 
 
5 
10.64% 
 
5 
47 2.57 
7. The responsibility for 
determining curriculum 
and academic programs 
should be… 
31.25% 
 
 
15 
37.50% 
 
 
18 
18.75% 
 
 
9 
6.25% 
 
 
3 
6.25% 
 
 
3 
48 2.19 
8. The responsibility for 
conducting student 
expulsion hearings 
should be… 
6.25% 
 
3 
12.50% 
 
6 
20.83% 
 
10 
16.67% 
 
8 
43.75% 
 
21 
48 3.79 
9. The responsibility for 
special education 
policies of the school 
should be… 
29.17% 
 
14 
25.00% 
 
12 
22.92% 
 
11 
10.42% 
 
5 
12.50% 
 
6 
48 2.52 
10. The responsibility 
for developing board 
meeting agendas and 
board meeting minutes 
should be… 
4.17% 
 
2 
18.75% 
 
9 
14.58% 
 
17 
27.08% 
 
13 
35.42% 
 
17 
48 3.71 
11.The development of 
the contractual 
agreement between the 
board and the 
management company 
should be… 
2.08% 
 
 
1 
4.17% 
 
 
2 
56.25% 
 
 
27 
14.58% 
 
 
7 
22.92% 
 
 
11 
48 3.52 
12. The acquisition of 
real estate, facilities and 
capital projects should 
be…  
4.17% 
 
2 
12.50% 
 
6 
16.67% 
 
8 
33.33% 
 
16 
33.33% 
 
16 
48 3.79 
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Table 3b. 
Summary Table of Percentages of Responses to Survey Questions Part 2 
The findings and subsequent analysis of the 16 survey questions were consistent 
in presenting a lack of consensus in terms of the responsibilities around charter school 
functions and operations. The first 12 questions provided a variety of options from the 
polarized choices of solely the responsibility of the management company to solely the 
responsibility of the board of directors along with intermediate ranges of shared 
responsibilities between the two parties. The second part of the survey consisted of four 
questions ranging from polarized opposite responses of strongly agree to strongly 
disagree, and intermediate ranges inclusive of uncertain. Both parts were formatted in 
Likert Scales that were provided to board presidents in hard and electronic formats for 
distribution to board members who met the criterion for survey respondents. 
The data illustrated a wide spread of responses indicating that different boards 
have different perspectives regarding their responsibilities and the responsibilities of the 
Questions  Range of response polarity and applied percentages based on quantitative 
survey responses. 
Total and Weighted 
Average 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly Agree Total Weighted 
Average  
1. The management of 
funds and resources is 
when boards of 
directors contract with 
full service for-profit 
management 
companies.  
4.26% 
 
2 
21.28% 
 
10 
19.15% 
 
9 
34.04% 
 
16 
21.28% 
 
10 
 
 
47 
 
 
3.47 
2.Accountability of 
public funds is affected 
when boards of 
directors contract with 
full service for-profit 
management 
companies.  
10.42% 
 
5 
25.00% 
 
12 
14.58% 
 
7 
31.25% 
 
15 
18.75% 
 
9 
 
 
48 
 
 
3.23 
3. Transparency of 
funds is affected when 
boards of directors 
contract with full-
service for-profit 
management 
companies.  
14.58% 
 
7 
27.08% 
 
13 
12.50% 
 
6 
27.08% 
 
13 
18.75% 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
3.08 
4. The board of 
directors understands 
the articles, terms and 
content of the 
management contract 
between the board of 
directors and the full-
service management 
company.  
4.17% 
 
2 
10.42% 
 
5 
14.58% 
 
7 
41.67% 
 
20 
29.17% 
 
14 
 
 
48 
 
 
3.81 
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full-service, for-profit private management companies they chose to contract with to 
manage their charter school. The survey results portrayed a lack of consensus and a 
commensurate wide range of perspectives, which indicates that boards of directors are 
confused and not aware of the provisional elements of their contract. The contract with 
full-service, for-profit private management companies sets the foundation of the board of 
directors’ ability to govern their charter school and guide their management company, 
which impacts their ability to provide effective governance. 
The collective responses indicate a lack of consensus regarding board members’ 
perspective on what the responsibilities are between themselves and their contracted full-
service for-profit private management company. The lack of consensus from the surveys 
presents issues with understanding the contract and shows strong possibilities for 
confusion and resulting potential conflicts in governance. 
Qualitative Findings 
The qualitative participants were board members who served in the capacity of an 
officer of a charter school board in the state of Michigan. The participants included seven 
people who have served most of their time in the office of board president, vice president, 
treasurer, or a combination of the previous roles. The required aggregate time as a board 
member was a preferred minimum service length of fifteen years. The demographics of 
the participants in the interviews were diverse in terms of race and gender with three 
women and four men. The race of the women included two African Americans and one 
White with the average age of the women being 53. The qualitative portion of the study 
also included two African American and two White men. All of the participants have 
college degrees. The interview participants also represented a strong variety of for-profit, 
full-service management companies, and authorizers (charter school offices - CSO).   
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The three research questions in this study are specific to charter school 
governance and the role conflicts that occur between charter school boards of directors 
and the for-profit, full-service private management companies. The research questions are 
as follows: 
1.) Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of 
directors and full service, for-profit management companies contribute to conflict 
in governance? 
2.) Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose 
boards of directors contract with for-profit management companies contribute to 
governance conflicts, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute to 
conflicts in governance? 
3.) Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan 
charter school boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit 
management companies? 
In the qualitative component of the study, the sources of data included seven 
charter school board members who served in officer roles. The board members had an 
average of fourteen years of serving on a charter school board. The longest serving board 
member had nineteen years and the least had six. Combined years of service was 98 years 
with nearly a century of experience working with full-service for-profit private 
management companies.  
   The participants represented diversity in race, gender, and professions. Every 
participant had a minimum of a college degree. The participants provided responses to 
open-ended survey questions during an interview. The responses were based on their 
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board experiences of working with full-service for-profit private management companies. 
The following is a list of the interview questions:  
1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter school board of 
directors, what are the pros and cons relative to governing the school that occur as 
a result of contracting with a full-service management company? 
2. Reflecting upon your board member experience in contracting with a for-profit 
management company, how would you describe the specific contractual 
relationship between the board and the management company? 
3. Considering that the relationship between the board of directors and the 
management company is a critical element in the successful operation of the 
school, what do you think are factors that might contribute to tension in 
governance as a result of this relationship? 
4. Do you believe that accountability and transparency of public funds may have 
changed when contracting with a for-profit private management company, or do 
you believe this is not an issue? 
5. Given what you know about leadership and school governance, are there things 
that could be done contractually or legislatively to improve the governance of 
Michigan charter schools? 
The qualitative data is organized by the descriptors that emerge from the 
individual board participants' responses to the qualitative interview questions. A 
descriptor is a word or phrase that gives meaning to the disposition, perceptions, or 
perspective of an interview respondent. A descriptor may become a theme depending on 
the discovery of similar dispositions from other interview participants. Many of the 
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descriptors are similar amongst the board participants, which exemplified 
response commonality. Some of the descriptors are different to acknowledge the integrity 
and uniqueness of the experiences of each board participants' responses to the interview 
questions.  
Interview Participant A 
 
 Background and Rationale for Being a Board Member  
 
Participant A has served on the same charter school board for seventeen years in 
multiple roles. His most recent role for the last four years has been as board president and 
prior to that he served as vice president. He has been on this charter school board since 
1998 and was one of the original board members of the public school academy. 
Participant A is an African American male in his mid-fifties and is a college 
graduate who currently works in management information systems as an executive in a 
Fortune 500 company. He has a strong appreciation and understanding of technology and 
its application to education and the work force. He stated,  
So, when I was asked to participate with the board about 16 years ago, I thought it 
was intriguing and I thought it was something with my background and skills set 
that I could help them with technology and things like that and help the overall 
education process.    
Participant A’s rationale for joining a charter school board was so that he could 
give back to the community and help urban children who may not have access to a 
quality education: 
The reason I actually started working with the board initially is because of the 
disparity in our community and to make sure that we have viability around 
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assuring that kids and parents in the community have an option to Detroit Public 
Schools that will give them the education they need to be ready for college. 
 Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service Management Company  
In Participant A’s responses to the first interview question relative to the pros and 
cons of governing when contracting with a full-service, for-profit private management 
company, he indicated how important it is to select a management company that is well 
versed in handling the day-to-day operations of the charter school in a manner, which the 
board cannot. He explained: 
I think bringing the right ESP [education service provider] to the table that will 
help with the day-to-day operations is key. From my perspective and a 
governance perspective, you [the management company] can be there every day 
to ensure that the education is disseminated in classrooms. 
Participant A acknowledged the benefits of having an entity that can manage 
operations in a manner that alleviated pressures from the board of directors to be involved 
in routine affairs and focused on the broader based concerns of the charter school. He 
stated: 
So a lot of ESPs and ESPs that we have worked with handle all of the day-to-day 
operations from soups to nuts; they handle education, they handle the lunch 
program, they handle hiring and firing of teachers, they handle the whole 
educational process 
So is that a good thing? I think it is a good thing in a lot of ways in that 
you have single “one-stop shopping” to make sure that things are handled in a 
similar manner; this keeps the board away from issues of hiring and firing 
teachers. 
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Participant A also shared the cons of the circumstances of having a full-service 
management company handle all aspects of the charter schools operations. He indicated 
that it becomes a paradox when the board has the management company take full control 
of operations and yet the board still has ultimate responsibility inclusive of fiduciary, 
compliance, and academic outcomes. He expounded: 
  
Let’s talk about a few of the cons that kind of pop up around understanding a full 
service entity that has full control around how education is disseminated and how 
it works. So what I have experienced over the years is that allowing an entity to 
have full operational control is good but when the board is ultimately responsible 
for the academic outcomes of what actually occurs and you only meet once or 
twice a month to actually see how the progress is going and looking at the pre and 
post test scores just is not enough. 
He continued to elaborate on the paradoxical disposition of the board having 
ultimate responsibility and added the specific element of student performance. He 
continued: 
 
The other con around that is the board itself is ultimately responsible from a 
fiduciary perspective and academically responsible to make sure students reach 
grade level; they must get the academic nurturing they need in order to move 
forward; it becomes really tough because you do not see what is going on a day-
to-day basis; so I think those are some of the primary pros and cons around the 
contractual piece. 
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Contractual Relationship  
 
Participant A’s response to the second interview question reinforced his 
perspective of the contractual obligations of the management company. He indicated the 
scope of work around the management company’s obligation to manage sub-contracts 
such as snow removal, landscaping, and grounds maintenance to larger tasks such as 
payroll management, health care, insurance, budgeting, accounting, and food services 
management. He explained:  
So a board will hire an ESP [education service provider] to conduct the daily 
business. The board will hire the ESP to manage its finances from a day-to-day 
perspective, i.e., ensuring the bills are paid, ensuring that the maintenance 
company is paid, that the grounds are clean, snow is removed on time, making 
sure that vendors are around for lunch and breakfast catering so that children have 
a good hot and healthy meal every day. Contractually, we asked the ESP to handle 
those things for us, but we the board are ultimately responsible for all milestones 
every month. 
Participant A’s examples explained his perspective that the daily operations of the 
school are the management company’s obligation due to the contractual agreement.  
When asked to describe the routine of activities in terms of the contractual 
relationship between the board and the management company, he continued: 
So the other things that come to mind is making sure that state funds are allocated 
and spent appropriately, because the board has the responsibility to make sure that 
state funds are spent appropriately. So when you look at it again, a 30-day period 
is a financial snapshot we take a look at. We look at the ledger, we look at the 
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transactions that occur every month to make sure that nothing is out-of-bounds, 
and we ensure that the principles are aligned to the financial processes. And avoid 
moneys being spent that are not aligned. 
The comment above appears to demonstrate that Participant A viewed the board 
as the party that monitors the fiscal responsibilities.  
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance  
In response to question three of the qualitative interview, Participant A indicated 
that one of the greatest sources of tension is when students’ academic growth is not 
realized in terms of metrics based on mandatory state and authorizer standardized testing. 
He felt that the management company should be held directly accountable for student 
achievement and specifically achievement tied to the goals aligned with the state 
requirements. There also seemed to be frustration tied to having to wait for student 
achievement results monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, and in some cases annually. He 
explained:  
The ultimate thing that would…have caused tension is when you do not see the 
student growth that has been identified in the contract or the student growth that 
needs to be aligned to the state. So we have state and other accountability to our 
authorizer to ensure that we are academically sound in the academic goals. If the 
academic goals are not met, there is a lot of tension around; do we have the right 
ESP in place? What is going on in that 30-day period that we don’t know about? 
What is happening between testing that we do not know about? What’s happening 
day-to-day in advisory roles that will help students reach their academic goals? 
Ultimately, it is the board that is responsible and the board is responsible to the 
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students and the community to make sure they have a voice and a system in place 
to help them meet and exceed the academic goals of the state and the contract. 
In his comments concerning tensions, it is likely that there are concerns around 
communication and who is ultimately responsible for certain factors at the school level.  
A reoccurring observation from Participant A was the board’s ultimate 
responsibility regarding all aspects of the charter school’s operations. There is reiteration 
of the board’s responsibility and the sense of commitment to the students and community. 
When asked if there are any non-academic factors that contribute to tension, he 
mentioned the challenges around contracts with vendors and how important it is to have 
the management company with the skills to choose quality vendors who will provide high 
levels of service to the school, and if not the management company must be held 
accountable. He stated: 
Yes, of course. Look at the ability of the ESP to look at different contracts. We 
want to ensure that those contracts are going to be the best for the school. So if 
you look at contracts that you put in place around vendors and lunch providers 
and look at how we disposition those contracts to make sure that students have a 
good hot and healthy meal; there may be tension around getting a low level 
provider and not using the provider that might give the best quality meal to the 
kids. Based on demographics, the school meal may be the best meal they receive. 
Some vendors do not understand these dynamics. Therefore it is important that 
the board understands that the provider understands the school community. Again, 
a lot of kids don’t eat except for the school’s food program. 
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Accountability and Transparency 
In terms of how these tensions are managed, Participant A indicated that the 
tensions are addressed at the board meetings. However, he also indicated a level of 
frustration, which happened when meetings are only once a month and he introduced the 
importance of transparency and trust between the board and the management company. 
He stated: 
It is really hard. I think when we look at having someone work on your behalf and 
not getting full disclosure of all of the elements [that] happen within a 30 day 
period; it is sometimes disconcerting, and not to be petty, sometimes there are 
little things like fights that actually occur within the school itself and the board 
does not find out until later… they are actually in the meetings, everything in the 
meeting is public record. When we look at the budget, the spending on a monthly 
basis, we want everything to follow a process, so having an overall level of trust 
with the ESP is critically important to make sure that they are spending resources 
in alignment.  
Participant A substantiated the tensions around transparency and full disclosure as 
it related to the sensitive and complex issue of student expulsions. He portrayed a sense 
of discomfort regarding disclosure of how and why students are expelled and why some 
opt to transition from his public school academy to another district. He said:  
We allow the ESP to make the recommendations around expulsions; we require 
from them proper documentation. Expulsion hearings are brought to the board for 
final disposition because the board is the only entity that may expel a student. We 
at times see that this is not taking place…and expulsions may occur unknown to 
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us, which is a problem, or kids leaving and the board has not had full disclosure of 
the circumstances of how and why they left. We want to make sure the right level 
of service is provided for the students, academically and socially in that 
community.  
The role of the board appeared from Participant A’s perspective to be about oversight of 
the school and making sure that there is alignment between what is implemented at the 
school and the policies set by the board.  
Participant A reinforced that the ultimate responsibilities lie with the board and 
that they must hold the management company accountable for the financial status of the 
school and the management of public funds. In the same respect, he talked about 
transparency of procurements and making sure the spending is aligned to the plans. He 
explained:  
So because the ultimate fiduciary responsibility lies with the board, we need to 
make sure that the right level of accountability is being disseminated at the board 
meeting. That is why our treasurer works with the financial entity to make sure 
that these monies are being spent accordingly and the financial report is being 
read to the board every month. We want to make sure that the accounting of the 
funds in that 30-day cycle has the right oversight and visibility to it. These are 
public funds and the board meetings are public meetings. 
He continued about the importance of accountability regardless of the type of 
contractual agreement between the board of directors and the management company. He 
stated an importance of increasing rigor in accountability if the contractual relationship 
requires such adjustments. He stated:  
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Reporting and analytics are very important in determining accountability. So we 
can have accountability regardless of what services the board decided upon; even 
a la carte would have accountability. Because the treasurer and the board would 
make sure we had the right processes in place to make sure that we are meeting 
our fiduciary responsibility. In the case of the management company, you are just 
hiring an entity to manage that function on the board’s behalf. Is there more rigors 
needed to ensure accountability? I think there is a little more rigor needed to make 
sure accountability is strong. 
Participant A concluded by reiterating that accountability emanates from the 
board of directors regardless of hiring a full-service, for-profit management company or 
not. He specifically said, “Accountability is there because it is the board’s responsibility. 
Accountability is not on the ESP; it is on the board. So whether it be hiring the ESP or the 
board handles it, accountability is on the board.” The ultimate responsibility, according to 
these comments, appears to fall under the board’s jurisdiction according to Participant A.   
In terms of transparency, he believed visibility is critical in addition to having 
agreed upon deliverables between the board of directors and the management company. 
He explained:  
Transparency is definitely an issue if you do not have the pre-determined 
deliverables in place to make sure that you have the right information at the right 
time; to make sure you understand what is going on during that 30-day cycle. If 
spending were occurring outside of the process, it should be in the report, which is 
why it is important to understand the deliverables and visibility. There seems to 
be issues that right, wrong or indifferent because you hire an ESP there are 
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different levels of visibility. The management company may try [to] glaze over (I 
am trying to use a different word than hide) but in certain scenarios there are 
certain elements that would occur like; what is going on at the school? Do we 
have the right level of climate and culture in the school? Do we have the right 
level of data teams engaged to provide information to the teachers, and are 
students getting what they need? It is really easy to disseminate that into data and 
say everything is good, but when you dig a little deeper and pull back the layers 
of the onion you find out in many cases that no, the right level of visibility is not 
always disseminated to the board of directors and that things are being swept 
under the rug or hidden to make the overall picture look better than what it 
actually is. 
These comments clearly present that a lack of transparency could be the source of 
conflict between the board of directors and the management company.  
He closed his response to these questions by indicating the importance of timely 
and accurate data. He also reinforced why the board exists, which is to advocate for the 
interest of the student and community. Participant A stated:  
When we have some of those issues occur, we try to make sure we have access to 
data to make sure we know what to look for to get issues resolved. We all can 
improve if we have the right process. We have to ultimately be mindful of why 
are we here? And we are here for these students and the community. And if we 
work together as a collective entity with the kids in mind and give the best 
services for these students, with the best talent we can secure, I think if we 
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continue on that path and have a collaborative view; that is how we reach our 
goals. 
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions  
The final question asked if there were things that could be done contractually or 
legislatively to improve the governance of Michigan charter schools. Participant A 
responded to both areas. First, legislatively he believed more could be done to balance the 
disparity of resources in terms of poorer school districts. He exclaimed:  
So let’s start with the legislative piece of this one key component around the 
legislative piece, is that wherever kids are, whatever the zip code we need to make 
sure that there are congruent amounts of money being spent on each kid to give 
them the resources they need to meet the metric set by the state; the zip codes 
such as Northville, West Bloomfield, Farmington; they get more money per 
student than the inner city zip codes do…that is a huge disparity, because the 
more resources you have, the ability to obtain other resources for teaching, 
technology, and more that enables you to develop a stronger student, better results 
because of the resources in place for the students to meet the state metrics.  
He ended his response with the belief that with commensurate financial resources, poorer 
school districts could close the disparity between them and wealthier school districts:  
If schools were given congruent or equal resources, or even close to it, they could 
perform better. So much of the resources are based on where you live; financial 
equity is important and we need to find a way to provide equitable resources 
regardless of zip code; for all kids in Michigan. 
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The Importance of Understanding the Roles of Key Players  
Participant A also mentioned the importance of understanding the roles, 
responsibilities, and dynamics of all key players in the charter world, such as charter 
school boards, authorizers, and the management companies. He felt the need for a 
consistent definition of what the entities do: what are their roles and expectations in the 
state of Michigan. He briefly mentioned the Michigan Department of Education and their 
effort to define these roles in the state. He explained:  
One thing I found to be good and maybe it is not legislative, maybe it is; the roles 
and responsibilities around the ESP, the board of directors, and the authorizer are 
critical and people need to understand that. I think the MDE [Michigan 
Department of Education] has done a really good job of trying to define those 
roles and responsibilities, lots of folks for whatever reason do not really 
understand what those roles are.  
He elaborated on how the Michigan Department of Education has provided a level 
of consistency in defining the roles and expectations of Michigan charter school boards, 
the management company, and the authorizer. Part of the consistency is the MDE website 
which provides written information about these three stakeholders. He explained:  
There are sets of documents on the MDE website that give you a clear view and 
definition. It helps identify who is responsible for the school, how the ESP role is 
to be played, and what the role is of the authorizer. Looking at and just reading 
what the roles are helps to provide a clear perspective of the entities. Over the 
years we have had different interpretations of roles and responsibilities because 
we did not have common sources of information and understanding or a good 
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understanding of how your role should be operationalized or how the role should 
be on a daily basis. Everyone must understand the roles they play. 
He closed this section again alluding to the disposition that the board of directors 
is ultimately responsible for their training and understanding their individual and 
collective roles as board members. He stated: 
It is the board’s task to understand their roles and responsibilities. I do not expect 
the authorizer or the ESP to tell the board what their role is. I say that because if 
you are ultimately responsible for something, then you should know what that 
responsibility entails. You should really know what your job is and how to do that 
job with fidelity and performance on a daily basis. The board itself, from the 
president all the way down, should have a clear understanding as to what their 
role is and their responsibilities to the school. 
In terms of how to make sure that new board members are prepared and 
appropriately trained for their roles on a charter school board, he indicated that much of 
the responsibility is on the charter school board and that it is important to be consistent 
and sourced from a credible entity such as the MDE. He explained:  
Education, as you get new board members in, I try to point them to documentation 
and elements that they can learn what their role is, so they can understand what is 
expected from them. There’s lots of information out there that is inconsistent with 
what the roles are from MDE’s perspective. We need to make sure we go back 
and make sure the roles as defined are grounded and consistent. 
He ends the question regarding what could be done legislatively by providing his 
thoughts on where the inconsistencies are derived. He responded, “They come from the 
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authorizer, and the ESP at times because the board is ultimately responsible for 
everything that occurs with the PSA. We need to make sure that we know our role and 
those [sic.] we are governing correctly.” The need for strong communication and 
alignment between all of the stakeholders was very important for resolving these 
inconsistencies according to Participant A’s responses.  
The final part of the last question was in regard to what could be done 
contractually to improve governance in Michigan Charter Schools. His response may be 
summarized as understanding the roles and dynamics of the industry and holding all 
stakeholders accountable. Participant A stated:  
Governance ensures that the desired outcomes happen. Outcomes are going to be 
the academic outcomes. [In order] to ensure that the contracts we have in place 
with vendors are appropriate, we must understand relationships. The metrics must 
be placed in the contract to understand what are the targets for everyone including 
the ESP, identify in the contract either hit these marks or reap the consequences. 
There must be visibility and accountability around everything we do. Incentives 
can even be in place to achieve the metrics and corrective action if progress is not 
being realized.  
In the previous quote, he illustrated the importance of governance and how it must 
be included in the metrics of the contractual agreement between the board of directors 
and the management company. He emphasized that consequences for the management 
company must come along with falling short of contractual metrics. In respect to how to 
measure and monitor performance outcomes, Participant A replied: 
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I think that is a good question. And I think what we need to do is make sure that 
we understand what those state targets are around Explorer, Plan, ACT, SAT, and 
NWEA/MAP. Look at those and how much growth towards those metrics can be 
achieved collaboratively with the board and management company; document the 
information in the ESP contract to ensure that they know what the goals are and 
have the right level of accountability. We can provide bonuses if metrics are 
exceeded; we must make sure that we hit the metrics based on the contract and 
responding accordingly based on if the metrics are exceeded, met, or not hit.  
Participant A closed his responses with the consistency of making sure that state 
targets and other forms of metrics regarding student performance and outcomes are tied 
directly to the contract between the board of directors and the management company. He 
believes effective governance, which includes accountability and understanding the roles 
of the charter school stakeholders, can impact the gap in education.  
Summary of Results and Analysis 
Participant A’s interview responses brought out some common areas of discussion 
that lend themselves to an analysis based on the likelihood of these areas being the source 
of role confusion and potential conflict. Table 4 shows descriptors that were presented in 
Participant A’s interview, which provided qualitative data from his responses.   
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            He reiterated his disposition, which the researcher has transformed into 
descriptors inclusive of the board of directors is ultimately responsible; board training; 
universal role definition and community orientation/volunteerism; contract implications; 
and the management companies are responsible for the day-to-day. Other descriptors 
included an overlap of academic responsibility, board accountability versus management 
autonomy, and role responsibility for student discipline.  
Participant A repeatedly expressed that the ultimate responsibility lies with the 
board of directors. Despite the contracts with management companies, vendors, and 
suppliers; the charter school board of directors is ultimately responsible and accountable 
to all stakeholders including students, parents, authorizer, Michigan Department of 
Education, and the community. He established that the responsibility of the board 
permeates every aspect of the charter school’s operation despite having a contract with a 
full-service, for-profit management company.  He indicated that board training is needed 
from a general and tailored perspective. Generally, he said that all members need training 
Table 4 
Identification of Descriptors from Participant A’s Interview Transcript 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
! Board of directors is ultimately responsible 
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day 
! Board training 
! Universal role definition 
! Contract implications – performance, sub-contracts  
! Community oriented/volunteerism 
! Overlap of academic responsibility 
! Board accountability vs. management autonomy 
! Role responsibility for student discipline 
student advocacy 
common and tailored training 
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on the board’s roles and terminology, so they may navigate prudently and knowledgeably 
through the challenges of charter school leadership and governance.  
Participant A’s rationale for being on a board is based on volunteerism and 
community service. He wanted to make a difference and provide opportunities for urban 
city children. He indicated that he wants to use his technological skills and management 
information career to help students with their overall educational development.  
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant A illustrated potentials for 
conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the 
for-profit private management company lack of defined roles, the management 
company’s responsibility for the day-to-day, accountability and transparency, and the 
confusion of role responsibility for student discipline. 
The first descriptor that exemplifies confusion is the board president’s likely 
disposition that the board is ultimately responsible for all aspects of the charter school’s 
operations. Whereas the board has ultimate governance from a macro perspective, the 
operational components are transferred immediately when the boards of directors sign the 
contract with a full-service, for-profit private management company. Any perspective 
other than clear lines of delineation will produce confusion and perpetuate conflict 
between the two contracted parties. 
The second descriptor that exemplified confusion is linked to the previous: the 
universal role definition of what boards do as a collective body in terms of governance 
and operational responsibilities. This included a clear definition of what are the 
implications of contracting for comprehensive management services with a for-profit 
private management company versus other models of contractual agreements that are not 
full-service. The various opportunities for boards to select different models did not 
include guidelines on what happens if a particular alternative is selected. This exacerbates 
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confusion, which results in conflicts if the board does not understand the dynamics of 
their choices and more importantly the implications of the contractual agreements. 
The third descriptor tied in with the first two because the management of the day-
to-day becomes confusing when parties do not understand the juxtaposition of their roles 
and if both parties feel they have sole ultimate responsibility of day-to-day activities, 
which impacts the operations of the charter school. Day-to-day confusion will lead to 
problems that perpetuate conflicts in operations and governance. 
           The final descriptor that emerges from Participant A’s interview is the confusion 
around the role responsibility for student discipline. He mentioned a few examples of the 
management company not disclosing matters related to student expulsions and the board 
of directors finding out after the fact. The interview participant also vehemently 
mentioned that expulsions are solely the responsibility of the board of directors. Any 
other entity, specifically the management company, carrying out suspensions is contrary 
to board members’ understanding and is a source of confusion resulting in conflicts. 
         The four descriptors from the interview of Participant A illustrated confusion in key 
areas of operations that perpetuated conflicts in responsibility, operations, management, 
and most of all governance. 
Interview Participant B  
 
           Background and Rationale for Being a Board Member  
 
Participant B is an African American male in his late-fifties and is a college 
graduate who works in management in the banking industry. He appears to have strong 
analytical skills and a great understanding of financial and economic principles, which 
are of great assistance given the financial challenges in charter schools.  
 Participant B has served on the same charter school board for eighteen years in 
the role of the public school academy’s board president. He accepted the request to serve 
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on the board from the school’s founding principal. He has been on the charter school 
board since 1998 and is one of the school’s original board members. Participant B’s 
rationale for joining a charter school board was so that he could give back to the 
community and assist a colleague with their attempts to improve the education status of 
children in the city of Detroit. 
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service Management Company  
When asked of the pros and cons of contracting with a full-service management 
company, Participant B provided the benefits of not having to worry about day-to-day 
matters such as the maintenance, payroll, and other very important tedious functions and 
activities required to operate a charter school. He stated: 
Ok, the pros were the ability of the management company to run the day-to-day 
operations: that was the pros. We were not involved specifically with the HR 
components like who is off this week and things of that nature, and that was kind 
of nice. Also the pros were they would handle the maintenance, back room 
security, things of that nature, and keep us posted on updated compliance issues 
within the charter school world; any Department of Education updates, 
newsletters, and publications, that was one of the pros of having a management 
company.  
In response to the cons of contracting with a full-service, for-profit management 
company, Participant B mentioned the challenge of not having any input into hiring the 
key leadership positions such as the superintendent and principal. He explained: 
The downside of it as we have come to find is the contract that we had engaged in 
was a long-term 7-year contract, our most recent contract. And as part of the 
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contract, was the fact we had no input in terms of who could be hired into key 
personnel positions. For example, the school leader, the assistant school leaders, 
any of the support staff, that [sic.] was all the responsibility of the management 
company. We could talk to them about whom [sic.] they chose, but it was totally 
their selection and that is what was built into that 7-year contract. We have found 
that sometimes that is not necessarily the best way. We did not have any input in 
terms of the selection.  
Participant B’s disposition of working with the management company was very 
positive in most aspects except for the critical area of hiring leadership, which is a key 
factor in determining the success of the charter school. He explained:   
No, actually we had a very fluid and fulfilling relationship until recently. And it 
was built around the selection of their team that would lead and manage the 
school. We were very happy with everything they had done. We had a good fund 
balance and [sic.] they managed the funds closely. The school was always well 
kept. We were always abreast of any changes. Updates in legislation and things of 
that nature, I mean they brought a lot of things to the table. The only problem was 
the changing in the staffing, which was considerable at the top. School leaders in 
particular for one reason or another. We experienced a lot of turnover at the top, 
especially in the role of the principal and other administrators. 
Given the challenges experienced by Participant B’s board, if he had the 
opportunity to change the original contract it would likely include provisions to allow 
board input into the selection of the principal. This would be in hopes to impact 
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leadership and prevent excessive changes and turnover at the whim of the management 
company. In terms of restructuring the contract, he said:  
We would have placed a clause in the contract saying that we would have the 
final decision on the selection of the leadership team…I think that would have 
made a difference in how things would have progressed. We had a situation where 
the management company actually promoted our school leader and made them a 
senior person in their company and moved people around internally that 
eventually did not work out. So had we had the ability to make the determination 
to select the next and upcoming school leader, the outcome may have been 
different.  
The previous clause may prevent such key decisions being made exclusive of and 
without any input from the board. In regards to specific instances of leadership changes, 
Participant B said, “The decision was made exclusive of the board. We were not 
informed that the decision was coming, but here’s the change; but please embrace it.” 
Upon being asked how this type of provision would manifest into operations, he 
explained that they would form an executive committee that would be empowered to 
make decisions on behalf of the board of directors. He explained: 
We have an executive committee, which comprises of the board president, vice 
president, and treasurer in our case. And they act on behalf of the board and 
anything they determine is recorded and ratified at the board meeting. If the 
executive committee had the opportunity to vet a potential candidate provided to 
us by the management company, we may have had a better understanding of what 
to anticipate in terms of their leadership capabilities…I think that may have 
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helped us in the long run and we would have put a clause in the contract where by 
either the board or a component of the board has the ability to make the final 
decision on the selection of the leadership of that school. 
Contractual Relationship  
Despite the issues regarding the hiring of school leadership, the contractual 
relationship was viewed as positive and functional. Participant B described the 
contractual relationship as follows: 
Contractually, it was effective and efficient. It was very well described in terms of 
responsibilities. We had our attorney that had been with us since day one review 
the contract and actually negotiate fine points in the contract. One of the things 
we already talked about was I wish we had included the ability to select the 
leadership person. But, in terms of reviewing the contract, structuring the 
contract, it went fairly well. We missed a couple of things, but it went very well. 
Overall, Participant B’s board was pleased with the contractual relationship. He 
did indicate the importance of having routine monitoring through reports on staffing 
levels, the budget process, and academic performance. In regards to the latter, he stated, 
“We would have had the leadership team have to provide information in terms of grades 
and performance on the academic side.”  More monitoring of academic performance and 
a stake in hiring decisions appeared to be the main issues that Participant B had with the 
contractual relationship. 
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance  
When asked about what factors might contribute to tension in governance, 
Participant B continued the theme of the selection of leadership. The leadership sets the 
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tone for the school and when turnover is frequent, he felt that stability is at risk. He felt 
that the primary source of tension came from turnover at the leadership level. He said,   
When you have a lack of stability for various reasons, you can look to the 
management company and ask why is this changing like this and why do you 
have so much turnover in specific areas, and can’t you find a stable person to 
come in with us and get the job done.  That is where the tension actually comes 
in. 
Accountability and Transparency  
When asked about accountability and transparency, Participant B indicated a high 
level of confidence in the tools that assist with monitoring and analyzing monthly 
operations and functions. He stated,  
In our case historically, I don’t think it has been an issue. Our reports are provided 
monthly. A couple of things that we did were to put us in charge of the 
checkbook, so we had a chance to see what is paid on a regular basis. We get a 
check register and then we will transfer the funds to cover a specific bill. 
Anything we are uncertain of; we ask questions. We do audits once a year, which 
have been clean. 
There appears to be a significant level of comfort in terms of the transparency of 
reporting of financial and operational matters. Participant B stated, “In terms of 
transparency and accuracy, it has been good for over 15 years. There are always 
questions about some of the detail in some of the categories but for the most part, all has 
been very transparent.”  
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Even with this comfort level, the board still had provisions including checks and 
balances to ensure transparency with requiring reports for any budget transfers more than 
$1,000.00. Regarding budget transfers, Participant B stated, “We would ask them to 
provide us with what was transferred over and why. We’d want to know what got 
transferred and why.” 
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions  
In terms of what could be done contractually or legislatively, Participant B 
believed that monitoring charter school growth and expansion was important given the 
challenge of limited resources and lack of qualified instructional staff. He stated the 
following: 
Let’s take legislative and this is for selfish reasons more than anything…I think 
the lift on the cap of charters schools was detrimental to what the charter schools 
movement could do. It expanded our presence but it also depleted our resources. 
When I say resources, I am referring to our instructional staff. I think we would 
have been able to maintain a better instructional staff and higher quality of 
instructional staff. One of the things legislatively that can be done is that more 
incentives can be put in place for teachers. Not sure exactly what that would look 
like, but I think the state can do a better job in trying to attract and promote 
teaching. 
In closing out the concerns legislatively for charter schools in Michigan, he 
reiterated, “There is a shortage of qualified teachers and lifting the cap provided more 
schools for less teachers. It spreads negativity across charter schools.  I do not think it 
was done in the best interest of charter schools, or public schools in general.” There 
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seemed to be concern from Participant B’s perspective on the negative effects that more 
charter schools can bring, especially in terms of hiring and retaining instructional staff.   
The other part of question five asked what could be done contractually to improve 
governance of Michigan charter schools. Participant B’s response was based upon nearly 
twenty years of charter school experience. He felt that charter schools are at a 
disadvantage because they are limited in regards to accessing alternative authorization or 
sponsorship of their charter. Most public school academies officially begin with the 
awarding of their charter, which contains their vision, mission, and reason for being. 
Very seldom have boards been able to transition from one authorizer to another. 
Participant B appeared to view this as a negative and therefore it disadvantaged board 
members and their charter schools to the sovereignty of the originating charter school 
authorizer. He stated: 
I have always had…we have one authorizer, and the contract/charter is with one 
authorizer, I am going to go that route. And the best way to say it, it is like a good 
ole boys network…I don’t know if you want to put the tape off on that one…but 
contractually if you are with one authorizer and if you have issues some issues 
with that one authorizer, for whatever the reason…they have meetings, and if 
your name comes up in terms of what is going on at that school, does that limit 
your ability to go or get contracted with another authorizer going forward; I think 
it might. It would taint any changes you want to do at the school [such as] if you 
wanted to move to a more vocational program. Could you contract with another 
authorizer to maybe just do that component or have the authorizer do the whole 
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thing? Contractually, I think that is something that would be looked at. That has 
always been a concern of mine anyway.  
There are two contracts that are of significance to the board of directors. The first 
was previously discussed, which is the charter contract between the board of directors 
and the charter school office. That charter was most likely granted from a public state 
university or other state entity empowered to give a charter. The second significant 
contract was that between the board of directors and the management company. This 
contract entailed the rules of engagement and interaction between the board of directors 
and the management company. The way the contract was formulated impacted the 
board’s ability to manage the operations of the charter school. Participant B indicated the 
following regarding their contract with their management company,  
The way that we were structured with our prior management company, it actually 
worked very well with exception to the educational component. My thought is if 
we had the foresight to change or put something in the contract so that we had 
some latitude in terms of the educational component, then I think it would have 
been a better contract. 
Participant B continued to discuss elements that, if restructured, would be placed 
in the contract. For example, provisions to have educational goals and performance 
incentives. He stated,  
I know that some schools in their foresight had some educational goals in their 
contract so if you hit educational hurdles and grades you could be paid your full 
contractual amount. If you did not hit that hurdle, your fee, or your management 
fee would be reduced by a certain amount. 
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The metrics would allow for the measurement of the management company’s 
performance. He continued, “Those kinds of things could have been in place, or included 
as well, which would have provided more incentive for the management company to do a 
better job in terms of instruction.” Participant B clearly indicated the impact the contract 
had on the power and authority of the board. If specific provisions are not placed in the 
contract in terms of consciously managing full-service management companies, boards 
may end up in positions where they feel a lack of authority and ownership. 
Participant B acknowledged the importance of leadership and governance in 
charter schools. He believes both can be improved with proper training and networks that 
allow sharing of insight, knowledge, experiences, and best practices. He supported policy 
groups such as MAPSA (Michigan Association of Public School Academies) and their 
mission of advocating for charter schools. He continued: 
It would be nice to hear from the source in person about what some of the changes 
are legislatively and how the charter school movement is doing as a whole; how 
regions are doing as a whole, what works, what is not working, and you can only 
get that through face-to-face. Also a best practice is to meet with other boards [in 
order] to hear what is working and not working. What works for you may not 
work for me, and what works for me may not work for you, but at least it is a 
means of sharing information. 
In terms of sharing information and developing networks for improvement, 
Participant B stated, “Actually it is more of a networking. Training is always good, but it 
is more of a networking function. Because you can always learn from someone who is 
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doing well.” He continued by stating that the authorizer is the entity to create such 
networks and forums.  
Participant B ended with what he would like to see more of in the future of charter 
schools. He indicated the need for alternate sources of funding charter schools and the 
importance of continued growth accompanied by stabilization and managing cost.  
Five years out...in terms of governance…I would like to see a forum where 
charter schools would have the capability of obtaining alternate sources of 
funding either bonding or some mechanism, not necessarily bonding. How do you 
control the growth and finances of your structures because basically if you don’t 
continue to grow, your expenses will escalate beyond your revenue sources? So, if 
you are stagnant in number and a capacity at your particular facility it is what it is; 
and you give increases to your staff every year, and if it is a stable staff, if you 
provide increases to a stable staff, you will bump against a ceiling eventually. 
How do you change that dynamic? That is a five-year issue for a school that is 
growing and doing well. If you don’t continue to expand your facilities, you are 
going to hit that ceiling: is there another source that we can possibly find to 
support our stability? 
Participant B mentioned numerous times the importance of placing provisions in 
the contract so that input could be provided from the board in terms of the selection of the 
superintendent and the principal. This would also be an effort to eliminate turnover of 
school leadership. He also reiterated the importance that leadership selection has on 
governance.  
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Summary of Results and Analysis 
Participant B’s interview responses discovered some areas of discussion that lend 
themselves to further analysis of the likelihood of being the source of role confusion and 
potential conflicts. Significant descriptors emerged from Participant B’s interview 
responses as seen in Table 5.  
 
He provided experiences that formulate his disposition, which the researcher has 
transformed such as joint responsibility for hiring key leadership, contract implications, 
board training and networking, community orientation, assumptions of the management 
contract, monitoring of the contract, and the management company being responsible for 
the day-to-day. Other descriptors also came out of the interview, such as legal guidance 
on the contract, board of director’s recourse in terms of authorization, and role 
responsibility for student discipline.  
Participant B strongly emphasized the retrospect of wishing the board of directors 
would have designed a contract giving them shared input for the selection of key 
 
 
Table 5  
 
Identification of Descriptors from Participant B’s Interview Transcript 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
! Joint responsibility for hiring key leadership 
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day 
! Contract implications 
! Assumptions of mgt. contract                        performance, sub-contracts  
! Community oriented/volunteerism 
! Legal guidance on contract 
! Board charter recourse in terms of authorization 
! Role responsibility for student discipline 
hiring and performance incentives 
! Monitoring of contract   tied to student performance 
! Board training and networking best practices and communications 
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leadership roles in the school. He added that their situation was exacerbated due to the 
longevity of the contract with the management company and the high turnover of the 
principal’s position, which the board had no recourse. He also focused on the importance 
of contractual implications regarding hiring and performance incentives for the 
management company. In terms of board training and networking, he appeared to have 
embraced board training, especially from credentialed sources. He also encouraged 
networking amongst boards of directors inclusive of sharing best practices. He mentioned 
his desire to contribute to the education objectives of the founder of his charter school. 
Participant B shared the challenges resulting from frequent turn over in the 
school’s leadership roles. He discussed the changes made and how the board could do 
nothing about it because the contract provided sole authority for hiring and firing to the 
management company. He also provided an example of how the management company 
displaced one of their leaders and brought them into the management company’s 
headquarters. He then elaborated on the contractual elements and how it affects hiring 
and performance incentives, which were lacking. He later turned his attention to training 
and the importance of networking with other charter school boards to share best practices. 
He suggested that the networking take place in more face-to-face forums. Other 
descriptors resonated; these descriptors are significant to the perspective of Participant 
B’s overall disposition regarding contracts and its impact on governance and leadership 
in Michigan charter schools when contracting with for-profit private management 
companies. 
Participant B’s rationale for joining a charter school board of directors was very 
similar to most highly educated board members. He believed that it provided a venue to 
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give back to the community and help improve educational opportunities for young 
people.   
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant B illustrated potential for 
conflicts given the role confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and 
the for-profit private management company in the areas of the inability to affect hiring of 
key leadership roles, and understanding the impact of the contractual agreement. 
The first descriptor that exemplified confusion was the board president and other 
board members’ perspectives that they would have input into the hiring process. They 
experienced high turnover in the key roles of leadership and even had one principal 
promoted from the school into the executive level of the for-profit management 
company.  In an instance where the board of directors expressed concern for a specific 
decision regarding a change of the principal’s office, they were told by the management 
company to “Embrace it!” The board of directors’ realization that they could not affect 
hiring in any aspect appears to have devastated them given their inability to impact hiring 
practices to even the slightest degree. Once the board signed the contract for full-services, 
which included all responsibility for employment, their ability to impact any decisions 
regarding staffing were null and void. 
The second descriptor that indicated role confusion was what appeared to be a 
hope of renegotiating an addendum or clause into the contract between the board of 
directors and the full-service management company. This clause would have enabled the 
board to have a voice in the hiring of key leadership roles. However, they signed into a 
seven-year agreement where the primary source of confusion and conflict centered on the 
contract, which was locked for seven years without contractual recourse unless there was 
some kind of material breach. The lack of contractual awareness inflates confusion, 
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which resulted in conflicts given the board’s lack of understanding of the contract’s 
dynamics and the far-reaching implications of signing agreements for multiple years. 
         The two descriptors from the interview of Participant B illustrated confusion in key 
areas of hiring key personnel and understanding the implications of the dynamics of the 
contract between the board of directors and the for-profit private management company. 
The ambiguity resulted in confusion and caused conflict, which impacted the governance 
of the charter school. 
Interview Participant C 
 
Background and Rationale for Being a Board Member 
 
   Participant C is a white female in her late forties with a college degree who has 
served on her charter school board for more than thirteen years. She has been on the 
charter school board since 2002 and plans to continue being a board member for years to 
come. She works in the field of health care and has managed a non-profit organization as 
well as her own business. She brings a variety of administrative and managerial skills to 
the board of directors as well as the experience of being a parent on the board of her 
children’s school.  
The impetus of her becoming a charter school board member was so that she 
could impact the education of her children and the lives of children in the community: 
I started as a board member of my school board when my children were young. I 
had one in kindergarten and one in second grade, and I wanted to be involved in 
their school experience. After being involved in the first year, I was approached 
about six months later after being involved in the school and asked if I would 
consider being a board member. That was over 13 years ago. 
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Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service Management Company 
She strongly believed that contracting with a full-service management company 
mitigates the responsibilities of the board and diminishes the board’s accountability. She 
stated, “With the full service, we as board members did not have as much responsibility. 
There was less accountability (that could go pro or con) from the board, and less 
responsibility for the school leaders as well. That is the one thing that would free school 
leaders to lead the school and focus on the kids.”  
The contract with a full-service management company allowed the board to not 
have to be involved in routine affairs. It also enabled the principal to focus on instruction 
and not have to bother with activities such as hiring staff. She explained, 
The hiring of employees did not have to be done by the school leader. The school 
leader would not have to go through the full process of hiring teachers: same for 
counselors and things of that nature. When you divert that to a management 
company that will take care of that. The management company took care of it, 
which also takes away the power of the school leader to be able to say this is who 
I want or who I would like. Day-to-day issues would not be the top priority of the 
board of directors. The management company’s full service role enabled 
administrators to better focus on students and families.  
Participant C often mentioned that the comprehensive management status gave 
the management company the ability to do what they wanted to in regards to budgeting, 
financial, and programmatic types of activities. She stated, "Some of the cons; funds were 
allocated to where the management company wanted them to be. We did not have the 
accountability. They were able to do what they wanted to with the funds.”  The latitude 
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enabled the management company to have full control over budget development. She 
continued, “The management company pretty much set the budgets for board approval. 
Having that particular scenario, it really took control away from the boards.”  It was not 
until program evaluations gave an indication of ineffectiveness that the board began to 
wonder if more programs were effectively being implemented or wasted school 
resources. She stated, “I found over the years that as monies were paying for ineffective 
programs (and we started pulling data) and seeing the effects of some of these programs, 
that the budget had to be redone and funds had to be allocated to different places.” 
Contractual Relationship 
 
In terms of question two regarding the contractual relationship between the board 
of directors and the management company, Participant C indicated a fairly one-sided 
relationship. The one-sidedness was exacerbated by the inexperience at that time of the 
board members. She stated,  
The contracts were made by the management company and expected to be signed 
by the board. So it was very one-sided at that point…so the finances and contracts 
were already set ahead of time and we were not fully grasping what we were 
doing at that time as board members. 
Participant C also gave indication that despite the fact that the management 
company made decisions regarding budgets and contracts, the board of directors was still 
the one responsible. She stated: 
I would say, in our experience, we had contracts that were made and it was 
between the management company and our vendor. There were some legal things 
(which I cannot go into detail), which put our school liable, which resulted in a 
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lawsuit, which resulted in things in which the school was still liable. The board 
was still liable for it at the end, even though it was management’s issue and their 
responsibility. It was still put on the board. We still had to pay fees; we had to pay 
lawyers out of our school’s budget. 
In the experience of Participant C, the management company was making 
decisions and the board was held accountable. Also, it appeared that the management had 
the disposition that the board would sign off on whatever they put in front of them: “Yes, 
the management company were less accountable to the boards because they made all of 
the decisions. They prepared everything ahead of time and expected the board to just 
approve it.” 
 Participant C gave an indication that there was a concern with giving an entity 
comprehensive control over the operations of the charter school:  
I just think the fact of having so much responsibility on one company, which are 
not as invested as the members of the boards that have seen these kids for so 
many years; that have grown up with these kids, they don’t have the same 
vestment as the board members or school leaders. 
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance  
 
Participant C indicated that tensions often came from the disposition of the 
management company that the board would approve anything the management company 
placed in front of them. Especially in the beginning years, when the board was less 
experienced. She stated,  
In the fact that all of the contracts would be prepared, even the contracts for 
venders, they would go out and put out the RFP (Request for Proposal), but still 
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go ahead and bring to the table and say this is the one we would like to go with 
and the one we will go with, instead of putting it in front of the board and letting 
us make the decision.  
Accountability and Transparency  
In terms of accountability and transparency, Participant C feels that issues exist 
related to the time board members have to thoroughly review important documents and 
data such as budgets, audits, and contracts. She stated,  
Yes I do, I believe that [by] having a for-profit entity, they already have their set 
out budgets in place and agendas set in advance. Going back to the fact that a 
board is there just once a month and their expectation is that you will go ahead 
and pass everything they put in front of you.  
Participant C elaborated on the issues of the board being expected to sign 
whatever the management company placed in front of them. She provided the following 
examples: 
The budgets, and the budget changes, revised budgets. I have seen revised 
budgets come in with cuts in certain funds by as much as 20 to 30k for one year. 
How can you cut that kind of budget without having discussions or providing 
reasoning behind it? When you have a board that is more involved in such areas 
then you will have more transparency and accountability. Or an advisory board 
reviewing and providing input, tearing it apart and asking questions.  
In regards to question four on accountability and transparency, Participant C 
indicated that when a board hired a full-service management company, it needed to be 
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even more involved given the breadth and scope of their involvement to the operations of 
the school. She stated: 
Other than the fact I believe board members need to be more involved (if they are 
going to have a full-service management company that takes care of everything 
from budgets, to purchases, contracts, hiring, firing etc.), their bottom line is, 
what is going to make them money. They are going to do what will more 
favorably impact their bottom line. What is first and foremost is their profit 
margin. They will always think of their profit margin first versus a volunteer 
position of a board member who is involved because of the kindness of their heart 
and are there because they want to be and not someone is forcing them there or 
giving them a big salary, because none of us are getting paid.  
Participant C provided a strong contrast of the sense of purpose between the volunteer 
board and the for-profit private management company. 
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions 
 
In terms of what could be done contractually or legislatively to improve 
governance in Michigan charter schools, Participant C suggested exploring other models 
of management that do not completely hand over all operations. She included some 
hybrid forms of management and self-management models. She stated:  
Contractually, there could be considerations on subcontracting certain entities. 
Our particular model has gone to more of a self-managed model where the board 
has given the responsibility back to the school leaders. The school leaders are the 
ones that put the budgets together and the finances are done by administrators; 
with teacher input. We contract background checks, payroll and things like that 
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for our management company that we currently have. We have now just minimal 
responsibility at the contract level. Our contracts are laid out with what is 
specifically laid out for us. However, if we were able to bring it legislatively, to 
pass laws across the board that would hold schools to the same standard across the 
board...many, many charters are run very differently, each one has their own 
accountability and each one has their own contractual agreements. Some have full 
service; some have no service. Some have sub contracts with many companies.  
Participant C indicated a legislative need for consistency in terms of how charter 
schools in Michigan are managed and operated. She also introduced the concept of a non-
profit management model she believed might better fit the needs of Michigan charter 
school boards of directors. She elaborated: 
If we were looking at it legislatively, it would be looking for a model across the 
board…legislature should press for more consistency. In my experience, I believe 
that having a non-profit management company would be a better model and 
option…it would be a different understanding to have a non-profit come in and 
work on behalf of a school…better to have a non-profit partner with a school to 
find resources through federal resources that are out there.  
Participant C further explained the legislative implications on governance 
regarding effective training for board members to understand their roles. She also 
indicated training should come from entities other than the authorizer. She stated, 
“Training, for the boards that are out there, not necessarily from the authorizers of the 
schools but more training to have board members understand their roles.” She continued 
to discuss the need for training beyond the general basics currently provided and 
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promoted tailored training to enhance knowledge and skills with the intent to impact 
board governance. She continued, “Specifically understanding contract negotiations, 
understanding budgeting; I believe breakout sessions on how to pick apart budgets, 
looking at school calendars, placing board members into sub categories to work with 
finances, discipline, etc. and forming different sub-committees from the board.”  
Participant C indicated that the training for Michigan charter school boards should 
be centralized as much as possible and come from the state level to ensure consistency 
and accountability. She stated, “It really should be brought at a legislative level, at a 
much larger level that is going to have accountability. It should be training brought by a 
nonprofit that has trained and understands what are the responsibilities of charter school 
boards.” 
In conclusion, in regards to legislative implications on governance in Michigan 
charter schools, Participant C suggested a look at community partnering and non-profits 
as a viable model for the operations of the schools. She indicated a concern for charters in 
the future and making sure that school choice is in the hands of parents. She explained: 
Personally, I would like to see non-profits come together to offer services to the 
schools [and] partnering with the schools. Being able to be a part of making sure 
that schools have their own mission, and goals so that they can accomplish those 
things. Community partnering is still going to be key in the charter schools going 
forward. Legislatively, we are in a difficult place right now because we don’t 
know what is going to happen for charter schools. We could be in a very 
dangerous place, by not having the freedom of choice. There are bills that could 
mandate every child going to their local school, and district…regardless of suburb 
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or city. We need to make sure that the choice stays with the parents to have their 
children in schools. 
Summary and Analysis of Results  
Participant C’s interview responses brought out some common areas of discussion 
that lend themselves to an analysis based on the likelihood of these areas being the source 
of role confusion and potential conflict. Significant descriptors emerged from Participant 
C’s interview responses as seen in Table 6.  
 
Significant descriptors emerged from the qualitative data from Participant C as 
illustrated in Table 6. She shared experiences, which conveyed her perspectives inclusive 
of the board of directors is ultimately responsible; board viewed as a rubber stamp; board 
training on roles, responsibility, and on the contract itself; and her volunteer/community 
service based rationale for serving on a charter school board. Other descriptors included 
transparency, accountability, board investment, demands of a charter school board 
member, and the profit motive.   
 
 
Table 6 
 
Identification of Descriptors from Participant C’s Interview Transcript  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
! Board is ultimately responsible 
! Management company not as vested as the board of directors 
! Rubber stamp 
! Transparency and accountability 
! Community oriented/volunteerism 
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day 
! Board charter recourse in terms of authorization 
! Role responsibility for student discipline 
! Perceived vs. reality of demand and expectations on charter school board 
members 
! Board Training on roles and responsibilities 
! Profit motive implications 
training on contract 
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Participant C emphasized that the board of directors has the ultimate 
responsibility regarding the operations and dynamics of the charter school. She also 
discussed the issue of how her board has experienced an expectation from the 
management company that the board would sign anything they placed in front of them. 
This management position aligned with the next description of her experience, which is 
her perception of the board being viewed as a rubber stamp. This metaphor was used by 
Participant C to mean that the board is a figurehead to sign and endorse whatever the 
management company places in front of them.  
She subsequently focused on board training on roles, regarding or inclusive of 
responsibility, and nuances of the management contract. The training was highlighted in 
her experience where she indicated that she and other board members did not initially 
fully understand their board of director roles and positions. Instead, they navigated often 
by trial and error and improved their leadership and governance over time. She also 
described the profit motive and its implications. Participant C described this as the 
management company’s focus of making a profit and everything else is secondary. She 
also appeared to focus on transparency, perceived versus reality of demands and 
expectations of charter school boards of directors, and the profit motive as previously 
mentioned. 
She provided rationale similar to other interview candidates in her determination 
to impact education for children in under-served communities. She responded to the 
request of a friend to join the board and has taken on roles such as vice president and 
currently president. 
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The qualitative data from the interview of Participant C indicated potential for 
conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the 
for-profit private management company with the descriptors such as ultimate 
responsibility of the board, and feeling like a rubber stamp, issues of accountability or of 
the board being ultimately responsible and transparent and lack of understanding the 
contract between the board of directors and the management company. 
The first descriptor that expressed role confusion is the board president’s 
disposition of seeing the board as having ultimate responsibility, and simultaneously 
feeling like a rubber stamp. This is a state of confusion because the board has the 
perception of power, however, they are expected to sign whatever the management 
company places before them and is told who will be their vendor for certain services. 
This led to the feeling of being a “rubber stamp” as opposed to an actual decision maker. 
The confusion as to what is the board’s position and what is the board’s power leads to 
conflicts between them and the management company. 
The second descriptor that indicated confusion is viewed through the board 
president’s perception around issues of accountability and transparency. She expressed 
what appeared to be frustration with holding the management company accountable due 
to lack of the certainty of the board’s roles. The other part of the confusion was based on 
the appearance that the board received reports without explanations on finances that were 
expended on programs without subsequent program evaluations. She expressed concerns 
of the board formerly not knowing what to do because they did not have the experience. 
The final descriptor encompasses the previous two because the interview 
participant indicated how more training is needed on the contract upfront to thwart 
negative implications from not knowing and understanding the contract. The example for 
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this is how the management company took the lead on sub-contracting and provided 
subpar information for monitoring and evaluating programs. 
         The three descriptors from the interview of Participant C illustrated confusion in 
areas concerning board roles and responsibilities, which produced the feelings of being a 
rubber stamp. In addition, the board operated from a disposition of inexperience and now 
suggests that training on the boards’ contracts is implemented upfront for all, and 
especially new board members.  The issues regarding lack of understanding of the board 
roles, feeling like a rubber stamp, accountability and transparency issues, and not 
understanding the dynamics of the contract presents confusion and adds to the 
governance conflicts between the board of directors and the for-profit private 
management company. 
Interview Participant D 
 
 Background and Rationale of Being a Board Member  
 
Participant D is an educated African American female in her early sixties who had 
served on her charter school board for six years prior to resigning. The impetus of her 
becoming a charter school board member was so that she could make a difference in the 
lives of children and provide an option to urban children who needed an alternative to the 
Detroit Public School system. She is a retired professional. Unfortunately, after six years, 
she resigned before her term was finished after coming to the realization that what she 
envisioned as a charter school board member was drastically different from her reality 
and experience. 
Participant D was the vice president on the board of a Michigan charter school. 
She joined the board of directors with positive visions of what a charter school could be. 
She remained positive despite hearing mixed reviews on charter schools in the state of 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	  140	  
Michigan and the nation. Despite the mixed reviews, she decided to give it a chance and 
became the vice president of the board of directors. She stated: 
Ok, why did I join the board? Basically, at that particular time, my grandchildren 
were coming of age where they would be attending school, at a Detroit school. 
And at that time, like everyone else, I was looking for alternatives other than 
Detroit Public Schools for them. I had heard a lot of good things about the charter 
school movement, and I heard a lot of bad things. But I wanted to take a chance 
for them and on their behalf; that is how I got involved.  
Participant D’s experience was soon shattered as her first term awakened her to 
some of the challenging aspects of governance that may occur as a charter school board 
member. She said,  
Basically, where do I start, when I first joined the board I never was really 
educated or trained, so to speak, on what my position would be as a governor of 
that particular entity. I came in with all of these expectations of being part of a 
movement and I was excited about doing great things for the children. However, 
after being in my second term, I realized that I was a rubber stamp. 
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service Management Company 
In regards to the first qualitative question regarding the pros and cons of 
contracting with a full-service private management company, Participant D referred to a 
con as the lack of understanding the roles that her board experienced. The lack of 
understanding created doubt in what their purpose was as a board, which she explained:  
We started to question what our responsibility was. Then I started to notice more 
of the financials, and I was asked to sign checks and different things. And we 
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were not given line-by-line. As I began to ask questions, I was never given direct 
answers. So I began to ask more questions by email, and I would get a little bit 
more but still not really answers. They would give me answers they thought I 
would want to hear, but at least they responded. 
Contractual Relationship  
In describing the specific contractual relationship between the board and the 
management company, Participant D simply stated, “That is the only reason they needed 
a board and that was because they had to have a board. A dictatorship and a rubber 
stamp.” 
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance  
 
In terms of what factors contribute to tension in governance, Participant D 
provided examples of frustrations caused by the lack of understanding of roles, input 
from board members seemingly not welcomed, and the difficulty she and board members 
experienced when asking questions regarding the operations of the school. She stated: 
One particular instance when we, the board of directors, were supposed to have 
say for the handbook and there was a confrontation, verbal, back and forth 
between the management company and myself and my board members; because 
they went on and did the handbook without any of our input. And that was the 
beginning of not only my distaste, but many of the board members at that time 
that were actively on the board. 
Such frustrations became fairly routinized as small issues came up, such as a 
discrepancy over the student handbook. Issues continued to mount as the board felt the 
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need to contract legal services to help navigate communications between the board of 
directors and the management company. Participant D stated,  
At that point, the board decided to hire another attorney because they realized at 
some point in time, when the board first began, it came with a ready-made lawyer; 
the attorney did not represent the board. We made the decision to start there; to 
hire another attorney.  
More tensions mounted as the board felt that the management company had 
selected the attorney for the charter school. Participant D articulated: 
I did my research and the management company had handpicked attorneys. They 
picked and assigned [attorneys] to these schools and if you [do] research, you will 
see that the same attorneys represent different schools. So when we really got into 
looking for an attorney, I started to get negative calls and negative emails from 
the management company. They asked to meet with me, myself and the president. 
I would never meet with them alone, and they asked us to back off with the hiring 
of a new attorney. When that did not happen, I knew by the next term I would be 
terminated so I got busy trying to do as much as I could before my term was up. 
Further tension came when the board did not receive feedback to questions asked. 
It appeared as though the management company did not feel compelled to give direct 
answers. Participant D stated, “Well the bottom line is, and they love to use the term, they 
are a for-profit and they don’t have to tell you anything.”  
Accountability and Transparency 
 
In terms of question four, Participant D emphatically believed accountability and 
transparency was an issue. She referred to questioning where the money was being spent 
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and why it was not clear in terms of rent, contracts, and other significant expenditures. 
She said: 
Who is getting these contracts? Are you putting the bids out there like you are 
supposed to and sharing it with the board? You tell me that you are spending 
millions of dollars on the school, but I don’t see what you did. The children do not 
have a lunchroom; they are eating in their rooms. They have no gymnasium; we 
are totally in the dark. 
The issues of accountability and transparency are in part because of the challenges 
Participant D depicted her board faced when asking for financial and budget related 
information. As previously indicated, she felt the management company’s disposition 
was due to being a for-profit private company and therefore not compelled to share their 
information. She stated:  
Well, my question at the end of the day is, how much profit are you making? You 
don’t want to show me that. And if you don’t want to show me how much profit 
you are making, then I am not quite sure that the children are getting what they 
are supposed to get. You can tell me anything, but I need to see the figures. I need 
to see the numbers. I need to see where the money is going.” 
The tensions continued all the way to the end of Participant D’s last day and 
resignation. She had asked that the board’s lawyer attend their public meeting and that 
specific documents be provided from the management company. She indicated: 
On the night I resigned, I invited the company they used to do their financials. 
They came in with some actual documents because they had sent us blacked out 
documents…their explanation was that something happened to the copier. But in 
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actuality, I had asked for the original documents so that was not true…they 
obviously sent us blacked out documents because it was something in it they did 
not want us to see.  
The tensions were obviously very high between the board and the for-profit 
management company as indicated by Participant D. Unfortunately, she did not have any 
pros to speak of given her and other fellow board members’ experiences with their 
contracted for-profit private management company. 
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions  
 
When asked what could be done contractually and legislatively to improve 
governance in Michigan charter schools, she indicated that there should not be a for-
profit entity running a public school academy that receives tax payers’ dollars. She stated, 
“Let’s start with legislatively because if you start legislatively, then the contractual will 
fall into place. They need to stop passing laws that gives these guys the opportunity to do 
what they are doing legally. That is the bottom line.” She continued to specifically state, 
“Well, I personally believe there should not be a for-profit running any public school.  
Because it is all about profit! And if they don’t have the children’s best interest at heart 
then it is a no brainer. They should not be in the business.” 
In terms of contractually, Participant D took the disposition that boards of 
directors should have their own contracted legal counsel. She explained, “Well, if, when 
the board comes in play, they should have their own attorney. Someone they trust who is 
looking out for their best interest and not the management company’s best interests. If it 
starts there, I think the rest will follow.” 
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Participant D reinforced the lack of empowerment saying that boards’ hands are 
tied and she alluded to a “rubber stamp.” When asked if anything could be done to 
improve the board’s ability to govern, she responded,  
No, because if the contract is tying the board’s hands behind their back, which is 
what these contracts are doing, basically you are a rubber stamp. And not only are 
you a rubber stamp, there is not transparency and no accountability, so other than 
that the contract is basically just paper. 
Despite the negative experience as a board member, Participant D says that she 
can live with charter schools as long as they are held accountable and their activities 
monitored. She said:  
I can live with charter schools. Because if someone is watching our money; then 
someone is watching the children. I am not against per se charter schools…I am 
against how they are being run and not servicing the children they say they are 
servicing. For example, the school that I was on the board for, there were a lot of 
social issues in that area…when you move in there you should know that…You 
should move there with a plan to include that whole child not just to make a 
profit.  
Participant D also suggested making sure that new and current board members are 
aware of the details of the contract between the charter school board of directors and the 
for-profit private management company. She stated, “Well, once again we are going back 
to the contract. When you sit on one of these boards, make sure you know what you can 
and cannot do.” 
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She also suggested that training occur from the first day of a person becoming a 
charter school board member. She said that roles are not clear from the beginning and she 
came in with a very naïve perspective. She stated, “No, it is not clear from the start. You 
would have to be there wide-eyed and bushy-tailed for a couple of years to really know 
what was going on unless you already had board experience.” She gave an example of 
how board minutes should be managed by the board of directors and not the management 
company. She also believed that people should be made aware of the demands of board 
roles so there are no misconceptions. She stated, “For novices like myself who just want 
to do something good…it took me a while to realize that this is not good…I am really not 
making a difference here.” In closing, Participant D stated,  
When I think back and I say why it took me so long, you know, could I have done 
more? Those questions will always remain with me. But I do hope that I did make 
a difference…I did go and say this is not right. 
She also stated that the contract was a critical piece and should be revisited 
routinely by the board and that opportunities to renegotiate should be seized to reflect the 
boards’ requirements. She appeared to believe that leverage and a position of strength for 
the board is in the contract. The contract should be reviewed as she stated: 
Yes, starting there...line-by-line…precept-by-precept…Bring in the attorney, 
allowing the attorney to educate that board member as to what the contract is 
about. Not one of the authorizer’s; not one of the management company’s… it 
should be a one-to-one relationship between the attorney and the board and make 
sure that attorney indeed works for the board. 
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Summary and Analysis of Results  
 
Participant D’s experience as a board member appeared to encompass frustrations 
that manifested into a sense of distrust for the management company. Her responses, 
which abated her focus on the need for the board to have independent legal council, were 
illustrated in terms of focusing on revising the contract. (See Table 7) 
 
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant D indicated potential areas 
for conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the 
for-profit private management company. Multiple descriptors emerged from the 
qualitative data from Participant D as illustrated in Table 7. She shared her experiences, 
which conveyed perspectives inclusive of: issues of transparency and full disclosure, 
feeling like a rubber stamp, lack of board training, and overlap of academic 
responsibilities between the board of directors and the for-profit private management 
company. Other pertinent descriptors also emerged but were less direct sources of 
 
 
Table 7 
Identification of Descriptors from Participant D’s Interview Transcript 
______________________________________________________________________ 
! Transparency and full disclosure 
! Confusion of overlap of academic responsibilities 
! Rubber stamp 
! Community oriented/volunteerism 
! No recourse for board of directors when in disagreement with the mgt. company 
! Management of sub-contractors 
! Role responsibility for student discipline 
! Tension due to contract negotiations with management company 
! Board training on roles and responsibilities 
! Profit motive implications 
student advocacy 
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confusion and role conflicts. These included; community orientation/volunteerism, profit 
motive implications, and tensions due to contract negotiations.  
The first descriptor that emerged from Participant D reiterated a sense of 
skepticism due to the ambiguity that the board of directors felt regarding transactions, 
budget reporting, and responses (or lack of responses) to the questions from the board of 
directors to the management company. The skepticism increased, as interactions over 
time seemed to not improve. These interactions led to issues involving the descriptors of 
accountability and transparency. Participant D expressed a sense of bewilderment 
regarding the reporting of public funds, and the seemingly evasiveness of the for-profit 
management company when it came to reporting and accountability to the board of 
directors. The confusion of the board of directors led to conflicts between the two parties. 
The second descriptor that emerged from Participant D is the feeling of being a 
rubber stamp. She indicated feelings of disorientation because the board seemed to not be 
able to govern from a position of strength. On the contrary, it seemed to have weaknesses 
in terms of obtaining basic information from its management company. This metaphor 
was introduced to this study by the data gathered from interview Participant C. In similar 
fashion, it describes the board’s feeling of just being a figurehead for parallel governance 
where they are just in board roles for the sake of meeting state requirements. The 
example provided by Participant D was the issue of the handbook where she stated that 
the board of directors was not allowed to provide input despite their request to preview 
and edit. She stated that these actions caused the board to question their purpose and if 
they were truly empowered. These experiences led to confusion and resulted in conflicts 
in the relationship between the board of directors and the for-profit private management 
company. 
The third descriptor is relative to the lack of board training, which she stated 
needs to be initiated as soon as a person becomes a board member. She stressed the 
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importance of understanding roles and understanding what the board of directors can and 
cannot do. The lack of role understanding led to confusion as to the board’s sense of 
purpose and commensurately contributed to conflicts in their ability to govern. 
         The three descriptors from the interview of Participant D illustrated confusion in 
areas concerning issues of accountability and transparency, the feeling of being a rubber 
stamp, the lack of understanding their board roles, and the contractual elements between 
the board of directors and the for-profit private management company individually and 
collectively contributed to confusion and added to the governance conflicts between the 
board of directors and the for-profit private management company. 
Interview Participant E 
 
 Background and Rationale for Being a Board Member  
 
Participant E is an African American female with a college degree in her late 
forties who has served on her charter school board for approximately eleven years. She 
has served in multiple roles for the past five years including vice president and currently 
she is the board president. She is a medical researcher for a local hospital. Her primary 
reason for becoming a board member is to help urban city children have access to 
educational opportunities. She stated: 
.  Ok, I have been serving on my current board for about 11 years. I was invited to 
be a board member by a good friend of mine of this particular board and I was 
intrigued with the idea of helping children. Also, seeing that I had a few of my 
own children that were school aged. We had been through several types of school 
systems with my children: Private schools, public schools, so I thought I would 
give it a try and see how much of an impact I could make with the board. I did not 
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know anything about being a board member for a charter school, so it was new to 
me.  
Participant E is one of the few charter school board presidents to lead her program 
through the challenging process of transitioning from one authorizer to another.  She 
indicated, throughout her interview, how demanding the roles of charter school board 
members have become in terms of time and preparation. Often, she said it was like a 
second job. 
She distinguished the differences in the role of general board members from those 
board members who hold specific roles such as treasurer, vice president, or president. 
The amount of time for preparation is essential for board members to add value to 
meetings inclusive of fruitful discussions and prudent decision-making. She talked of 
supporting the community and student advocacy.  
She mentioned the importance of the board and the management company 
working together to meet the challenges of public education. She discussed the 
importance of leveraging the authorizer and the community to maximize the resources of 
the school. She emphasized the importance of board training and supported the idea of 
the board having input into selecting the leadership of the school. 
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service, For-Profit Management 
Company  
 
In Participant E’s response to the first interview question regarding the pros and 
cons relative to governance when contracting with a full-service management company, 
she indicated how it is a voluntary position based on the premise of being an advocate for 
the community. She reiterated how demanding it is to be a contributing board member 
and how much support is needed to govern effectively. She stated: 
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I would say the pros, partly, when you are a board member for a charter school, it 
is voluntary. There is no monetary compensation for being a member, you don’t 
get any financial perks, per say, there is no financial gain from being a member. 
So your time is all relative to you giving back to the community. With that being 
said, being a board member of a charter school could almost be like a full time 
job. And you need a lot of assistance to help manage and maintain the school that 
you govern. And the pro, I would say, is if you have a very astute, professional, 
experienced management group you could accomplish a lot of that and maintain 
some type of trust that they are doing the day-to-day stuff that needs to be done; 
relevant to providing a good education to the students of your school. So I would 
say that is a pro because it takes a lot to run a school.  
           In acknowledging the challenges of what it takes to run a charter school, she 
included the fact that a board requires a lot of support if it is to provide an opportunity for 
a good education. In the same respect, she recognizes that a balance is needed to govern 
from a macro perspective and not micro-manage the day-to-day, which is the 
responsibility of the management company. However, giving space to the management 
company requires a lot of trust that they will be transparent and vigilant in managing the 
resources of the school. She articulated this in the following: 
One of the cons I would say is although you do not want to micromanage, as a 
voluntary board member you do not have the means to be involved in the day-to-
day minutia of running the school…you can often allow too much leeway for the 
management company to manage the school and often you allow them to make 
decisions that should be made by the board. So you have to strike a delicate 
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balance between governing and then overseeing the activities and make sure there 
is transparency between you and the management group, so you can trust what 
they are doing and allow them to do it as a board. Yet that everything is 
transparent; that there is nothing going on that the board is not aware of.  
            The demands on all public schools are tremendous and require training and 
insight if a board member is to be effective and not just present. She contrasted the 
difference between being a regular board member and one that holds an officer’s role: 
I would say, me on a personal basis, that being a board president for the last few 
years, the contrast between when I first became a regular board member, and the 
last three to four years as president. The climate of accountability changed a lot in 
the state of Michigan. Accountability to standardized testing, and holding the 
board and school accountable for how well their children performed. It became a 
lot more laborious for the board members to be aware of how academically astute 
our children are based on the standards put in place and then have to account for 
any shortfalls. Either we have to do a lot of the research ourselves or put onus on 
our management group to provide us with the proper resources to keep us aware 
of where we are as far as the standards are concerned, and where we should 
be…so it became a situation where having a full time job makes it difficult for me 
to give the attention needed to be effective.  
As Participant E substantiated the complexities of standardized testing and other 
federal and state requirements, she elaborated on the demands that she stated are much 
greater than a two-hour per month meeting. She explained:  
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I thought about the activities and welfare of our children and it became a second 
job. It was not just a once a month activity for me. It was becoming more of a 
weekly assessment of what I need to be doing; how we need to be preparing for 
our kids so they could perform at their greatest ability. Also, we need to make 
sure that we have the proper resources in place to do that. That is what I would 
say in terms of it becoming a job more so than a 1 or 2 hours a month situation.  
She further elaborated on the importance of understanding board roles, especially 
when one holds an officer’s position: 
I would say yes, it depends on the role you have. Of course, if I were just a 
regular board member, I would not have as much responsibility like that as 
president. I have been a board president for about 4 years now and I would say 
over the last two years or so I have become more integrally involved in the 
welfare of the school and our relationship with our new authorizer. And also, the 
accountability of our management group because we had some new personnel 
changes. I just want to make sure that the level of service we receive from our 
management group does not go down, that it still continues to be quality service. 
And with that being said, I find myself thinking more about my responsibilities as 
a board member and providing more action outside of those meetings that we 
have once a month and little committee meetings we may have periodically. I take 
my role more seriously because I know there are little lives dependent on us to 
advocate on their behalf for them to get a good education. So my volunteer job as 
a board member; sometimes it could be a part time job for me, not 40 hours a 
week, but it is definitely not just meeting on one Tuesday out of the month for a 
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few hours. I take it very seriously what I do, and regretfully so, I wish I could do 
more…but I have a family and I work full time. But I do the best I can.  
Participant E mentioned multiple times that despite the demands and requirements 
from the state and federal government; and despite contracting with a full-service 
management company, the responsibility primarily was on the charter school’s board of 
directors. She articulated this disposition as follows: 
Ultimately, it is the board of directors’ responsibility to see that we put in place, 
what needs to be implemented utilizing our management company; needs to be 
implemented in terms of getting the proper instruction in place, data management 
and utilizing the data to better equip our teachers and looking at the performances 
of the students. So, ultimately I would say it is the board of directors’ 
responsibility for that.  
Participant E articulated the specific demands on the person who assumes the role 
of board president. She expounded: 
Yes the responsibility and onus of a regular board member is not as heavy. The 
board chair, of course, because whatever goes wrong, the buck stops with you. So 
I have to sign off on contracts, I have to sign off on bids, and different things that 
I have to have my name on…If I am not aware of what is going on and it goes 
awry, my name is on it...so I have to make sure that I understand what I am 
getting myself into as a board president for the school and individually. Whereas a 
regular member, I did not have that level of accountability per se. So it is a 
heavier role to assume and I kind of assumed this role by default, but I am glad to 
be the board president for this school. 
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Given the board of directors’ position of ultimate responsibility, she made it clear 
that if the management company is not meeting the requirements of making students 
successful, then their performance must come under question and scrutiny. She 
exemplified this with the following:  
And then if the management group are not doing what they need to be doing in 
terms of equipping the staff with what they need in order to educate the students 
and teach them in terms of where they can perform at an acceptable level. Or even 
see some gains overall as we assess our core groups of students, our cohorts, and 
compare them to other districts and things like that. So, if they are not doing what 
they need to do, the board is ultimately responsible to assess what we see and then 
see what we need to do in terms of that particular management group.   
Participant E acknowledged the challenges of changing management companies 
and therefore reiterated the importance of trust and working together. Given the 
challenges of working together, there are areas with great concerns. One of those 
concerns was the appointment of school leadership. In the following, she discussed the 
importance of hiring leadership and staff:  
In terms of hiring, for example, we give at my particular school; we give our 
management company leeway on hiring teachers, instructional coaches, and the 
like. We think they have enough experience to do that…there are situations where 
we may feel like we want some input. For instance, a school leader, we want to 
have some input as the board as to who is hired for that particular position. But 
for the most part, we give our management group leeway in that respect and trust 
they choose the right people for the position. 
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Participant E was comfortable as long as the trust is present to allow the 
management company the lead role in hiring all staff. However, there was some 
hesitancy to give them full autonomy in hiring the principal or superintendent roles. She 
acquiesced to the experience of the management company while maintaining a level of 
input into that particular decision. She stated,  
I personally am not an educator and as a board member I would not know what to 
look for. I can look at generalities and credentials and say this person’s credentials 
are more conducive to this role than another person, but it is not my area of 
expertise. And therefore, we can leave it to the experts. 
Participant E indicated that regardless of who does the hiring and at what level, 
the board is still responsible for all of the school’s outcomes and that included the 
allocation of resources. She said: 
Overall it is the board, as far as the governance of the funding, we are responsible 
for that. We should know, and we do as far as budgetary needs, what our needs 
are, what our student count should be; maintaining a healthy fund balance in case 
we need to move some monies around for instructional people in place to help the 
instruction of the students; the adjunct personnel that could help with our students 
getting up to par. We know, most importantly, we make sure that resources go 
toward student needs.  
She exemplified the breadth and scope of the board’s responsibilities by 
mentioning many of the resources required to operate a school, while keeping students’ 
needs in perspective. Next, she indicated the importance of selecting the appropriate 
human resources while balancing funds. She continued to reiterate that, regardless of how 
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the school is managed, it is ultimately the responsibility of the board of directors. She 
explained:  
We want to make sure that we take care of our teachers and the Para pros in the 
classroom and that we provide them with the resources they need. It is a challenge 
because you have to balance the student count right; that impacts what you are 
able to do; the cuts in state funding; it is a delicate balance, but we know that we 
are ultimately responsible for that and we leave our management group the 
leeway to make sure that they get the proper pieces or parties in place, so we can 
do what we need to do to maintain or help to improve the academic success of our 
students.  
Contractual Relationship  
 
The second qualitative interview question asked for a description of the 
contractual relationship between the board of directors and the management company. 
Participant E referred to the board’s awareness of the contract; however, she admitted 
that the contract is not always at the forefront of their minds because of the longevity of 
the relationship with the current management company. She stated: 
I would say we are very much aware that there is a contract between the 
management and the board of directors. But because, as with my particular 
school, there is such a long history with this management group that sometimes 
the fact that there is a contract kind of gets lost because of the long relationship. 
And there is always this assumption that sometimes you have to shake things up a 
little bit, so that we are not taken for granted; that because you have been with us 
all these years that we won’t make any changes.  
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There are benefits and drawbacks to having a long contractual relationship with a 
management company. The benefit is familiarity with the drawback being that the 
management company may take their client for granted. Participant E’s board appeared to 
be aware of the issue of contractual longevity. She said: 
So we have to periodically let them know that we hold them accountable for 
making sure our children get what they need. So you have to maintain a 
professional relationship, but yet because you work with someone, people or an 
entity, it can become personal and you have to make sure to let them know we 
may be like a family, but you still need to do what you need to do and fulfill the 
contract obligation.  
Participant E alluded to the importance of the contractual agreements that the 
board has with the management company. She explained that if the relationship is strong, 
it could weather challenges that would typically threaten it. Given the challenges of 
standardized testing and mandates from the federal government, authorizers feel the 
pressure of having solid portfolios of the schools that they create. These pressures trickle 
down to boards and management companies. In most instances, the authorizer will 
remain the constant, and the board of directors or the management company will change. 
In very few instances, an anomaly will occur and it is the authorizer that is out of the 
relationship. She gave the following iteration: 
There were some changes that came and affected the schools in the state in 
general and how authorizers were accountable to the state for the schools they 
authorized. And a lot of it had to do with standardized testing and it put a strain on 
the relationship between the authorizer and our management group. And we were 
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kind of the “middle guy”…we were placed in the middle and kind of in between, 
and the authorizer put pressure on us to maybe dissolve our relationship with the 
management group. And we took a stance in that we needed to look at what is 
best for the children first and look at our longevity of the school and not so much 
give-in to the pressure from the authorizer, from what they were under from the 
state, so with that it did make the management company nervous; and we did let 
them know under no certain terms no one was indispensable [sic.] and we would 
look at considering another option. So we were able to weather the storm. 
Actually, it turned out that we ended up with another authorizer and we are still 
with the same management group.  
Participant E’s board seemed to have found a balance in managing the benefits 
and drawbacks of a long-term contractual relationship and they have leveraged it to make 
changes by transitioning from one authorizer to another. At the same time, she reiterated 
the value of a long contractual relationship, but also making sure the management 
company does not take them for granted. Her board seemed to have found equilibrium 
between the three entities of the board of directors, the management company, and the 
authorizer.  
Despite the synergy, everyone is held accountable. When asked about what needs 
to be prioritized to maintain a contractual agreement, Participant E indicated that student 
performance is the main element and if it is not meeting the requirements through the 
management company’s evaluation, then the board of directors would look to make a 
change. She stated: 
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I would say because there is so much focus on the standardized testing, but our 
overall goal is to provide an education that will allow our children to excel to the 
next level and beyond. So we know that standardized testing is part of it, a small 
part of it and we know that our children have to walk against, run against, and 
usually lag behind some of our suburban counterparts. They have so many issues 
they have to deal with to even get them to a place where they can excel 
academically. But with that being said, we know that as a board, if our 
management group loses focus, students are not first and we do not see the 
progression with our students’ growth, then it is time to evaluate whether we need 
to stay with this management group or not.  
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance  
 
The contract is one of many matters that may cause tension in the governance of 
charter schools. However, there are many other factors that may potentially cause 
tension. This interview entailed that question and how the relationship between the board 
of directors and the management company may contribute to tension as it relates to 
governance.   
Participant E’s initial response included making the decision on the leadership of 
the school. Her response reinforced how important the school leader is regarding the 
success of the school. She responded: 
Well, I have a perfect example. A few years ago we had a wonderful school 
leader, who has tried to retire and after several attempts finally made that leap to 
retire. We had to get a new school leader to replace this person. And we chose a 
particular person and this was the board of governance and the management group 
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both selected this person. And the management group found the candidates and 
we interviewed them collectively. After they got to a certain point, the board of 
governance came into the process of the interview and between the two 
candidates we selected the person. This particular person came in as a school 
leader and because there was such a transition, our previous school leader was 
such an important part of our school culture; it was going to be a big adjustment 
anyway. 
The previous response indicated tension as it relates to hiring school leadership. 
Other tensions followed such as those stemming from academic performance and 
specifically as it is measured by state standardized testing. Other sources of tension 
affecting governance included fiscal and resource management.  She stated:  
Yes, academic standardized testing, making sure you have the right people in 
place to get our students’ gains where they need to be. Financial resources, there 
are always struggles as to how we are going to use these little bitty funds that we 
have and how we are going to distribute them. And is it going to go to more 
teachers or getting school buses; so we may bring more students in from outlying 
areas into our school district. And so it is a delicate line on how to manage the 
finances so we can ultimately help our children be successful academically. So 
there is always that struggle there. 
      Accountability and Transparency  
 
The next interview question asked if the board member believed that accountability 
and transparency of public funds changed when contracting with a for-profit company. 
Participant E responded: 
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As a volunteer board member, when I look at how much charter schools are 
scrutinized over their funding, and then you read stuff about what is going on in 
Detroit Public Schools, I am like we must not be dealing with the same level of 
accountability because there is no way in the world I could run my school like a 
Detroit Public School and we would not be shut down. So in terms of the 
management group, I think our board in general is just very conscientious about 
knowing where the funds are and how they are dispersed because we do not want 
to get in trouble and more we want to make sure that students are getting what 
they need with limited funds. I think our charter school does a good job in terms 
of transparency and managing the funds that we have.  
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions  
 
Participant E was then asked if there was anything contractually or legislatively 
that could be done to improve governance. She responded: 
I think legislatively we do not play with a level playing field. We should be able 
to get the same amount of dollars per pupil that public schools get. It should be an 
even playing field for every district, public and charter in the state. So we know 
that is not fair. It should be done legislatively to make sure that every pupil gets a 
fair share and amount of dollars so we can help our children get to where they 
need to be. You have to have the financial resources for that. Contractually, of 
course, in your contract you hold the management group accountable for 
maintaining certain academic milestones and goals and growth…and that ties to 
your authorizer [charter] contract as well. Just making sure all parties are aware of 
what the agreed upon contracts are, making sure that they can be attainable, and 
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that we strive towards obtaining those goals. At least we want to see growth and 
we don’t want to see that students are going backwards.  
She expressed her belief that the field is not level between urban and suburban 
schools. Her legislative desire is that it will be addressed one day. In terms of the 
contract, she shared the concept of fortifying the contract between the board of directors 
and the management company with performance metrics that reward results and 
scrutinizes when falling short of the performance metrics. She responded: 
Well, they get a percentage. Contracts are usually written [that] if our 
management company meets a certain milestone, they get a certain percentage per 
pupil. If you do not meet that milestone then you do not get that increased 
percentage: or whatever. We have to reassess if they are not reaching 
expectations. Then we have to reassess if we need to decrease the amount of 
money you are getting per pupil or even …or even consider bidding out …so 
there is that contractual obligation that the management group has…and we have 
to make sure that as governance we hold them accountable to that and if they do 
not hit those milestones; [we] do not just ignore it, but address that issue and 
decide what we are going to do moving forward.  
In terms of the contract and spelling out the roles between the board of directors 
and the management company, Participant E believed more direct training is needed and 
that the board needs to do more in terms of training. She stated the following: 
I believe it is, it may not be directly written out, what the board as a whole or as 
individual parties, but it is implied that we govern the school and that we employ 
our management group to help us to do the day-to-day operations. And I think we 
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probably as a board, because we are a small board and have some turnover, I 
mean you are asking people to volunteer and it is demanding and people work. It 
is a commitment and it is something to be taken seriously, so I think we, as a 
board, need to do a better job at even educating our board members of their roles. 
A lot of times it is “on the job” training. You learn as you go [about] what your 
role is as a volunteer board member for a public charter school…but it is more 
probably implied than implicit of the roles in the contract. 
Participant E mentioned that training from the former and current authorizers has 
been well received, especially given the turnover of members on her board. She argued 
that it is imperative that board members know their role: “Our authorizer and past 
authorizer did a really good job trying to orientate and provide governance seminars for 
their various boards. And so it is a contingent that it should happen, so that board 
members understand their roles in governance.” She continued that it is important to have 
a working knowledge of charter schools and the key entities in the charter school 
industry. She concluded: 
Just to understand what it means to be a board member of a charter school. Even 
just understanding what a charter school is…and how the authorizer is and what 
role they play…if you use a management group and how they help in that 
scenario; understanding all of the stakeholders and how they are involved in the 
continuum of relationships from the authorizer to the management group, to the 
board, to parents, the community, and the management group employing the 
teachers, and understanding all of these relationships; that is important that the 
authorizer helps as well.  
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This final response by Participant E demonstrated her perspective on the role of 
the authorizer in the relationship between the management company and the board of 
directors, which was unique to her interview.  
Summary and Analysis of Results  
 
 Participant E’s experience as a board member appears to entail perceptions that 
the board provides leeway to the management company for hiring and that the longevity 
has both pluses and minuses when it comes to the relationship between the board of 
directors and the for-profit private management company. She mentions that the 
management company must be held accountable for student achievement and growth. 
She expresses the need for board training for all members, and special training for 
members that are new and novice to the charter world. She values the relationship 
between the two parties and feels a synergistic relationship is a must in order to produce 
positive results. Participant E believes that the board of directors is ultimately responsible 
for all aspects of the charter school.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Table 8 
Identification of Descriptors from Participant E’s Interview Transcript 
_____________________________________________________________ 
! Shared responsibility for hiring key leadership 
! Confusion of overlap of academic responsibilities 
! Board ultimately responsible  
! Community oriented/volunteerism 
! Contract based on performance metrics and not history 
! Transparency and accountability of financial resources 
! Role responsibility for student discipline 
! Giving mgt. company leeway  
! Board training on roles and responsibilities 
! Contract with incentives for student performance 
student advocacy 
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day 
not micro managing 
! Perceived vs. reality of demand and expectations of charter school board members 
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for conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the 
for-profit private management company. Multiple descriptors emerged from the 
qualitative data from Participant E as illustrated in Table 8. She expressed experiences, 
which conveyed perspectives inclusive of: issues of shared responsibility for hiring key 
leadership positions, the board being ultimately responsible, board training and 
responsibility, volunteerism/community orientation (student advocacy), giving the 
management company leeway for hiring, and the perceived versus reality of the demands 
and expectations of charter school boards of directors.  Other pertinent descriptors also 
emerged, but were less direct sources of confusion and role conflicts. These included; 
roles and responsibility for student discipline, contract based on performance metrics and 
not history, and the management company is responsible for the day-to-day. 
The first descriptor that emerged from Participant E’s interview is the confusion 
of having shared responsibility for hiring key leadership positions in the charter school. 
The allowed input of the board is not formal and not inclusive of the contractual 
agreement between the board of directors and the for-profit private management 
company. The potential for conflict is the perception of the board members impact on 
hiring roles, such as the principal. There is not a formal clause in the contract, which 
gives the board input into the hiring of administrative roles. As a matter of fact, the 
contract indicates that the management company has sole responsibility for hiring the 
administration and all positions in the charter school. 
The second descriptor that emerged is the perception that the board is ultimately 
responsible for all aspects of the charter school including operations. Even though there is 
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a feeling that the board of directors is responsible for all aspects of the operations of the 
school, they are not. It is more accurate to say the board is accountable for all aspects of 
the charter school dependent upon their contract with the management company. 
However, once they sign a contract for full-services with a management company, the 
responsibility is contractually transferred to the management company. The potential for 
confusion increases, which leads to great potential for conflicts in these circumstances 
because with the transfer of responsibility comes the commensurate transfer of power and 
authority and the board’s ability to influence the operations of the school is diminished.   
  The third descriptor from the interview is board training on roles and 
responsibilities. The board president acknowledged the need for training, which 
precipitated from a significant level of board member turnover. This change in board 
membership, in many instances, leads to novice replacements. The replacements are 
sometimes not oriented prior to their start and are not aware of the elements of the 
contract, which impacts the ability of the board. Some may even not understand the 
dynamics of charter schools and the environment within which they operate. These 
situations perpetuate confusion from the start and sets high probability for confusion and 
conflict given the ambiguity of board members’ roles and responsibilities. 
  The fourth descriptor is that of community orientation/volunteerism and student 
advocacy, which is often the premise for people joining charter school boards. The 
volunteer mindset may not be aligned to the profit-centric position of the management 
company and collides when activities, policies, and objectives are not agreed upon or fall 
into dispute. Participant E joined the board after being asked by a friend if she would 
consider being on a charter school board. Having children of her own and experimenting 
with trying to find the best locations for them, she accepted becoming a board member. 
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The fifth descriptor is the concept of the perception of the board of directors 
giving leeway to the management company to hiring staff. This is accompanied by a false 
impression that boards have any say in the hiring practices of the management company. 
The hiring practice is clearly stated in the contractual agreement between the board of 
directors and the management company that the latter has full and complete control over 
who is hired and terminated. This misperception is a precursor of confusion and potential 
conflict given the likelihood of disagreement on hiring at any point in time. 
The sixth descriptor is the perceived versus reality of the demands and 
expectations of charter school board members. Interview Participant E articulated that her 
perceptions of what was entailed with being a board member far exceeded the reality of 
being a board member. She indicated numerous times that it is like a part-time and full-
time job; and that the preparation and follow-through is tremendous, especially for those 
who hold positions such as president, vice president, and treasurer. When a volunteer 
position entails such demands, it is a possibility for potential conflicts given the rationale 
for contracting a full-service private management company includes alleviating board 
members from having to manage the detailed operations of the charter school. 
         The previous descriptors from Participant E’s interview illustrated confusion in 
areas of shared responsibility for hiring key leadership, perception of the board being 
ultimately responsible, board training and responsibility, the concept of volunteerism, and 
the perception of giving leeway for staff hiring by the management company. These 
descriptors are part of multiple factors that contributed to confusion and added to the 
potential governance conflicts between the board of directors and the for-profit private 
management company. 
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Interview Participant F  
 
 Background and Rationale for Being a Charter School Board Member  
 
Participant F is a white male in his mid-fifties and is a college graduate. He is an 
attorney who works heavily in civil rights. He is also a former teacher. He has a strong 
knowledge of contracts and values all aspects of community development and relations. 
He has been on the board and president of a charter school since its inception in 1996. 
Participant F has been an active board president since 1997. He assisted with the 
beginning phases of the school as they originally operated from a former catholic high 
school. He guided the program through a series of financial challenges and navigated 
multiple moves to different facilities while he worked with two for-profit private 
management companies during his tenure. 
He received six renewals to serve in his board role all with one authorizer and two 
full service for-profit private management companies. His experiences in teaching and 
civil rights provided a dynamic perspective of charter schools’ evolution and fiscal 
operations in terms of how public tax dollars are managed between a non-profit school 
and a for-profit private management company. 
His rationale for joining a charter school board was linked to his community 
development and civil rights background, which provided a brilliant lens to view the 
challenges and needs of charter schools. His legal career gave him analytical skills to 
better understand the contractual, legal, financial, and political infrastructures that often 
challenge less credentialed board presidents. Being on a board provided Participant F 
with a means of helping the community and simultaneously impacting education in urban 
areas lacking the resources of most traditional public schools. He was contentious about 
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how for-profit private management companies are able to receive taxpayers’ dollars so 
easily when they are allocated to Michigan charter schools, which are non-profit entities. 
He mentioned that not many industries allow such transactions.  
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a For-Profit Private Management Company  
 
Participant F believed the main positive aspect of contracting with a for-profit 
management company for educational services is that you may be working with 
professional people who are well trained in functional areas. He stated:  
Let’s start with the pros; you are dealing with, you can be dealing with business 
people. Not always, but you can be dealing with business people.  And as an 
organization, they can manage contracts. Ideally, they should manage contractors 
well. They should be fully up to speed on payroll, personnel, and compliance 
issues.  They, I would say from the business end of it, should be credible.  
Participant F’s list of pros ended at the business aspect of what for-profit private 
management companies bring into practice. After the initial pro, he went said, “I would 
say I should have a longer list of pros. Unfortunately, but I probably don’t.”  
He then listed out his perspective of cons tempered with a lot of phrases such as, 
“things could go well if you have the right people who put the children, families, and the 
community first.” As he began to list the cons, he said, “If you have the right people that 
are student-child-family oriented: it’s fine. Or just feel in their heart to do the right thing: 
full disclosure, honesty, careful with expenditures, and things of that nature. It can work 
very, very well.” He elaborated on the previous and began to introduce the profit motive 
as a concept of what drives for-profit private management companies. He explained:  
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But the profit motive is very, very high. It does dictate and influence a lot of what 
occurs that are said that are not for the student or for the welfare of the school and 
things of that nature. But at its core: it’s a money-driven process. And that’s really 
sad.  But I see what they are doing is anything to maintain that contract. The 
contract and the money that is generated through it can be enormous. The head of 
it, the top people in a for-profit management company, can make more than a 
superintendent in a large public school district can make. The contracts are about 
a million dollars every 3 years and as far as the expenditures and that, they can 
hire staff and things like that, charged back to the school, where the million 
dollars every 3 years really almost purely represents profit with very little 
overhead actually to be incurred by the management company. That concerns me.  
Other cons that were mentioned were related to the management company taking 
actions and seemingly expecting the board to be non-resistant. He provided the following 
example:  
I can give you a very specific example. Our contract provides that our 
management company provides bookkeeping fees. With our new management 
company, they insisted that, oh, we hire a bookkeeper at all of our schools.  They 
had a bookkeeper that did it at another school on a part-time basis. The other 
school closed and so they made her full time at our school. So we are paying full 
time for a bookkeeper that makes as much as our second or third top teacher. 
$40,000 a year plus benefits for a bookkeeper even though bookkeeping is 
provided for, that is something that the management company, at their expense, 
should provide.   
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Participant F addressed the concerns as such, “When I approached it with the 
management company, during a board meeting, I was told, well, um, we hire 
bookkeepers at the school’s expense at all of our schools and this is just something that 
we do.” The nature of the previous response from the management company gives a 
perception that the management company has the authority to allocate resources without 
the approval of the board of directors. He also stated, “If the board doesn’t know, that 
doesn’t make it right, and because maybe boards don’t read the contract, they don’t 
understand that that is something that’s supposed to occur.” 
Participant F also indicated that the relationship between the management 
company and the authorizer could be nebulous for board governance given the contract 
between the board of directors and the authorizer; and a separate contract between the 
board of directors and the management company. He went on to say, 
The authorizers’ goal is stability at the school, no change for any reason, and that 
they can get their authorizer fee. And so you tend, when you have the for-profit 
arrangement you have, you tend to develop that close relationship between the 
management company and the authorizer. And to me, the board is kind of 
extraneous to the management and governance of the school. And that is a 
concern. But I think you would probably have that in any area where they have 
high profit margins and I could say the same things as far as the mortgage 
industry. I see that kind of excess in the mortgage industry because the 
compensation is so high.  I see it in my practice when it comes to securities and 
investments…the same kind of thing.  So I am not saying that this is any different 
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than other areas, but I’m saying that it is a problem. It’s a problem as the high 
profit model is in other areas, in other kinds of industries. 
Coupled with the previous perspective, Participant F felt that the management 
company would conduct themselves in a manner to keep the contract. He stated that their 
primary objective “Is to preserve the contract at all costs; absolutely.” 
 When asked to elaborate on one of the earlier statements that positive things may 
happen if a management company is student, family, and community oriented, he replied; 
“First off, that having a charter school can, in my opinion, be very responsive to the 
needs that occur. If something happens, we can change direction midcourse. Its not 
bureaucratic…things can happen.”  He went on to provide an example, which included 
attendance and responsiveness. He explained:  
Whether a problem with attendance, or a problem with a particular subject matter 
or whatever, charter schools can rapidly change to meet the needs; so that should 
result in better academic performance so that’s the value of a charter school. 
Where it’s an individual school that is controlled, managed locally, and things can 
get done; so that’s the plus side of it.  
Participant F expounded on the role of the management company’s liaison to the 
board of directors. He stated: 
When you have someone, and there are individuals that I can point to… I mean 
we have had two management companies, but at times there have been people of 
high integrity, high commitment, and high caliber that are honest and trustworthy 
and will alert you right up front. Where if they say something, you know it’s the 
truth.  That is thrilling, that’s refreshing, and I get a sense that is how the other 
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board members feel.  Their happy, their comfortable, and they feel a big loss 
when someone like that leaves; because now we are only going to get filtered 
information, and a public relations presentation and things of that nature rather 
than just accurate information.   
Participant F expressed an appreciation for trust, openness, and disclosure, which 
appeared to be based on the character of the board liaison person who is assigned to the 
account. However, he said that if the liaison is not of high caliber, then problems emerge. 
He stated: 
There is nothing wrong with something coming up and saying we need to address 
this, we need to address that, no one is going to terminate a management 
company. We’re not going to get upset about it, we would like to know because 
that enables us as a board to say what can we as a board do to come alongside the 
management company or what can we do to reach out to the authorizer. What can 
we do to improve the situation and we are supposed to be team players working 
towards the same goal; but when that breaks down; then it’s a problem. 
Contractual Relationship  
 
In terms of question two regarding the contractual relationship between the boards 
of directors and the management company, Participant F clarified the difference in the 
school’s two main contracts. He explained, “I know with the management company we 
have a management agreement. I know with the authorizer that we have a charter 
contract.”  He also expressed that board members are probably not aware of the contract 
to the degree that they have a full understanding of its dynamics. He stated,  
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Well I think first off, I think a lot of the board members aren’t really aware that 
the contract governs the relationship. I just don’t think that they quite understand 
it.  I really don’t think they know what is required and what the management 
company is supposed to do. 
He subsequently mentioned another dynamic in terms of the disposition of the 
management company and their feelings regarding the school. He said, “I think the 
management company almost feels as though it is their school, if that makes sense, when 
it’s not. It’s the PSA, it’s the Academy’s school.” He then elaborated on the disparity of 
responses between the two management companies contracted with over the charter 
school’s life cycle. He stated:  
In terms of requests for records and information, if I back up with the previous 
management company, then a simple phone call was all I needed to get that 
information and it was provided. With the current management company, the 
simplest of requests takes a series of emails and it’s carefully defined and filtered. 
By the time you are done with that process, you are skeptical about what is the big 
concern with it.  There are times with communications where I will have to 
reference paragraphs of the management agreement, which shouldn’t be 
necessary.  Lip service is given to full disclosure, but there isn’t full disclosure.  
And again, because of [the] for-profit motive I am concerned that the email is 
being written to me to be phoned into the authorizer, but it’s not really being 
written to me. Like I’m just a third party to whatever posturing that the 
management company is attempting to do.  
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In terms of obtaining information on student performance, it was sometimes 
difficult to obtain or receive a prompt response. Participant F said, “If asking for 
background information or supporting information, it can be grudgingly provided.”  He 
continued to explain: 
For example, I asked for student performance and achievement data and I was 
told that I would have to get it from the building leader, the principal at the 
school. I contacted the principal and then from there I was directed to the head of 
the management company and then I was directed to the board liaison. I sent a 
request to the board liaison that was delayed for quite some time.  Finally, he sent 
kind of an overview summary of it, but I never got the data.  Never got it. And 
again it’s important because if you try to set things from a board standpoint like a 
budget or some governance you need to know what it is. I just wanted to actually 
see the data. Just for my curiosity… I wanted to see it. I am embarrassed if you 
ask me specific questions on student performance that I don’t know as much as I 
should and that’s not right.  Then the next set of data came out and I went through 
the same thing and I never got the actual data. 
He continues to discuss the challenges of getting data on school performance that 
he feels should be readily accessible to board members. However, he further presents a 
sense of resistance from the management company and said: 
I have gotten summary reports and information on things they wanted to present. I 
had found online where they had the different kinds of data and graphs that you 
can get, so I made a specific request to get that but you’ve got to independently 
search and study on your own or you won’t be educated going to the board. You 
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won’t be fully advised going to the board meetings.  It just doesn’t happen.  I have 
to reach out beyond the management company. I try to find other people in the 
education field to advise me.  I do have to reach out to find people to give me 
objective information that I need as a board member. And I would have hoped 
that I could turn to an authorizer and get that, but no…they don’t really want to 
hear from me. They really don’t. I’m a bother or whatever. Their interaction is 
strictly with the management company talking about student performance and this 
and that.  
Participant F went on to share other areas where information was difficult to 
obtain, or where the board of directors did not have adequate information to address 
school matters such as the budget and finances. He said, “We are not to touch budget 
items. How do you have a board and govern as a board? We can’t even control the 
budget? Why I say it’s a concern is because by the time we get budgets proposed and 
amended budgets, they’re running deficits and that’s a concern to us; but we are not 
empowered to deal with that.” 
Factors that Contribute to Tension in Governance 
 
When asked about what factors might contribute to tension in governance, 
Participant F talked about board members getting up to speed and valuing the longevity 
of experienced board members. He stated: 
It creates tension in how to get a board member up to speed and some of it is just 
experience.  The longer you serve on the board, after you cycle through the first 
year, you get a sense of all of the things that occur on an annual basis or on a 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	  178	  
school year basis and then as you go through a couple of times, 3 or 4 times, you 
get more and more familiar with it.  
Another source of tension mentioned is when the board is used as a scapegoat and 
when staff is discouraged, if not permitted to approach the board with concerns. He said,  
Another thing that contributes to the friction is that some management companies 
block anybody from approaching the board or they’ll say, well we would like to 
do this but the board won’t let you do this or the board won’t let you do that. I 
mean so we are kind of scapegoated or kind of used. 
He substantiated the previous concern by illustrating how staff (employees of the 
for-profit management company) is advised to take their concerns to the human resources 
department of the management company, and not to the board of directors. In the same 
respect, if the management company wants to push their agenda, they may have the 
employees come in full force to a board meeting. Participant F explained: 
They were told: if you have comments or concerns you take it to HR, you do not 
go to the board. There was one instance where there were letters and things 
written and they came before us as the board…we didn’t take action because we 
don’t get involved in personnel issues and so we just referred it back to the 
management company. But after that it was made clear and communicated to the 
staff that they were never to contact the board.  
He took exception of the management company’s communication to the staff and stated 
that: 
We are a public entity. People have a statutory right to contact the board at any 
time. There is a complaint procedure in place if they are not satisfied. Same for 
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parents, well if they are not satisfied going through the channels with the 
management company then they go in front of the board. If they aren’t satisfied 
with that then they can go in front of the authorizer. There is a procedure that 
people are supposed to go through. Things are not going necessarily through that 
process … it’s another way that we can become out of touch with what is going 
on at the school… the counteract is that under our policies we are required to have 
one board member that is a parent and we are fortunate that we have two and they 
are active … so they are enormously helpful to me as a board member to know 
what is going on at the school. I cannot begin to tell you how important that is. 
Without them, I would not have the parents’ information … it doesn’t mean that it 
actually changes anything, but you want to know what are the concerns. 
He says that the board would like to hear from staff to help provide a feel for what 
they think and how things are going. However, that line of direct communication does not 
exist and what the board hears is directly from the management company. Participant F 
stated: 
I have no interaction with the staff. I don’t know what they think so I’m relying 
on the head of the management company and what they think about this, which 
may or may not reflect what the teachers says or what the paraprofessionals or the 
staff say. That’s the kind of friction that occurs because being a board member 
means always receiving partial information. The more information I can get is so 
valuable and it is so difficult to obtain. 
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Accountability and Transparency  
 
Participant F expressed feelings of frustration as a board president who has a 
desire to communicate accurately and consistently with constituents and stakeholders. 
Part of the lack of communication between the board of directors and the for-profit 
private management company lends itself to issues regarding accountability and 
transparency of public funds when contracting with management companies, or does he 
believe that it is an issue? He said with heavy emphasis: 
Well… I would like you to put this in caps: A public school academy is a non-
profit entity but in reality those funds are passed through to a for-profit entity…to 
me that can’t be. You can’t do that. It makes a public school academy simply as a 
shell for the for- profit company because the funds, operations and management 
are turned over to a for-profit entity. I happen to think from a policy standpoint, 
that’s wrong … the whole purpose of setting up a school as a non-profit entity is 
for that purpose. It’s not a money-making entity. Profits are not to be derived 
from it, but when those funds are passed onto a for-profit entity, we are doing just 
that. If you take a step back and just think about it, it makes absolutely no sense to 
do that. To have that framework in place...it’s unacceptable. I don’t think that 
there, under any stretch of the imagination, there should be a non-profit entity 
passing on its funds for its operation to a for-profit entity.  I’m trying to think of 
an example of where it’s done and it’s not just non-profit passing the funds onto a 
for-profit.  These are not only non-profit funds but these are government 
funds…government funds should not be used.   
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Participant F referred to concerns of legitimacy if all of a sudden, rules change 
and these for-profit management companies simply switch over to non-profits. He said, 
“My concern is you are used to years of running a for-profit organization to just come up 
with a name and register it with the state as a non-profit entity raises questions in my 
mind to the legitimacy and credibility of your representation that suddenly you are going 
to switch and behave as a non-profit: that’s my concern.”  He explained the rationale for 
his concern as just a cosmetic alteration that will internally be the same as the for-profit 
company. He said, “So what I am saying is that if we say all PSAs can only work with 
the non-profits, you’ll be getting the same players handling the non-profits that were 
handling the for-profits, and so that won’t work.”  He concluded this section with a 
comparison to traditional public schools and the imbalance of for-profit management 
companies managing charter schools in the state of Michigan. He explained:  
In terms of a traditional public school, it’s purely non-profit in its governance and 
in its organization and a PSA should be the same way. So I don’t think we have 
thought long and hard of it. Michigan is way out of whack with the percentages of 
for-profit management companies. I did some research on it and I found that our 
authorizer is representative of the state numbers in terms of being wildly disparate 
between for-profit and non-profit management companies. 
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions  
The previous observations of Participant F led well into the next qualitative 
question asking what could be done contractually or legislatively to improve governance 
in the state of Michigan. He began with the contractual element of adding provisions to 
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have the charter school’s leadership (superintendent/principal) report to the board of 
directors. He said: 
The first thing I would like … the critical component of the school is the 
leader…the studies go all over the place. I read that its 60% (that the principal) is 
the main factor of the success of the school…their leadership over time impacts 
every aspect of the school. I would like the board to have more of a say…in some 
schools it’s actually written into the management agreement. I would say the right 
to refusal…that the building leader serves with the consent of the board.  That if 
the board is unsatisfied, it can dismiss the leader right there. 
Participant F presented concerns that all staff reports to the management company 
and this limits the ability of the board to receive direct and objective feedback. He voiced 
his concerns by saying,  
My concern is that the board, in implementing things; the board goes to the 
management company or deals with the staff members. But the staff members, 
principal, AP, everybody answers to the management company. They serve at the 
will of the management company.  You don’t get direct, accurate info from the 
building leader because the building leader is saying what the management 
company wants him or her to say. And so that’s a real concern.  
Participant F continued to build on the contractual possibilities and moves to a 
complimentary legislative action that would strengthen and further empower the board. 
He said,  
That’s a contractual one. You could write it into state law, obviously. For 
example, state law says that you can terminate a school administrator with 30 
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days’ notice, so the state law has spoken on it legislatively. I know we talked 
about it, made mention of it, in a previous answer of taking the profit motive out 
of it.  I think that would be one.  
He provided more suggestions in terms of having more non-profits manage the 
charter schools and simplifying the accounting budget codes to be more “user-friendly.” 
He said,  
Yes. Yes, and making it truly be non-profit, top to bottom. I thought of another 
one to say. I am concerned about the budget codes... they are confusing. From a 
budget standpoint, a CPA can understand it. Given the way the categories are 
grouped and that, the information is not given in a practical way. 
He provided an example from the banking industry and how they made 
information easier to understand to the novice borrowers and consumers. He stated: 
In a lending context, the CPV restructured the good faith estimate of closing costs 
to make it understandable to a layperson. I think there needs to be that type of 
thing when it comes to the school accounting ...categories are too long, its 
confusingly presented, both on the income and the expenses, but they need to take 
a step back and say you know what we’re not doing is setting up these codes for 
CPAs…we’re setting them up for lay people and the general public to understand 
how the funds were spent, where they are going to, like that…we don’t have that.  
He continued his concerns by revisiting the profit motive and how the funds may 
not get to those closest to the student, but goes to top management. He expressed: 
Another concern I have, in getting back to the for-profit motive, at the end of the 
day, the money is being given to the senior management and it’s not being given 
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to the people delivering instruction … it’s not being given to improve 
expenditures or instructional materials, books and things like that that actually 
benefits the students or the improvement of the facilities and things of that nature. 
So I think if we move the profit motive out [of] there and the profit component, 
we can put greater power into improving instruction.  
He is basically saying that provisions are needed to help boards better understand 
financial documents and budgets reports and that would greatly assist with board 
governance.  It would also impact transparency with boards being in a position to better 
scrutinize reports, ask questions, and better prepare for board meetings. He stated: 
These are the major things, so absolutely financial transparency in terms of how 
that information is presented and that answer ties into the question you asked 
about the board members getting up to speed. If the financial information were 
there, in a way that was readily understandable, that would go a long way to 
assisting board members and others doing it.  
The other element of the report that is mentioned is the reporting of student data 
on performance. It is often presented in a way that is not fully understood by board 
members. He exclaimed: 
I would say this; another one would be reporting student performance data. It’s 
not always so clear; I understand what a standard deviation is but I have no idea 
what a standard deviation means in terms of the testing.  
He felt that the board of directors is limited with resources to navigate the 
complexities of financial and budget reports. He explained: 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	  185	  
So I don’t think that’s done and what we do, and here is where the problem comes 
in, so what do we do as a board member? Well…  If we don’t understand the 
financials, we get an opportunity to ask whom: the management company? And 
they are the ones making it clear for us.  That’s a problem. That’s a real problem. 
Or, I want to understand student performance data, so who do I go to? And the 
problem is the information is filtered, it is put in such a way. I’m not faulting 
management companies; that’s what they are going to do. They are going to make 
themselves look good.  
Participant F went on to recommend hiring external companies to assess the 
budget and assess the educational components inclusive of an explanation of the 
academic metrics. He recommended that there would be third-party advisors that would 
come in and perform operational and academic assessments. He stated,  
So I’m hearing it directly from a third party rather than hearing it from a 
management company.  And I think we could do the same thing for student 
performance. If I had my way, I would think that boards should be encouraged to 
get independent assessments.”  
 He gave the example of having an independent auditor for finances; this would 
be an independent auditor for academic metrics and they would not only assess what is 
done but what should be done; because even a financial audit only matches expenses to 
planned expenditures; it doesn’t tell you how to strategically allocate resources. He 
stated,  
For example, they make sure that expenditures match up with the budget, but they 
don’t address the wisdom of are the monies being spent properly. Auditors don’t 
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tell us that. Auditors are not a benefit to us in that sense they may identify if 
money is misappropriated, but it doesn’t tell us what we are doing. 
Participant F shared that even after being a board president for nearly two decades 
that he is still uncomfortable with the schools’ finances. He stated: 
I am not comfortable with our finances. And I sit here as a board member up to 19 
years and I’m not comfortable. Not saying that money is being pocketed, I’m not 
accusing anybody of that, but I would like to know specifically are these 
expenditures reasonable. Are salaries in line with what they should be? I need to 
know these things: are we being charged for things that under the management 
agreement should belong to the management company? There are independent 
professionals out there that can advise us on these questions and that would really 
improve our comfort level as a board and mine as a board member, and I’m sure 
others as well.  
Participant F discussed what he believed are the priorities of management 
companies based on his experience of contracting with the two that comprehensively 
managed their charter school. He said, “The priority of a management company is, 
obviously, to preserve the contract. Period. They like student performance. They like 
numbers because that’s what someone may look at. It’s a good selling point to get more 
contracts: keep and maintain the contracts.” He subsequently indicated that management 
companies’ focus on making sure they keep a solid relationship with the authorizer. He 
said the following: 
They’re very, very careful before anything else to serve the authorizer. They want 
a strong relationship with the authorizer. I know full well, if anything, whether it’s 
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timely preparing the board minutes and the agenda, they’re doing so to meet the 
compliance standard or timeline of the authorizer. From top to bottom, their focus 
is on keeping the contract, [and] satisfying the authorizer. That is quite clear.  
He also expressed a belief that when authorizers are supportive of boards, it better 
positions the board to manage the contract with the for-profit management company. He 
said,  
If you have the authorizer that is supportive of the board, then you may see the 
management company be concerned with serving the board, but otherwise they 
are not now. That’s our passion as board members. It never gets far beyond it. 
That’s what we want to see, so I get excited when the student performance is 
strong. 
Participant F articulated his perspective of how the board of directors affects 
student performance. He stated,  
I think the best thing we can do at the end of the day is to ensure that we as a 
board have selected the very best whether it’s a management company, CPA, 
board counsel, custodial services, you name it. That we select the best, the best 
professionals to assist us. 
 He substantiated this position with acknowledging that a professional board 
should be able to make solid choices. He said: 
We as a board, if we have a professional background: We should be able to 
identify them. We have to do our homework and make sure that we have the best 
people in place. If they are not performing up to par, then make that switch. 
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Where my frustration comes in is where I see a weakness here or there and not 
being empowered to make that academic change.  
Conflicts in Board and Subcontract Relationship  
 
He then shifted to the board’s ability to assess contracts and how difficult it is to 
sometimes obtain information about vendors. He also felt that his hands are tied, as 
noted: 
I would like a list of contractors and see what the compensation is, what the term 
is, where they are located, and have that and have it presented to the board. We 
should have it on an instant; these are the people that we contract and deal with 
and then as we decide to renew these contracts or put a bid out and get the best 
rates we need to do that on a regular basis. I have board members I know don’t 
know all of the contracts and things that we have.  
He continued his discussion on contracts and how vendors have the impression 
that they are contracted with the management company. The example he used was the 
contract between the board and the food service provider. He stated that the previous 
management company said on several occasions, “Those are our contracts.” Participant F 
responded that the contracts are with the board of directors. He explained that vendors 
have a tendency to erroneously function as if their contract is with the management 
company. He said, “They contract with us, but they tend to see it as the management 
company. That they are actually contracting with the management company and that’s 
just not accurate.” He goes on to talk about the perception of the board and how board 
members may not fully understand:  
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But there’s that perception that we are hands-off and in a lot of respects we are, 
but I don’t think the board realizes that those are our contracts. Those checks are 
coming from the board [and] they aren’t coming from the management company. 
But you know… But are we getting the best people at the best rate? I think we 
could do a lot better and this is where the incentive comes in. The management 
company is not bearing those costs directly.  
Agent- to-Client Contractual Relationship 
 
In the discussions of contracts, Participant F provided a perspective of the 
relationship between the board and the management company and if it is seen as a client 
to vendor relationship. He replied, “Yes and no. Yes, it is clear in my mind ‘who’ works 
for who. It’s also clear in my mind ‘who’ works for who. The management company 
should be working for the board. I mean we are parties to a contract.” He does indicate 
that it is difficult to manage at times given the management company’s attention to the 
authorizer. He feels the management company may do what it wants to do unless it falls 
out of favor with the authorizer. He says, “Until they are dissatisfied with the 
management company, or feel there are some deficiencies with the management 
company; it doesn’t come from us. There’s lip service to that the management company 
does what it wants because it only answers to the authorizer.”  
He indicated that he chooses his battles and that the main purpose is to focus on 
student performance. He said, “The greater purpose is the welfare of our students and the 
performance of our students. That’s the bottom line. If that means sacrificing something 
that I feel I have the right to in the contract, absolutely, it’s about the students.”  He stated 
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as a final perspective a concern with being viewed as a rubber stamp and not truly 
empowered as a board. He concluded,  
All you have to do is slap us down on a couple of budget items and at some point 
we are like ok fine you don’t want us to do anything, so what do we do: rubber 
stamp what the management company gives us; you can get anybody to rubber 
stamp it if that’s what you want. 
Summary and Analysis of Results  
 
Participant F’s interview responses brought out some common areas of discussion 
for analysis based on the likelihood of these areas being the source of role confusion and 
potential conflict. He mentioned concerns that the board often feels disempowered 
(rubber stamp) to make decisions, and that the management company only honors the 
board of directors if the authorizer makes it clear that the board is empowered to govern. 
He uniquely voiced concerns regarding how tax dollars are handled and articulated his 
concerns that such funds morph from a public taxpayers source to a private destination 
often without an ability to be tracked and not required to be disclosed. Participant F 
articulated fundamental issues regarding the contract and how it governs the relationship 
between the board of directors and the for-profit private management company. 
Significant descriptors emerged from Participant F’s interview as listed in Table 9.  
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Significant descriptors emerged from the qualitative data from Participant F as 
seen in Table 9. He shared approximately 19 years of experiences that helped to develop 
his perspective on leadership and governance. The highlights of his experiences included 
shared responsibility for key leadership roles, profit motive, board training on roles and 
responsibilities with an emphasis on the contract, and public funds going to for-profit 
entities. He also mentioned highlights regarding the mindset of being a volunteer: 
transparency and full disclosure, and disempowerment expressed in terms of feeling like 
a rubber stamp.   
Participant F’s experience emphasized the importance of the contract and that 
board members should focus their attention to understanding the contract between the 
board of directors and the for-profit management company. The understanding of the 
contract would eliminate who has the ultimate authority and that the management 
company is a contractor and not the main party. He believed the contract should be 
 
Table 9 
 
Identification of Descriptors from Participant F’s Interview Transcript 
__________________________________________________________________ 
! Shared responsibility for hiring key leadership 
! Transparency and full disclosure 
! Profit motive very high implications 
! Public funds issue                       channeled through a non-profit to a for-profit 
! Value of charter school is ability to respond 
! Transparency and accountability of financial resources 
! Support of authorizer is significant 
! Board ultimately responsible  
! Board training on roles and responsibilities 
! Rubber stamp  
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day 
! Community oriented/volunteerism 
training on contract 
disempowered 
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revised to include board input into key leadership roles and that the board should have the 
right to revoke any key positions that are not meeting expectations.  
He strongly emphasized the profit motive and how powerful it is for the 
management company. He indicated that they would do anything to maintain the contract 
and also keep the authorizer content. Transparency and full disclosure are of concern 
because he believed it would depend on who is the management company liaison that 
works with the board of directors. He also described experiences of feeling like a rubber 
stamp in that the board was expected to simply agree with the agenda of the management 
company. He indicated sometimes experiencing the feeling of being an outsider when the 
management company communicated with the authorizer.  
Other descriptors resonated and are significant to the disposition of Participant F’s 
overall experiences, which shaped his perspective on governance and leadership in 
Michigan charter schools when contracting with for-profit private management 
companies. Other descriptors included the board is ultimately responsible, the value of a 
charter system is the ability to move quickly, and how support from the authorizer is 
essential if the board is to be respected. 
Participant F’s rationale for being on a board is based on volunteerism and 
community service. He wanted to make a difference and provide opportunities for urban 
city children. He felt that the charter movement is not of value unless the performance 
metrics exceed that of traditional public schools.  
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant F indicated potential areas 
for conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities and the contractual agreement 
between the board of directors and the for-profit private management company. Multiple 
descriptors emerged from the qualitative data from Participant F as illustrated in Table 9. 
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He conveyed 19 years of board experience in the role of the president. These descriptors 
illustrated his board experiences and perceptions inclusive of shared responsibility for 
hiring key leadership, profit motive and implications, board training (especially on the 
contract), public funds issues, feeling like a rubber stamp (disempowerment), 
transparency (full disclosure) and accountability, and the board is ultimately responsible. 
These descriptors, separately and collectively, contributes to confusion, which results in 
potential conflicts between the board of directors and the for-profit private management 
company. 
The first descriptor that emerged from Participant F’s interview is the issue of 
having shared responsibility for hiring key leadership positions in the charter school. The 
board realized after the fact that they did not have any input into the hiring practices. In 
retrospect, they would have placed a clause that indicated they have input and the right to 
refute any placements. Both positions are contrary to the current practices of the 
management company, which advocates for comprehensive management responsibilities 
inclusive of sole responsibility for staffing. The potential for conflict increases with such 
circumstances given the critical role of school leadership and the implications of 
reporting to the management company, reporting to the board of directors, or reporting to 
a confusing version of both. The current contract is not inclusive of a formal clause that 
gives the board input into the hiring of administrative roles.  
The second descriptor that emerged from Participant F’s interview is the 
perception that the profit motive of the management company is very strong and has far-
reaching implications that affects every aspect of the operations of the charter school. The 
board of directors is driven by the premise of volunteerism, while the board president 
feels that the management company is driven by profit, and as he stated, “[the 
management company] will do anything to keep the contract.” He also gave indication 
that the contract is stacked against board members and that they should receive training 
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specifically on the dynamics of the contract to better understands the expectations of their 
roles.   
The third descriptor emerged from the need for the board to receive training on 
the contract. It appears to be a missed opportunity because of the length of the contract 
and the assumption that every management agreement must parallel the length of the 
charter, which may be as long as seven years depending on the criteria of their authorizer. 
Conflict is inherent in circumstances where board members do not understand the 
expectations of both the management company and the governance roles of the board of 
directors. 
The fourth descriptor entails the issue of public funds as they come in sourced 
from public tax dollars with high priorities of transparency and accountability, but later 
morphs into the private accounts of the for-profit private management companies where it 
becomes void of access, scrutiny, transparency, and accountability. This transformation 
of managing funds is prime for potential conflicts given the accountability of the board of 
directors and their role as fiduciary stewards of public funds and resources. Conflicts also 
arise from the inability of funds to be tracked once they arrive in the possession of the 
for-profit management company. 
The fifth descriptor is the feeling that the board is disempowered and becomes a 
rubber stamp for the will and agenda of the for-profit private management company. This 
matter fosters confusion because it is contrary to how board members are recruited and 
appointed by authorizers in the state of Michigan. They are presented with a role of 
respect, ownership, and authority as volunteer citizens; ready to accept the reigns of 
stewardship for responsibility of assets, resources, and funds; not to mention the ability to 
impact communities, families, and children. Situations where volunteers feel they are a 
rubber stamp creates a feeling of confusion and resulting in potential conflicts impacting 
governance. 
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The sixth descriptor is transparency, full disclosure, and accountability. 
Participant F presented many situations where they were unable to receive answers to 
questions regarding the allocation of resources, the tracking of funds, and no urgency to 
respond to questions regarding student performance. Most of the matters, if not all, of 
charter school academies are subject to public meetings and also accessible by decree of 
the freedom of information act. When a board cannot readily obtain responses from its 
management company, this creates confusion and generates conflicts between them given 
the board requirements to govern, which is predicated on receiving data and information 
as needed and when requested. This matter also sets up conflicts in terms of what 
recourse boards have when such circumstances are present. 
The final descriptor is the common perception that the board of directors is 
responsible for all aspects of the operations of the school, which is accurate before a 
contract is signed for full-services to manage the operations. Once full-service agreement 
contracts are signed, the board’s breadth and scope of authority and responsibility is 
drastically reduced and commensurately shifted to the full-service, for-profit private 
management company. The contract makes such provisions legal and provides little to no 
recourse to the boards of directors. The potential for confusion grows, which leads to 
great potential for conflicts in these circumstances because the boards’ power becomes 
spurious and their ability to influence the operations of the school reduced. 
Participant F’s experience emphasized the importance of the contract and that 
board members should channel their energy to understanding the contract. The 
understanding of the contract mitigates questions of who has the authority and 
responsibility for the charter school and that the management company is a contractor 
and not the owner of the charter school. 
Interview Participant G  
 
 Background and Rationale for Being a Charter School Board Member  
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	  196	  
 
Participant G is a white male in his sixties with a college degree. He is an 
entrepreneur working in the horticulture industry. He is currently the vice president of the 
charter school’s board of directors. He stated that he has been on the board for more than 
12 years and has served every board role possible except for board president. He said,  
I am vice president only because I wanted to be in the position to ask questions 
rather than be a facilitator and ask for motions and stuff. I would rather be in a 
different position where I can have more flexibility, whereas I think a president is 
more of a figurehead. 
He has held numerous positions on the board such as, board director, general 
board member, treasurer, and vice president. All of the roles he has served in have helped 
him to build board knowledge and capacity regarding governance. He said, “I have pretty 
much enjoyed all of them. I mean you still have your voting privileges and stuff in every 
role. You are a part of the decision-making process. I enjoyed them all. I think the vice 
president has a little more flexibility than some of the other ones.” His primary reason for 
joining a charter school board included a desire to help children and make a difference in 
the community. He said: 
The primary reason [I like charter schools] was I think the way it was run. Being 
involved with the educational system, I have seen a lot of complaints with 
teachers through the years and I like the concept of the charter schools being more 
of a business operation. There is a lot more accountability to be held. There’s no 
running for elections for board members. There is no way to be bribed or coerce 
the decision-making process. And I like the concept of how the teachers were 
evaluated and the students with a lot of accountability. It was run in the confines 
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of a business compared to public schools. I felt that was a better avenue for the 
future of the next generation of people to run the country.  
Participant G has been affiliated with the charter school board since its inception. 
He took a leave of absence for four years for an out of state job opportunity. Upon his 
return, he continued his role as a board member. 
Participant G made it clear that a trusting relationship has developed between the 
management company and the board of directors. One area that was questionable is the 
dynamics around selecting top school leadership. The following was in response to 
asking if there were situations where the board of directors had concerns or questioned 
their management company’s decisions. He said: 
Sometimes, and some things that had to be worked out if we had questions in 
regards to a principal leaving. As a board, I think we had questions as to why they 
left. A new teacher, I should say new principal, was appointed and the board had 
very little say so and then we suddenly had another. Basically, we as a board had 
questions as to why the change [had occurred]. It affects the board because we are 
in there day-in and day-out and we have to work with him. We see the teachers, 
we see the students, basically everything on a daily basis. So we felt as a board we 
should be included in that process; not that we wanted to hire them ourselves; but 
we should know more about their background, what their specialty was, their 
concerns, and what their vision is for the future of our students. 
After the board approached the management company with their concerns, 
changes were made to include the board in the screening process and allow them to 
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question and address the appointment of top school leadership before they were offered 
employment. Participant G explained: 
And now we get invited to more or less a meet and greet where we meet the 
potential candidate they plan on hiring. We ask questions of them, and it is not 
monitored necessarily by the management company. So of our own freewill, we 
can ask whatever questions we want of the principal and the management 
company. I think that process is really good and we got no roadblocks when we 
requested that. But in the past, we got no say-so, as a governing board. We had no 
say-so; the management company made all of the decisions on hiring and firing; it 
affected us as a board. So now we have more say-so on the hiring and firing than 
we had before.   
The board required and negotiated a position of strength that allowed them to 
impact one of the primary positions of charter schools. This gave them the opportunity to 
better understand the disposition of the people that will lead and respond to the concerns 
and governance of the board of directors. 
Contractual Relationship 
  
The second qualitative interview question asked for a description of the 
contractual relationship between the board of directors and the management company. 
Participant G said that everything is in writing and they have an open relationship. He 
articulated:  
Again everything is in writing. I mean as far as the contract with the management 
company. And it is an open relationship. Where we have questions, they will 
explain things to us. The management company is forthcoming with any questions 
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we may have. And they seem to be able to address all of our questions and 
concerns. And so I do not have any problem with the management company.  
Participant G reiterated the importance of trust and the basis of the relationship 
between the board and the management company. He explained how the management 
company responded to inquiries and honored the parameters of the contract. He 
explained:  
It is a very open relationship and that is something that is needed. I would say 
contract-wise, anything we ask for is provided to us. If we get into a shady or gray 
area, our attorney advises us. Sometimes even the attorney has a different view 
than we have. But again, as a board we make that decision. They have been very 
good as far as the contract and following it. We know what is expected of us and 
how to function.  
When asked to elaborate and describe the term “open relationship,” Participant G 
said, “No matter whom you want to speak to. For example, if we have a financial 
question, it is not we will get back with you within two to three weeks or to their 
convenience. If you have a question, it is handled almost immediately.” He elaborated by 
providing an example and more definition of the term “open relationship” with the 
following: 
I have yet, since working with my management company, had yet to not get an 
answer, and if someone was out of town or in a meeting they would get someone 
through our board liaison who would get us answers to what we were looking for. 
So by open I mean there’s no hesitation, no delay. Whatever you ask, even 
something that would be offensive to the management company, they have never 
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withheld information. We have always gotten factual information, and have 
gotten it backed up with documentation and so I think that is a big plus working 
with a management company.  
In transition to deeper questions regarding the contract and the board’s 
understanding of the contractual relationship, Participant G responded, “I would say yes. 
I would say yes because again, through our authorizer, through our management 
company, through our legal representation, we have meetings or part of the meeting set 
aside so that we are brought through different things step-by-step.”  In conclusion to the 
questions regarding the contract and asked if he would like to see any contractual 
revisions, he said,  
No not at this time. If something was handled inappropriately or there were gray 
areas that came up, most definitely then. Like I said, everything that may be a 
potential problem is handled on a timely basis and it is generally to the 
satisfaction of everyone involved.  
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance  
In terms of what factors contribute to tension in governance, Participant G feels 
there is not any tension beyond the previously mentioned issue with the selection of 
school leadership, which was eventually resolved. He says that when problems occur they 
are immediately addressed with the management company. He explained:  
I am trying to think of an example where there is tension of governance…I don’t 
feel there is any tension because I think anything that has come up is always 
resolved; nothing lingered, and it is resolved by the entire board; not just one 
person. And I can’t really think of any tension. Like I said, the only one that came 
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up was the fact of hiring the principal. There was a little bit of tension there 
because we felt that we should be more involved but again that was rectified and 
it was agreed, and now that is part of our operating procedure. 
            Participant G provided more examples of what may have caused tension. He 
returned to the one example of the management company hiring a principal without their 
input. They felt totally out of the process and used the term “disempowered” as follows: 
Well, by tension, you sometimes as a board member get the impression they want 
more than just a warm body, so they put their principal in as a figurehead to run 
things. As a board, we are the ones that have to work with him: we are the ones 
that have to make that we as a governing board are making sure they follow 
procedures and the outline that has been given to us by the management company 
and the authorizer. So back to the tension part, by the [management company] just 
putting someone in we felt we were disempowered because we did not have the 
opportunity to learn more about this person they were putting in. This is a part of 
our leadership team and we need to know more about that person that we are 
working with; so that raised a little bit of tension…we were not happy with it, we 
felt that we were not in the loop or part of the team; so with that being resolved 
with the new system now the tensions have been reduced. 
           Participant G recalled the point of having input into the selection of school 
leadership. Roles other than top leadership are solely the call of the management 
company. He believed the principal should be totally empowered to make all the staff 
decisions. This kept the board focused on governance, and the management company on 
operations. He explained:   
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Pretty much the principal because again the principal, she’s in charge of the 
teachers, building, and everything else, so we don’t disempower her. We are only 
there as a governing board: a monitor. If there is a teacher, and the management 
company or authorizer feels a teacher is not doing their job properly, that is up to 
them to resolve it. It has nothing to do with us other than a governing board; we 
make sure that the processes are done according to the contract set up. 
When asked how long it took for the management company to respond, he said: 
 
Almost immediately, the tension came up. It rose, of course, the more we talked 
about it the more agitated the board was with our liaison and the management 
company. And again when the situation arose and we had to have a new principal, 
we were given like a bio on him so we had some background on that person 
before we met him and then we had a meet and greet at a local restaurant.  So 
with the management company, it was not really delayed or dragged out. If we 
had any concerns, it was addressed and the compromise was brought into play. 
The Importance of Empowerment in Governance 
         Participant G provided more feedback regarding the management company’s 
responsiveness and the importance of working together as a group. His board was 
emphatic about their empowerment and ownership of governance. An example was when 
the authorizer imposed a board member on their team. The subject board took issue and 
conferenced with the authorizer to make sure that the board determined who is brought 
on as a candidate and eventual board member. Participant G stated:  
Our school liaison told us that we needed a board member and of course everyone 
is always looking for one: teachers, staff, everybody else. We try to keep a well-
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mixed board. We try to keep someone that has a business background, someone 
that has an education background; someone that is a parent or has a student in the 
school… is a parent or grandparent so that we can see more ideas to solutions. 
When the board liaison came on, he found a board member somewhere and 
somehow and told us this is who we were going to have. And I kind of resented 
that because we were getting a board member that we knew nothing about. We 
felt they were being put into place because of a time constraint. And you have to 
have so many board members so this is who we are going to give you. And I think 
we resented that as a board, because again as a board we look for certain qualities 
and somebody that has a commitment to the education of the kids and stuff. He is 
going to see the education system as we as a group see it and realize that we are 
there to govern not to dictate policy but to evaluate the circumstances. So when 
the authorizer appointed this particular person, I would say that him and I had 
somewhat of an escalated conversation. But it was more to clear the point of 
view…anyhow the board member, he felt, as the authorizer this is who he felt we 
needed and as a board member we felt we should have the option to review this 
person as a member of our team, not his team.  
           Participant G and his board members wanted to have a voice in all decisions 
impacting governance; the leadership of the school and candidates for the board of 
directors are two examples where they felt their input was imperative. While demanding 
empowerment, they maintained respect for the functions of operations and oversight. An 
example below included working with the management company and the authorizer: 
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The management company obviously does the hiring and firing, so that’s their 
decision. But again back to the board. As a governing board, we are seeing the 
total picture so we always ask to be in the loop so if someone is going to be fired 
or something like this is going down. We should question this …it’s our team 
leader of our building. The person in charge of our school may have a different 
change of heart or venue and things are not for the best of the students, then we 
may even bring it to the management company and question… this or that. Again, 
if everybody is in the same loop and feels the job is not getting done, and like any 
other job, that is the whole concept of the charter school. It is simply like a job, if 
you cannot do the job to the best of your ability and show accountability that you 
are doing it, than you need to be replaced.  
          Participant G referred to the board’s philosophy by which it governed as “whatever 
is best for the students,” determines what decisions are made. He made it clear that it is 
all about the students and not the management company. He stated:  
 I think as a whole it is the board. I can speak for the rest of them, that it is like a 
guideline or parameter we use [for] teachers, curriculum, [and the] Management. 
A lot of things go on between the management company and the authorizer: the 
state rules, regulations, and stuff and I think it is real important the board can look 
at all of those things collectively and be able to be involved with them because all 
of those decisions are going to [sic.] impact the students. When you come back to 
it, what are we talking about here; we are talking about a school; what does a 
school do; it educates the mind of the young children so we are looking for the 
best education and what is best for the student, not what is best for the 
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management company, not what is best for the authorizer, it is what is best for the 
student in the long range. So if the authorizer says we need to do this, or if the 
management company says we need to do that, we have to take a look at it and go 
back to those golden parameters: how does this decision affect the future of our 
students? And if we don’t feel that it is in a positive way, we can change it.  
           Accountability and Transparency  
           The fourth question asked Participant G if he believed that accountability and 
transparency of public funds might have changed when contracting with a for-profit 
management company or if there was an issue. He responded by basically saying that 
accountability improved with a management company. In addition, transparency 
improved given the processes required for procurement. He stated the following: 
 I think the accountability is better with the management company. Again, 
because with the movement of the charter schools there are a lot of eyes on what 
is going on and with the accounting staff and with what is required from the state, 
auditors, and everything else. I feel more confident about the charter system than I 
do the public schools in regards to accountability. I think the transparency is more 
open with the for-profit companies than with the public school system, I feel 
much more relaxed with the ability of the management company than I do with 
the public schools.  
           There appears to be a strong comfort with transparency and accountability that is 
tied to the level of trust in the relationship compounded with the routine reports at board 
meetings and procedures and systems tied to annual audits. He stated, “Financial-wise, 
we see the report at our meetings and we also obviously see the auditor’s report so the 
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transparency and openness is there for us.” He fortified the board’s disposition with the 
following statement: 
Because of the reports that we receive at every meeting; because of the audit 
reports from a reputable audit firm; everything is in writing, and decisions are 
made on money pending, money being used. There is a paper trail; the paper trail 
is so obvious that you don’t need an accountant to follow it. I mean you can 
follow the agenda on what was approved, what was spent and the balances…so I 
think the transparency is very good. I would not question it at all.  
         Contractual and Legislative Suggestions 
          When asked about what could be done contractually or legislatively, to improve 
leadership and governance in Michigan charter schools, Participant G said that it is still 
early in the evolution of charter schools and that they were initially not looked upon 
favorably. He explained:  
I don’t know anything off the top of my head that could be done. It is almost a 
retro situation that something has to happen first. For example, the concept of the 
charter schools was not looked at favorably. And then as they became more 
involved, they started to, for example, remove the caps on the charter schools so 
they got more recognition. And as far as legislatively, I said there are ways, it is a 
situation where time is going to tell the answers. I think as the movement toward 
the charter schools continues, I think those things will have to be addressed as 
they arise. And at this point, I can say everything that has been going on, as far as 
the cap being removed, we are progressing ahead. You have to be subject to 
change, and I think some of the teachers get complacent with the way things have 
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always been done. But the way things were always done may fit that era. With 
technology and the way the world has changed, it has people who are going to 
oversee the next generation of these kids. You have to make those changes to 
keep up with the world the way it is.   
           Participant G believed that it is still too early to place judgment on charter schools. 
He does believe that they are progressing constructively and will be the wave of the 
future and eventually impact, if not replace, the functions of traditional public schools. 
He stated the following: 
So I can’t pinpoint anything, there is no golden rule of what needs to be 
done…the evolution of the charter schools if it continues to progress, if things 
continue the way I have been seeing it, I think that will be a thing of the future. 
Public schools will be non-existent…they are set up more efficiently: The 
planning that goes into it, the class, the layout, the curriculum, the evaluating the 
teachers, the students. I think in the future, it will be the whole concept. All public 
schools are either going to adapt to the way charter schools are run for profit and 
for education or they are going to fall by the wayside.  
           Participant G is committed to the charter school model and believed that every 
aspect of the charter school model is more proficient than traditional public schools. His 
focus was primarily on the students and the effect of governance on performance and 
stability. He emphatically stated the following:  
Well if I may be blunt, as far as our interview this morning, the questions are 
revolved around governance and leadership, transparency and again the focus 
seems to be on the charter schools themselves; where again my focus is on the 
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kids.  I think if you had been asking me more from the kid’s aspect on the kids: 
what is good for the kids, what is the future for the kids; I am not much of a 
politician, I let the management company work out those problems. In a 
governing position, I am more concerned with how it affects our students and 
their education; I don’t want to dictate policy. They are the ones that have all of 
the data and the research. But I enjoy seeing that data: looking to see if the grades 
improve and seeing the attendance records. The end result of all this work and 
effort comes down to the students, so that is what I am focused on: not unless they 
do something outwardly stupid and it is proven that way…All the decisions, if the 
focus is on the students; that’s the end result, that is the report card...that is the 
part I watch, the students and the grades. 
           In terms of Participant G’s final responses to if governance can be affected 
through the contract or legislatively; he defied the negative propaganda that highlights the 
ills of charter schools. He did not generally believe that charters are all bad. On the 
contrary, he felt there is a lot of value when charters are compared to public schools. He 
stated:  
Probably again, the propaganda when the charter school first started. Being a 
board member for so long, you know it was money grabbing. It was companies 
out there to make money…education was not a factor...it seems as though the 
charter schools were being getting beat up from all sides...from the standpoint of 
governance, the other school systems, the public school and everybody seemed to 
be dead set against charter schools. I think the perseverance and staying with the 
plans and following through on it and now with the changes. And I have been 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	  209	  
involved over the years; I think they are seeing a lot of value in the charter 
schools versus the public schools. 
           In conclusion, Participant G reinforced the student-focused philosophy. He spoke 
of some of the entities and rhetoric against charter schools. He provided a very positive 
construct in terms of what the future holds for charter schools and the positive impact 
they may have on public education. 
 
 
            Summary and Analysis of Results  
Participant G’s experience as a board member appears to encompass a positive 
perception of the contractual relationship with the for-profit private management 
company. The board of directors appeared to have a constructive relationship that is 
guided by trust and an understanding of the contract and the roles of both parties. Some 
areas did provide areas for potential confusion and resulting conflicts in governance. The 
primary sources are related to the hiring of leadership roles, which the board has required 
input based on previous issues where they had no input into the hiring of principals. The 
other sources include the potential for conflicts in the monitoring of day-to-day activities 
where the board is involved. It also includes the placement of board candidates, which 
Participant G and his board vociferously supports only the members having the final say 
given it is their team and they have to work with them directly. 
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Significant descriptors emerged from the qualitative data from Participant G as 
illustrated in Table 10. He expressed appreciation for how charters operate in terms of 
functioning like a business. The highlights of his experiences included shared 
responsibility for hiring key leadership, transparency and full disclosure (open 
relationships and trust), full-service management is viewed as a positive, board 
recommendations for board candidates and volunteerism/community oriented (student 
advocacy).  
Participant G’s experiences included the board’s participation in the selection of 
key leadership positions at the school. The board expects to meet, interview, and question 
all candidates for school leadership. They also demanded to recruit any and all board 
candidates. His board felt they should have a say in any decision that impacted their 
leadership and governance.  
He indicated how the positive interactions, over time, have developed into an 
open relationship between the board of directors and the management company. The 
 
Table 10 
Identification of Descriptors from Participant G’s Interview Transcript  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
! Shared responsibility for hiring key leadership 
! Accountability of finances                       related to student performance 
! Community oriented/volunteerism 
! Full-service management company is a plus 
! Charter school’s impact on family 
! Charter school’s displacement of traditional public schools 
! Board recommendations for board candidates 
! Transparency 
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day 
! Charter schools’ ability to give feedback on teacher evaluations 
trust/open relationship 
student advocacy 
! Conscious mix of board/professionalism 
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relationship has fostered a level of trust that has permeated the interactions between the 
two parties. This mutual respect enabled the board to work in confidence that the 
management company will respond in good faith.   
Participant G has served in all board positions except for president, which he 
viewed as a figurehead. His experiences in the roles of a general member, treasurer, and 
vice president have equipped him with a strong understanding of board roles and 
responsibilities.  His primary rationale for becoming a board member was to serve his 
community and help children to achieve. 
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant G indicated potential areas 
for conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the 
for-profit private management company. Two of the multiple descriptors that emerged 
from the qualitative data from Participant G have potential for conflict as illustrated in 
Table 10. The other descriptors represent a more constructive relationship between the 
two parties that appeared to function positively based on his twelve years of experience. 
His shared experiences conveyed perspectives inclusive of; issues of hiring key 
leadership and having board members sourced by any means void of the board of 
directors given they are the ones that must work with new members. The other 
descriptors provided insight to the relationship that is effectively working on the grounds 
of trust and mutual respect. These descriptors included trust through an open relationship; 
and the ability of the management company to provide value-added educational services. 
The first descriptor from the interview with Participant G emerged as the ability 
of the board to have input into the hiring process. This situation, although seemingly 
positive, has great potential for confusion and conflicts. The board has been granted 
access to meet the school leadership as chosen by the management company. This gives a 
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sense of having their input valued; however, contractually the boards of directors have no 
recourse when it comes to selecting the school’s leadership. The management company is 
wise in making provisions for the board of directors to have an informal forum in which 
to ask questions and discuss the school leader’s philosophies, vision, and experience. 
However, again, this is permitted outside the boundaries of the contractual agreement.   
The second descriptor that emerged from Participant G is who has the authority 
for recommending board candidates. The board took offense to having external sources 
provide candidates for the board of directors’ positions given the sensitivity that it is the 
members that have to work with the possible appointee. This is problematic and has 
potential for confusion and conflict given the multiple sources from which board 
candidates are derived. Circumstances where the management company may recommend 
a board or board members must come under heavy scrutiny given the need to keep 
relationships authentic and void of hidden agendas, favoritism, and subjectivity. 
The third descriptor from Participant G is the feeling of having a constructive 
open relationship between the board of directors and the for-profit private management 
company. He mentioned the importance of having a professional management company 
equipped with the ability to prudently manage the business operations of the charter 
school. He mentioned their ability to obtain information swiftly and effectively in order 
for the board to address issues that improve their governance abilities. Openness is a 
positive for any relationship; trust and disclosure allows cooperation so that the school 
may prosper. 
The final descriptor is related to the management of the day-to-day operations of 
the charter school. The board seems to have a hand in the daily operations from a positive 
perspective in dealing with teachers, students, families, and the community. Even though 
the circumstances that Participant H conveyed in his interview are positive; it is an area 
of potential confusion and conflicts given the board’s participation in daily operations 
beyond the boundaries of governance. 
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Emerging Themes from Qualitative Data 
 
Analysis of the qualitative research provided an opportunity to explore the stories 
of experienced board members based on their individual interviews. The verbal 
interviews were typed into transcripts, which allowed the researcher to find meaning 
from the responses of the seven board member participants. The review of the individual 
transcripts enabled the researcher to codify data in a manner to reveal descriptors that 
were reoccurring from the interviews. Each board member expressed unique perspectives 
based on their board experiences, which illustrated what they believe regarding 
governance in their charter schools when contracting with full-service for-profit private 
management companies.    
The areas of importance based on repetition within individual interviews emerged 
as descriptors. Once all transcripts were analyzed, the descriptors were identified so 
comparisons could be made to find the common ground from the collective interview 
transcripts. What follows is a thematic analysis based on codifying the qualitative data so 
themes may emerge from the discovery of similarities and consistencies in the data of the 
interview participants.   
The themes captured the meaning of what the interview participants expressed in 
their respective comments. A summary of themes that emerged collectively from the 
interview participants were based on the frequency or repetition of the key words, 
phrases, and descriptions in the interviews, are provided in Figure 18. These nine themes 
emerged based on the frequency of the descriptors mentioned in the qualitative interviews 
and the topic’s relevance as expressed in the participants’ verbal responses.   
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Figure 18. Emerging themes from codifying qualitative interview data. This illustration 
presents the frequency of times that the subject themes were mentioned in the 
qualitative interviews with seven participants.  
Community-centered and Volunteerism Theme 
The Community-centered and Volunteerism theme emerged on the basis of 
repetition and depth of description provided by the participants.  All seven of the 
qualitative interview participants talked about their rationale for becoming charter school 
board members. The underlying theme for each participant was that giving back to the 
community and providing opportunities to families and children, who would otherwise 
not have a viable alternative to traditional education, was an important part of their 
volunteerism.  The long-term board members volunteer their time due to the fact that 
their reward is helping their community and providing viable education alternatives for 
children. The following quotes are directly from the participants’ transcripts. Participant 
A stated: 
Community centered/
volunteerism 
Board training is a necessity 
Transparency and full 
disclosure 
The profit motive 
Feeling like a rubber stamp 
Once a month is not enough 
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I have been a board member going on 15 years now. The reason I actually started 
working with the board initially is because of the disparity in our communities 
around ensuring that we have a congruent academic process and services that 
were going to be extended throughout the community in southwest Detroit. So 
when I was asked to participate with the board about 15 years ago, I thought it 
was intriguing and I thought it was something with my background I could help 
them with technology and things like that and help the overall education process. 
He conveyed a passion for assisting urban students by giving his time and 
technology skills which is a part of his career in management information systems. He 
has concerns regarding what he perceives as gapping disparity between wealthy and poor 
school districts. He continued: 
One thing I would like to reiterate is again, the disparity around and within the zip 
codes, it is critical not to discriminate against any of the children just because they 
are in a different zip code. I think we need to make sure from a legislative piece 
that we put processes in place and the right level of rigor in place so we may take 
this to our government and work with our governing bodies so we can fix this. 
Some of the communities have a lower set of wage earners; it corresponds to 
having less resources in the community overall. I just think it’s the wrong way to 
go from where I sit. We need to understand how we can make sure we get that 
gap decreased and have some processes in place so we get some congruency in 
place because these kids are critically important… 
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The impetus of Participant D’s volunteerism is two-fold. First it is a desire to 
impact her grandchildren’s education and second was to become part of a movement that 
could impact education. She exclaimed: 
Ok, why did I join the board? Basically, at that particular time, my grandchildren 
were coming of age where they would be attending school, a Detroit school, and 
at that time, like everyone else, I was looking for alternatives other than Detroit 
Public Schools for them. I had heard a lot of good things about the charter school 
movement and I heard a lot of bad things. But I wanted to take a chance for them 
and on their behalf; that is how I got involved. 
In this final example of the community-centered and volunteerism theme, 
Participant F gave another illustration of why board members volunteer. Participant F’s 
careers have included teaching and civil rights. He is a lawyer who is determined to help 
disadvantaged urban minority children. Similar to Participant A, he wants to close the 
gap between wealthy districts and poor districts and he wants to level the education 
landscape as much as possible.  He exclaimed: 
Board members serve because they want to see student performance and our 
school is an urban school. I want to see minority students; disadvantaged students; 
have the same opportunity for life and careers as others do in other areas. I want 
to make the playing field equal. That’s the passion and I want to make sure that 
we are offering something that they are not getting at a traditional public school. 
If we are not making a difference, if there is not a substantial improvement, then 
we are wasting our time with this being the same or being slightly better than 
what someone could obtain educationally in a public school is not enough. That’s 
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what we need to know. That’s our passion as board members. It never gets far 
beyond it. 
Analysis of Community-centered and Volunteerism Theme 
The interview participants all shared common passions in terms of becoming 
members of charter school boards of directors. They all wanted to serve in a capacity to 
provide opportunities to children and give back to communities that would benefit from 
their volunteerism. The rationale for joining differs between the previously mentioned 
volunteers. Some joined because of their own children or grandchildren, seeking 
alternatives to traditional public schools. Other participants volunteer in order to 
unselfishly share their talents and skills to benefit others. The unanimous desire to serve 
on the board of directors is predicated by a paradigm of charity and volunteerism that is 
very different from the paradigm of for-profit management companies that is profit-
driven. These somewhat opposing paradigms may clash, causing confusion and resulting 
in conflicts that manifest in policy and procedural differences between the board and 
management company. 
Board Training is a Necessity Theme 
The board training that is universal and tailored theme emerged on the basis of 
multiple mentions of the need for a variety of board trainings that were expressed in the 
interviews. Two types of training surfaced in the dialogue of the interviews, which were 
general board training and specific or tailored board training. The desire for general board 
training emphasized core dynamics of governance that would be applicable to all board 
members. Whereas, more specific or tailored board training would be for those board 
members who hold or anticipate holding an office such as treasurer, vice president, and 
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president. The participants mentioned a desire to have board training from multiple 
sources beyond what is typically provided from the authorizers and the management 
companies. The following quotes are directly from the participants’ transcripts. 
Participant A stated: 
One thing I found to be good and maybe it is not legislative, maybe it is, the roles 
and responsibilities around the ESP, the board of directors, and the authorizer are 
critical and people need to understand that. I think the MDE has done a really 
good job of trying to define those roles and responsibilities; lots of folks for 
whatever reason do not really understand what those roles are… we have come a 
long way to bridging that gap of understanding the roles and acting within the 
roles to ensure that everyone has a clear understanding of what their roles and 
responsibilities are around each of these entities to ensure collaborative efforts to 
educate these children. 
In most instances, the authorizer has provided board training. Participant A 
explained,  
It is the board’s role to understand their roles and responsibilities. I do not expect 
the authorizer or the ESP to tell the board what their role is; I say that because if 
you are ultimately responsible for something, then you should know what that 
responsibility entails. 
The next participant echoed the previous sentiment by reiterating that training 
should come from multiple sources. Participant B stated, “Training for the boards that are 
out there, not just from the authorizers, but more training to have board members 
understand their roles.” She continued by providing areas to train board members such as, 
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“Specifically understanding contract negotiations, budgeting, breakout sessions on how 
to pick apart budgets, looking at school calendars, placing board members into sub 
categories to work with finances, discipline…etc. But different sub groups focus on 
different aspects.” 
The next participant’s comments illustrated the challenge of decoding and 
understanding various financial and accounting budget codes. Participant F admitted, “I 
am concerned about the budget codes, they are confusing. From a budget standpoint, it 
can be understood by a C.P.A.” He continued expressing his concern in the following: 
Well, if we don’t understand the financials, we get an opportunity to ask 
who…the management company. And they are the ones making it clear for us.  
That’s a problem. That’s a real problem. Or, I want to understand student 
performance data, so who do I go to? And the problem is the information is 
filtered, it is put in such a way. I’m not faulting management companies; that’s 
what they are going to do. They are going to make themselves look good.  
Participant F closed with expressing his concerns about the finances of the charter 
school: “In the worst, I am not comfortable with our finances. And I sit here as a board 
member up to 19 years and I’m not comfortable.” 
The next example is provided by Participant E who has the benefit of having 
served in multiple roles with the latest being board president. She articulated a significant 
difference between the demands of a regular board member versus the demands of 
serving in a board officer capacity such as treasurer, vice president, and president. She 
explained: 
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I would say yes, it depends on the role you have. Of course, if I were just a 
regular board member, I would not have as much responsibility like that as 
president. I have been a board president for about 4 years now and I would say, 
over the last two years or so, I have become more intractably involved in the 
welfare of the school and our relationship with our new authorizer and also, the 
accountability of our management group. 
Participant B discussed training from the perspective of including networking 
with other boards and having forums with different policy groups. Participant B stated: 
Well, this is my own opinion, and shortcomings; one of the things I think that 
could have been improved; with our changes to social media such as Facebook, 
and Instagram. We have gone to a process where we don’t necessarily meet with 
peers, and or legislative groups, or leadership groups like MAPSA (Michigan 
Association of Public School Academies). It would be nice to hear from the 
source in person what some of the changes are legislatively and how the charter 
school movement is doing as a whole; how regions are doing as a whole, what 
works, what is not working, and you can only get that through face-to-face… also 
a best practice with other boards to hear what is working and not working. 
Analysis of Board Training is a Necessity Theme 
The previous board members expressed the need for general and specific kinds of 
board trainings. There appears to be a desire for training from multiple sources other than 
their authorizer. The general training is for novices and regular board members who do 
not hold a specific role as an officer, while tailored training is desired for boards of 
directors who hold specific officer roles such as president, vice president, and treasurer. 
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The specific training would be designed to enable the officers to better perform 
effectively in their roles and responsibilities. What frequently surfaced from the board 
member participants’ interviews is the lack of training, which directly correlates to role 
confusion that exacerbates conflicts between boards and management companies. These 
conflicts have implications on many aspects of charter school operations, policy 
development, awarding of sub contracts, handling of discipline matters, deployment of 
curriculum and academics, and much more. An additional area mentioned by some of the 
interview participants is training specific to becoming aware and understanding the 
contracts between boards and their management companies. Some of the interview 
participants believe that by becoming aware of and understanding the contract, board 
members will better understand their roles and the roles of the for-profit management 
company, which implies less confusion and resulting in a reduction of conflicts in 
governance.  
Transparency and Full Disclosure Theme 
The Transparency and Full Disclosure theme emerged on the basis of repetition 
and consistency. The board interview participants placed a high value on transparency 
and full disclosure as a necessity for having a trusting and an open relationship with the 
for-profit private management company. Some participants voiced concerns of the lack of 
transparency in terms of not having all pertinent information for decision-making; while 
others indicated that boards were being told only what management companies felt was 
needed.  
Positive expressions were given in the cases of boards having an open 
professional relationship with the management companies. Negative expressions were 
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given where boards experienced circumstances that information was withheld, partially 
provided, or where multiple requests had to be made. The latter circumstances fostered 
distrust and a feeling of disrespect for the office of the board of directors.  
Participant A led with the description of his experience and disposition on 
transparency. His disposition indicated a level of skepticism in terms of the board being 
presented with accurate reports if the news is not positive. He explained: 
There seem to be issues that, right, wrong or indifferent, because you hire an ESP 
[Education Service Provider] there are different levels of visibility. The 
management company may try glaze over (I am trying to use a different word 
than hide), but in certain scenarios there are certain elements that would occur like 
what is going on at the school. Do we have the right level of climate and culture 
in the school? Do we have the right level of data teams engaged to provide 
information to the teachers, and are students getting what they need? It is really 
easy to disseminate that into data and say everything is good, but when you dig a 
little deeper and pull back the layers of the onion, you find out in many cases that 
the right level of visibility is not always disseminated to the board of directors and 
that things are being swept under the rug or hidden to make the overall picture 
look better than what it actually is.  
Continuing with Participant D, she provided a strong degree of concern regarding 
transparency and full disclosure. She indicated a desire in knowing details of how the 
money is being expended and what are the monetary [profit] benefits to the for-profit 
private management company. She expressed the following:  
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Well, my question at the end of the day is, how much profit are you making, you 
don’t want to show me that, and if you don’t want to show me how much profit 
you are making then I am not quite sure that the children are getting what they are 
suppose to get; you can tell me anything, but I need to see the figures, I need to 
see the numbers, I need to see where the money is going? 
Participant D provided further concerns on transparency and gives examples of specific 
areas that increased skepticism around transparency. She continued:  
Oh absolutely, and the amount of money we are paying in rent and who is getting 
these contracts. Are you putting the bids out there like you are suppose to and 
sharing it with the board? You tell me that you are spending millions of dollars on 
the school, but I don’t see what you did. The children do not have a lunchroom; 
they are eating in their rooms. They have no gymnasium. We are totally in the 
dark. 
Other participants also experienced issues regarding transparency. Participant F 
expressed a concern of not receiving accurate information. He stated,  
They would say, no, no, no, we have always given you the information that you 
want.  What do you mean that we are not giving it to you? And the answer is well, 
you’re giving it, but it’s been filtered, censored, and scrubbed up. 
Some of the board member participants provided positive responses regarding 
transparency in terms of receiving information as requested and having an open 
relationship with the for-profit private management company. Participant G stated: 
I think the accountability is better with the management company. Again because 
with the movement of the charter schools, there are a lot of eyes on what is going 
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on and with the accounting staff and with what is required from the state, auditors, 
and everything else, I feel more confident about the charter system than I do the 
public schools in regards to accountability. 
No matter what their viewpoint on transparency and full disclosure, it was clear 
that this was a theme that was prevalent in the comments of the interview respondents.  
Analysis of Transparency and Full Disclosure Theme 
All of the interview participants indicated some kind of concerns regarding 
transparency and disclosure. The concerns ranged from areas inclusive of financial and 
budget reporting, sharing information regarding student performance, awarding of sub 
contracts, allocation of resources, rent, and the transformation of public tax dollars into 
the private world of non-disclosure of the for-profit management company. The 
implications of issues around transparency and non-disclosure are far reaching and causes 
confusion and conflicts in the realms of governance.  
The Profit Motive Theme 
The Profit Motive theme emerged on the premise of moderate repetition and 
depth. The theme was repeated in terms of boards of directors conveying that 
management companies’ prime motive for managing charter schools is to make a profit. 
The depth of the profit motive was given in regards to placing students and academics as 
secondary to the bottom line of management companies. A feeling also surfaced that the 
desire for profit influences many of the academic and non-academic challenges facing 
charter schools. 
In responding to the question of what are the pros and cons of contracting with a 
for-profit private management company, Participant F’s response as follows: 
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The con, well it’s in your question. It is, if you have the right people that are 
student-child-family oriented, its fine. Or just feel in their heart to do the right 
thing, full disclosure, honesty, careful with expenditures and things of that nature. 
It can work very, very, well. But the profit motive is very, very, high. It does 
dictate and influence a lot of what occurs. There may be things that are said that 
are for the student or for the welfare of the school and things of that nature. But at 
its core, it’s a money driven process. And that’s really sad, but I see what they’re 
doing is anything to maintain that contract. The contract and the money that is 
generated through it can be enormous. 
     As Participant F continued, he expressed concerns over how taxpayer 
funds pass from a not-for-profit entity to a for-profit entity. He continued:   
A public school academy is a non-profit entity but in reality those funds 
are passed through to a for-profit entity; to me that can’t be. You can’t do 
that. It makes a public school academy simply as a shell for the for-profit 
company because the funds, operations, and management are turned over 
to a for-profit entity; I happen to think from a policy standpoint, that’s 
wrong! The whole purpose of setting up a school as a non-profit entity is 
for that purpose. It’s not a moneymaking entity. Profits are not to be 
derived from it, but when those funds are passed onto a for profit entity, 
we are doing just that. If you take a step back and just think about it, it 
makes absolutely no sense to do that. To have that framework in place, it’s 
unacceptable. I don’t think that there, under any stretch of the imagination, 
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should be a non-profit entity passing on its funds for its operation to a for-
profit entity. I have a major problem with that. 
Participant F concluded his perspective on the profit motive by stating, “So I think 
if we move the profit motive out of there, we can put greater power into improving 
instruction.” It was evident from Participant F and others, that they have an awareness of 
the profit motive and its role in the relationship with the management companies. 
Multiple interview participants provided perspectives that the management 
companies primary reason for existence is to generate a profit and that this motive 
overshadowed the vision, mission, and values of the charter school and the board of 
directors. A significant number also indicated that the for-profit business ideologies were 
in contrast to the philosophies which the board members embraced such as volunteerism, 
civic mindedness, and building communities by providing better educational 
opportunities for families and their children. The potential conflicts for such contrasting 
perspectives are far-reaching and extend to issues including operations, academics, bids, 
staffing, and cost versus quality related matters where the board may emphasize quality 
and the management company cost. The confusion for the board of directors emerged 
from their position of hiring a for-profit management company and somewhat 
unconsciously passing their power to the management company who is, subsequent to 
contract signing, the entity that now decides much of what programs are chosen and 
implemented; and what is acceptable from a cost perspective.  Another example is the 
incentive that management companies have when there is inherently a bigger profit by 
cutting programs and their associated cost. For example, in some management contracts, 
the management company may legally retain the budget surplus of the charter school. 
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Therefore, the less the school spends, the greater the management company’s profit 
margin. 
Feeling Like a Rubber Stamp Theme 
The Feeling Like a Rubber Stamp theme was stated multiple times with the 
specific phrase most often quoted verbatim and other moments synonymously stated by 
the interview participants. For example, some of the synonymous phrases included using 
terminology such as being disempowered or a feeling of being expected to sign off on 
whatever was placed in front of the board of directors. In these instances, boards of 
directors felt a strong sense of powerlessness. Often times, the participants expressed that 
they felt they were without a sense of recourse or true authority, despite having the titles 
of being a charter school board member. Participant F provided a disposition, which 
included a statement of not being empowered. He stated: 
So we don’t get into that kind of detail in the minutes and I don’t think that’s 
constructive, but the message was clear …we are not to touch budget items. How 
do you have a board and govern as a board? We can’t even control the budget? 
Why I say it’s a concern is because by the time we get budgets proposed and 
amended budgets, they’re running deficits and that’s a concern to us; but we are 
not empowered to deal with that. 
In terms of discussing the elements of the contractual agreement between the 
board of directors and the for-profit private management company, Participant D 
indicated concerns over being a rubber stamp. She explained: 
If the contract is tying the board’s hands behind their back, which is what these 
contracts are doing, basically you are a rubber stamp. And not only are you a 
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rubber stamp; there is not transparency and no accountability. So, other than that, 
the contract is basically just paper. 
She continued to discuss the issue of just being part of a board because boards are 
required for charter schools. She explained: 
Basically, where do I start, when I first joined the board I never was really 
educated or trained, so to speak, on what my position would be as a governor of 
that particular entity. I came in with all of these expectations of being part of a 
movement and I was excited about doing great things for the children. However, 
after being in my second term I realized that I was a rubber stamp. 
This feeling of not truly making the decisions or feeling like a rubber stamp permeated 
many of the interviews.  
Analysis of Feeling like a Rubber Stamp Theme 
A significant percentage of the interview participants articulated concerns of not 
having the authority to provide effective governance, if any governance at all. Board 
members expressed feelings of disempowerment, having their hands tied behind their 
backs, and given things to sign without explanation. These feelings were in opposition to 
the reasons why the participants became board members. They wanted to contribute to an 
ideology of improving education; instead some of them stated that they felt they were 
engaged only because boards of directors are required for charter schools. These feelings 
more than likely stem from a lack of understanding of the contract inclusive of the 
differing roles and obligations of the board of directors and the for-profit management 
company. The lack of understanding of the roles contributes to confusion and conflicts in 
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governance. To paraphrase one of the interview participant’s statements, the management 
company can only do what the contract allows.  
Input into Hiring School Leadership Theme 
The theme of input into hiring school leadership emerged to some degree in all of 
the interviews. However, it strongly resonated with five of the seven boards of directors. 
It was presented in multiple ways that this decision has cascading effects on the entire 
school in terms of academic performance to working constructively with the boards of 
directors. A consistent disposition was that boards of directors wanted to achieve or 
pursue input into the role(s) of school leadership. Some even mentioned a desire to have 
input not only in the selection of school leadership, but also input into the leadership’s 
evaluation.  
Participant B expressed regret that they, the board, did not have terms placed in 
the contract that would have enabled the board of director’s executive committee to have 
input to the selection of school leadership. He said: 
We have an executive committee, which comprises of the board president, vice 
president, and treasurer in our case. And they act on behalf of the board and 
anything they determine is recorded and ratified at the board meeting. If the 
executive committee had the opportunity to vet a potential candidate provided to 
us by the management company, we may have had a better understanding of what 
to anticipate in terms of their leadership capabilities…I think that may have 
helped us in the long run and we would have put a clause in the contract where by 
either the board or a component of the board has the ability to make the final 
decision on the selection of the leadership of that school. 
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Participant E discussed how their board provides the management company with 
the discretion to hire constituency roles; however, the leadership roles require board 
input. Participant E stated:  
In terms of hiring, for example, we give at my particular school, we give our 
management company leeway on hiring teachers, instructional coaches, and the 
like; we think they have enough experience to do that. There are situations where 
we may feel like we want some input, for instance, a school leader we want to 
have some input as the board as to who is hired for that particular position. 
Participant E provided an example of where the board of directors not only had input but 
also selected the person for their school’s leadership. She explained: 
We had to get a new school leader to replace this person. And we chose a 
particular person. The board of governance and the management group both 
selected this person and the management group found the candidates and we 
interviewed collectively. After they got to a certain point, the board of governance 
came into the process of the interview and between the two candidates we 
selected the person. 
The Participant F gave an example of how they initially did not have input into 
the selection of school leadership, but subsequently poised themselves to change it to 
where they do have input to the selection of school leadership. Participant G explained: 
So of our own freewill we can ask whatever question we want of the principal and 
the management company. I think that process is really good and we got no 
roadblocks when we requested that. But in the past we got no say-so, as a 
governing board we had no say-so; the management company made all of the 
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decisions on hiring and firing; it affected us as a board. So now we have more 
say-so on the hiring and firing than we had before. 
The final illustration comes from Participant F. He explained how he would go 
about addressing the issue of the board of directors having input to the decision of school 
leaders within the contract. He explained: 
The first thing I would like; the critical component of the school is the leader. I 
read that its 60% [that the principal] is the factor of the success of the school; the 
leadership over time impacts every aspect of the school. I would like the board to 
have more of a say; in some schools its actually written into the management 
agreement. I would say the right to refusal; that the building leader serves with the 
consent of the board.  That if the board is unsatisfied, it can dismiss the leader 
right there. 
The need to provide input into hiring, though limited to school leadership roles, 
was a theme with the majority of the interview respondents.  
            Analysis of Input into Hiring School Leadership Theme 
The majority of the participants articulated a desire to have boards of directors’ 
provide input into the selection of the charter schools’ administrative leadership. These 
positions include the superintendent and principal roles. Many of the interview 
participants stated that if they could change anything in the contracts it would be to have 
a say in the key leadership roles. Some of the participants indicated an informal say in the 
selection of principals; however, there is not official provisions to allow the boards to 
have input into the selection of key leadership roles. There is definite confusion here 
because even though some boards are allowed to meet with leadership candidates, there 
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are not any provisions in the contract between the boards and their management 
companies to formally have input or recourse if any disagreements occur. The confusion 
creates potential for conflicts in the governance of charter schools.  
The Board Is Ultimately Responsible Theme 
The Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme emerged from the majority of the 
qualitative interview participants. These respondents took an adamant posture that they 
are ultimately responsible for every aspect of the school despite having a contract with a 
full-service, for-profit private management company. Their responsibility permeated 
every aspect of the school’s operations and functions inclusive of student achievement, 
finances, budget, facilities, and other areas. Participant A commenced with statements for 
the boards’ feeling they have ultimate responsibility. He said, “Because the board is 
ultimately responsible for everything that occurs with the PSA. We need to make sure 
that we know our role and that we are governing correctly.” Participant A continued: 
The board itself is ultimately responsible from a fiduciary perspective and 
academic responsibility to make sure students reach grade level. They must get 
the academically nurturing they need in order to move forward. It becomes really 
tough because you don’t see what is going on day-to-day. 
Participant A discussed some of the detailed responsibility of the management 
company regarding the day-to-day operation. He then reiterated that the board has 
ultimate responsibility. He explained:  
So a board will hire an ESP to conduct the daily business. The board will hire the 
ESP to manage its finances from a day-to-day perspective, i.e. ensuring the bills 
are paid, ensuring that the maintenance company is paid, that the grounds are 
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clean, snow is removed on time, making sure that vendors are around for lunch 
and breakfast catering so that children have a good hot and healthy meal every 
day. Contractually, we asked the ESP to handle those things for us, but, we the 
board, are ultimately responsible that all milestones are met every month. 
Participant E provided a perspective that the board has ultimate responsibility and 
this gives the direction for the management company’s actions in terms of school 
operations. She stated: 
Ultimately, it is the board of directors’ responsibility to see that we put in place 
what needs to be implemented utilizing our management company; needs to be 
implemented in terms of getting the proper instruction in place, data management 
and utilizing the data to better equip our teachers and looking at the performances 
of the students. 
These examples typify the ultimate sense of responsibility that the respondents had in 
terms of being the governing body. 
Analysis of the Board Is Ultimately Responsible Theme 
The Board is Ultimately Responsible theme emerged in the majority of the 
transcripts of the interview participants. This theme illustrated the disposition and belief 
of board members who think that the board is ultimately responsible for everything 
involving the charter school, inclusive of, but not limited to functions of: Operations, 
hiring, sub contracts, curriculum and academics, expulsions, special education, student 
performance, compliance, budgets, and other key aspects of operating charter schools. 
The confusion around this topic is that when they sign a contract with a for-profit private 
management company, similar to those in the contract analysis, the board transfers 
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significant amounts of their responsibilities/functions over to the management company. 
The length of the contracts also become an issue because the majority of the contracts, if 
not all, encompass clauses that make the term of the contractual agreement parallel to the 
length of the charter agreement with the authorizer. The confusion emanates from the 
lack of awareness, familiarity, and knowledge of the contract between the board and 
management company, which implicates potential conflicts in the boards’ ability to 
provide effective governance.   
Once a Month Is Not Enough Theme 
The Once a Month Is Not Enough theme provided the disposition of board 
members feeling that a once a month meeting, for approximately two hours, is not 
enough time to effectively deploy governance roles. They exclaimed that there was not 
enough time for the due diligence needed to provide not only effective governance, but 
also attention to details of common needs such as grading, financial analysis, budgets, 
student performance, school culture and climate, facilities, acquisitions, and many other 
aspects that are part of operating a school. They also expressed the need and requirement 
for preparation and follow-up time required for boards to effectively engage discussions, 
analysis, and decision making at the board meetings. In regards to this theme, Participant 
A stated: 
No, no, once a month is not nearly enough to get a good foothold of what is going 
on in the building out of the 30 days; looking at a dash board that looks at things 
such as Explorer, PLAN, ACT…looks at NWEA MAP on a daily or monthly 
basis does not give you the ability to determine how well those students are doing 
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when it comes to the state targets that we are looking at; we do have, it is nowhere 
enough to just look at the data from a 30 day window. 
Participant E discussed the challenges of becoming a board member with an 
officer’s role. She has served in multiple positions and now is the board president. She 
says that her board duties are like a second job. She explained: 
So it became a situation where having a full time job makes it difficult for me to 
give the attention needed to be effective. I thought about the activities and welfare 
of our children and it became a second job. It was not just a once a month activity 
for me. It was becoming more of a weekly assessment of what I need to be doing, 
how we need to be preparing for our kids so they could perform at their greatest 
ability. 
Part of the challenges that she expressed entailed the activities that require 
attention outside of the parameters of the once-a-month board meetings. She continued to 
explain: 
I find myself thinking more about my responsibilities as a board member and 
providing more action outside of those meetings that we have once a month and 
little committee meetings we may have periodically. I take my role more seriously 
because I know there are little lives dependent on us to advocate on their behalf 
for them to get a good education. So my volunteer job as a board member 
sometimes it could be a part time job for me, not 40 hours a week, but it is 
definitely not just me meeting on one Tuesday out of the month for a few hours; I 
take it very seriously what I do and regretfully so I wish I could do more…but I 
have a family and I work full time. But I do the best I can.  
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There was a strong sense from these and other interview comments that there is 
much more time required to implement the tasks of board members. Once a month 
meetings, which many came in under the premise that this was the main time 
commitment, appeared to not be enough for effective governance. 
Analysis of Once a Month Is Not Enough Theme 
A significant number of the qualitative interview participants indicated 
perspectives that meeting once a month is not enough in terms of board members having 
ample time to analyze, contemplate, discuss, and follow up on issues and matters relative 
to board agendas and meetings. Most feel that two hours per month is not enough to give 
due diligence to matters relating to the operations, budgets, finances, compliances, 
awarding of contracts, and performance outcomes pertinent to the charter school. The 
circumstances become even more demanding in terms of board members that take on 
officer roles such as president, vice president, and treasurer in that these roles require 
preparation and analysis so that topics may be discussed from a position of knowledge, 
which enables suggestions and recommendations that are valued added; as opposed to 
relying solely on perspectives outside of the board of directors. Some of the board 
member officers indicated feelings of having a second job given the demands of their 
roles. The challenge becomes identifying the lines of demarcation drawn to separate 
duties; is it clear that where the board’s responsibility begins and ends in conjunction 
with those of the management company. When the roles are not clear, the board may not 
spend time on broader policy issues and cross the lines into the day-to-day operations, 
which presents great potential for confusion resulting in conflicts between the board of 
directors and their selected full-service for-profit private management company. Two 
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hours a month, which is equivalent to one day out of the year, is not enough time to 
govern an entity of such complexity as a charter school and the millions of taxpayers’ 
dollars allocated to its operations. 
Everything Goes Back to the Contract Theme  
The theme of Everything Goes Back to the Contract emerged from the qualitative 
interview participants with one exception. They discussed the importance of placing 
clauses in the contract between the boards of directors and the management companies to 
prudently effect hiring of school leadership, performance measures in the contract, and 
having board members trained on the elements and content of the contract. The challenge 
included having an active contract that is long-term with an inability to augment until the 
term is reached and it is time for renewal or termination of the contractual relationship. 
Participant F provided one example inclusive of a concern that his board does not 
fully understand the contract between the board of directors and the management 
company. He explained: 
Well, I think first off, I think a lot of the board members aren’t really aware that 
the contract governs the relationship. I just don’t think that they quite understand 
it.  I really don’t think they know what is required and what the management 
company is supposed to do. Where I think the management company almost feels 
as though it is their school, if that makes sense, when it’s not, it’s the PSA; it’s the 
academy’s school. 
Participant G provided a positive perspective of the contractual relationship 
between the board of directors and the for-profit private management company. He 
stated: 
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It is a very open relationship and that is something that is needed. I would say 
contract-wise, anything we ask for is provided to us. If we get into a shady or gray 
area our attorney advises us. Sometimes, even the attorney has a different view 
than we have. But again as a board, we make that decision. They have been very 
good as far as the contract and following it. We know what is expected of us and 
how to function. 
Participate A provided a perspective of how the contract could be structured to 
positively impact the governance of charter schools. He elaborated: 
I think the things that could be done contractually that will support governance. 
Governance ensures that the desired outcomes happen; outcomes are going to be 
the academic outcomes; to ensure that the contracts we have in place with vendors 
are appropriate; we must understand relationships. The metrics must be placed in 
the contract to understand what are the targets for everyone including the 
ESP…identify in the contract either hit these marks or reap the consequences. 
There must be visibility and accountability around everything we do. Incentives 
can even be in place to achieve the metrics and corrective action if progress is not 
being realized. 
Participant B discussed the component of legal counsel in terms of negotiating 
parts of the contract. However, he indicated how crucial it was to miss that element in 
former contract formations. He explained: 
Contractually, it was effective and efficient. It was very well described in terms of 
responsibilities. We had our attorney that had been with us since day 1 review the 
contract and actually negotiate fine points in the contract. One of the things we 
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already talked about was how I wish we had included the ability to select the 
leadership person; but, in terms of reviewing the contract, structuring the contract, 
it went fairly well. We missed a couple of things but it went very well. 
All of the discussions around the other themes featured a discussion on making sure the 
contract had provisions to address that particular issue or concern. In the end, there was a 
clear understanding of the participants that the contract was a tool for making sure certain 
aspects were addressed.  
Analysis of Everything Goes Back to the Contract Theme 
Four of the interview participants provided qualitative data with findings that well 
represented the feelings of all seven respondents. They all presented a perspective, 
whether accurate or not, of how important the contract was in terms of operating and 
setting the parameters for the interactions of the board of directors and the for-profit 
private management company. The four examples from findings presented strong 
indications that these board members realize how critical the contracts are; however, all 
are stated in a sense of retrospect. Retrospect meaning their discoveries are after the fact 
of the contract being signed and in effect. 
In addition, there is an acknowledgement that board members probably do not 
fully understand the contract and that legal counsel is beneficial to assist the boards of 
directors with navigating the legal complexities of charter school contracts. One of the 
board respondents reiterated the benefits of an open relationship. Whereas this appears to 
be a positive element in the relationship between the board and the management company 
in that the board has an opportunity to give input into the hiring of school leadership; it is 
a gesture from the management company to have a positive relationship with the board of 
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directors. However, it is not a contractual matter in that if the management company 
decided not to allow the board’s input; there would be no recourse for the board given the 
elements of the contract which clearly states in the section of personnel, that the 
management company is solely responsible for all activities related to hiring and 
terminations. The previous are prime examples of confusion regarding the relevance of 
the contract and how this results in potential conflicts, which impacts the boards of 
directors’ ability to provide effective governance. 
Summary of Qualitative Analysis  
The qualitative analysis includes an in-depth review of the stories of the interview 
participants and their transcripts. A codification process fostered the emergence of 
themes from descriptors identified in each individual transcript. A cross-analysis 
identified threads of commonality from the codifying process based on frequency. The 
themes that emerged from this analysis included community-centered/volunteerism, 
board training is a necessity, transparency and full disclosure, the feeling of being a 
rubber stamp, the board is ultimately responsible, and input into hiring administrative 
leadership of the charter school. The previous themes are all centric to issues within the 
relationship between the charter school boards of directors and the full-service for-profit 
private management companies. The themes encompassed a myriad of implications 
fostered by confusion, which often times included issues of role ambiguity and lack of 
contractual awareness and knowledge. These themes illustrated the varied levels of board 
confusion, which leads to potential conflicts in the governance of charter schools in the 
state of Michigan. 
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Chapter 5: Presentation and Analysis of Charter School Contracts and For-Profit 
Management Companies 
 
Introduction  
 
The contractual analysis is an element of the qualitative components of the mixed 
methodology study of potential inherent conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter 
school boards contracting with full-service for-profit private management companies. 
The comparative analysis explores the content of five recent contractual agreements 
between charter school boards and their chosen full-service for-profit private 
management company to manage the operations of the public school academy.  
The contract analysis (See Appendix D for contracts used in analysis and 
Appendix E for Comparative Contract Analysis Matrix) contains nineteen item 
descriptors based on a review of the contracts and listed in a matrix with comments to 
explain the contractual phenomena, which takes place as a result of the comparison. The 
format allows for designators to be placed in the appropriate cells if the item description 
is present in the five management contracts denoted by titled Contract A, Contract B, 
Contract C, Contract D, and Contract E, all representing a specific contract between 
charter school boards and for-profit management companies.  
The comparative analysis matrix contains nineteen descriptors that are part of 
eight sections, which are sourced from commonalities in the five contracts. The matrix 
illustrates if the specific descriptors are present in each contract designated by a check 
mark or if the descriptors are not present, which is designated by a circle. 
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Contract Comparison Analysis --- Macro Findings 
In the contract analysis, 80% of the five contracts were strongly similar in 
presentation, structure, and content. Only one of the contracts (20%) contained a very 
different structure from the other four. The latter is probably due to the management 
company being based in the state of New York, which may have their own templates for 
their charter school industry. None of the contracts were exactly the same but all had 
some dominate similarities, which included: 
• All contracts indicated in some manner that they manage the day-to-day 
operations of the school. 
• All contracts clearly indicated that the management companies solely have 
responsibility for hiring and terminating employees at all levels and positions 
whether instructional, operational, and administrative. 
• All contracts indicated a reference to the authorizer. 
• All contracts indicated (to a varying degree) that they have the right to manage 
subcontractors. 
• All contracts articulated the fee/compensation structure of each for-profit 
management company, which is very different except for two. 
• All of the contracts indicated that the management company is responsible for the 
charter schools’ curriculum and academic program. 
• All of the contracts specified the role of the management company and all but one 
indicated the obligations of the boards of directors. 
• All contracts, except for one, clearly indicated that the management company has 
financial, accounting, and budgetary responsibilities. 
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• All contracts indicated in some form that the management companies are 
responsible for special education. 
• Four of the five contracts used a standard boilerplate template. 
All of the contracts were void of the following: 
• None of the contracts indicated who is responsible for student expulsions. 
• None of the contracts indicated who is responsible for managing board agendas 
and minutes. 
• None of the contracts indicated who is responsible for capital acquisitions. 
The following lists some areas and items that were somewhat unique to some of the 
contracts: 
• One of the contracts has a very different fee structure based on various 
management tasks and deliverables with associated cost for each.  
• Two of the management companies indicated that part of their fee is to retain the 
school’s fund balance.  
• One of the management companies had a partially incentive based strategy, which 
provided additional compensation for achieving student performance metrics.  
• One of the management companies had a five-year progressive fee plan which 
increases from year 1 to year 5; this same company charged an exorbitant amount 
for use of their proprietary curriculum. 
• Two of the management companies provided access to start-up funds for their 
clients (charter school boards of directors) and also provided financing 
availability where repayment is made through the schools state funding. These 
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two companies also indicated a willingness to provide facilities and lease it to the 
school. 
Summary of Contract Analysis  
The contracts are essential to providing the expectations of both the client (charter 
school boards of directors) and the agency (for-profit private management companies). 
The contracts clearly articulated the responsibilities and expectations of the management 
companies. Their roles are clear in terms of having full-service responsibilities for the 
operations of their public school academy clients. Whereas the management company has 
clear expectations, the boards’ roles are not as specific and are generically ambiguous. 
Four of the contracts have a small paragraph; which lists approximately six to eight items 
that conveyed the boards’ obligations. These items are fairly generic and basically state 
that the boards have governing responsibility, however, governance is not defined and 
left to interpretation.  
The majorities of the contracts are very similar and seem to originate from the 
perspective of the for-profit private management companies given the dominance of 
articles pertaining to the management companies’ roles and responsibilities and very little 
in terms of the boards of directors. 
Boards of directors are also at a significant disadvantage given legal structure and 
jargon of the contracts. They will find themselves frustratingly getting in a quagmire of 
legalities, complex legislation, and regulations. Unless they have retained legal counsel 
who is versed and knowledgeable of charter school laws in the state of Michigan. 
Management companies typically have legal counsel that is a part of their executive team 
or they have retained a law firm that provides their legal counseling.  
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If boards are not conscious of the significance of the contract, they will operate in 
a fog of unawareness as to what are their expectations, obligations, and rights. This will 
commensurately affect their ability to effectively govern and provide prudency when 
imposing governance and developing policies and resolutions for charter schools.  
Boards of directors’ awareness and comprehension of the contracts with 
management companies are essential to mitigate confusion and overlapping of 
responsibilities, which perpetuates conflicts in the governance of charter schools in the 
state of Michigan. The complexity of charter school laws and the challenges of 
governance permeated the charter school industry. Knowledgeable and informed boards 
are required given the challenging dynamics of charter schools’ existence and operations. 
This is especially the case in the state of Michigan where for-profit private management 
companies manage more than 80% of charter schools. 
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Chapter 6: Quantitative and Qualitative Triangulated Convergence 
Introduction  
The following triangulates the quantitative data, qualitative data, and the 
contractual analysis. The quantitative data was obtained through a two-part Likert Scale 
survey that was provided to qualified board members. The surveys were provided in two 
ways, hard copy and electronic, in order to increase the probability to reach or exceed the 
goal of receiving forty completed surveys from eligible Michigan charter school board 
members. The qualitative data was obtained by the purposeful selection of seven board 
members who had been on charter school boards contracting with for-profit private 
management companies. The board members selected for interview participation had a 
preferred fifteen years of experience and served in an officer position such as board 
president, vice president, and treasurer. 
The researcher deployed a parallel mixed method design, which Creswell (2014) 
stated,  
A researcher collects both quantitative and qualitative data, analyzes them 
separately, and then compares the results to see if the findings confirms or 
disconfirms each other. The key assumption of this approach is that both the 
qualitative and quantitative data provide different types of information –- often 
detailed views of participants qualitatively and scores on instruments 
quantitatively --- and together yield results that should be the same (p.219). 
The triangulation process provided data reiteration and substantiation of the two 
different designs. This approach provided an opportunity to merge data for confirmation 
or disconfirmation of the phenomenon of conflicts in governance when charter school 
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	  247	  
boards in Michigan contract with full-service for-profit private management 
companies.  The researcher transformed the qualitative data into numeric values by 
applying percentages to the responses of each interview participant to the collective 
responses of the aggregate group, which consisted of seven board members from seven 
different Michigan charter schools. Figure 19 illustrated the conceptual framework for the 
conduct of analysis that was used.  
Figure 19. Conceptual framework for conduct of analysis.  
The triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative data included the topics of 
role confusion and resulting conflicts around the responsibilities for hiring and 
terminating key personnel such as superintendents, principals, and teachers; the effect on 
transparency and full disclosure of public funds when boards of directors contract with 
for-profit private management companies; the realization that everything goes back to the 
contract; and the paradoxical challenge of boards of directors feeling they are ultimately 
responsible for charter school operations. These topics surged from the quantitative 
design and emerged from the qualitative design warranting triangulation inclusive of the 
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contractual agreement; which dictates the parameters of the inter-relational dynamics 
between the board of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management 
company. 
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Hiring Charter School Personnel  
 
        Introduction  
 
         Table 11 illustrated the convergence and triangulation of the quantitative and 
qualitative findings, along with the contractual analysis as it relates to the responsibility 
of hiring, terminating, and evaluating charter school staff. It aligns to Research Question 
1 that addresses the contractual relationships between the boards of directors and the for-
profit private management companies and how it contributes to role conflicts in the 
governance of charter schools in the state of Michigan.   
                         
           From a quantitative disposition as explained in Table 10, 4% of survey responses 
indicated that hiring should be a function of the board of directors. Thirty-eight percent of 
the survey responses indicated that hiring should be a function of the management 
Do the Contractual Relationships Between Michigan Charter School Boards of Directors and Full-Service For-Profit Private 
Management Companies Contribute to Conflict in Governance 
Quantitative: 
The responsibility for hiring key personnel such as the 
superintendent, principal, and teachers should be: 
Qualitative: 
1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter 
school board of directors, what are the pros and cons relative to 
governing the school that occur as a result of contracting with a 
full-service management company.  
3. Considering that the relationship between the board of directors 
and the management company is a critical element in the 
successful operation of the school, what do you think are factors 
that might contribute to tension in governance as a result of this 
relationship."
"
"
"
58% of the board survey respondents indicated that the hiring decision 
should be shared to varying degrees for hiring key personnel. This 
included teachers.   
60% of the qualitative data provided the ability of the board to affect 
hiring as a major issue; as well as a factor contributing to tension in 
governance between the board of directors and the management 
company.  
Contractual Analysis:  
The contractual analysis of five contracts between Michigan boards of directors and management companies all substantiate the contractual 
position that the management companies have exclusivity regarding hiring and terminating charter school staff. The verbiage specifically uses 
terms/vocabulary such as; the management company has sole responsibility and authority to determine staffing. This responsibility includes; 
hiring, terminating, evaluating, disciplining, moving, shifting, and transferring any and all employees of the management company who are 
deployed to work at the subject charter school(s).  
Table 11 
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company. Fifty-eight percent indicated that some shared input between the board of 
directors and the management company should occur. Qualitatively, six out of seven 
interview participants discussed hiring matters, while 60% of the interviews exclaimed 
hiring as a factor fostering tension. From the qualitative findings, one of the interview 
respondents stated,  
The downside [con] of it as we have come to find is the contract that we had 
engaged in was a long-term contract. And part of the contract was the fact we had 
no input in terms of who could be hired into key personnel positions. We did not 
have any input in terms of the selection. 
The qualitative and quantitative data provided board perspectives that were 
incongruent with the intentions of the contractual agreement. In both research 
methodologies, the board members all believed they could or they wanted to impact 
hiring of the charter school’s staff. This is in stark contrast to the charter contractual 
agreements explored between Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors and their 
chosen for-profit private management company. The contracts specifically state, as seen 
in the example of Contract D, the following:  
15. I Personnel Responsibility. Subject to the limitations of this Agreement, the 
Public School Academy Contract, the Code and other applicable laws and 
regulations, The correlating management company will have the sole 
responsibility and authority to determine staffing levels, and to select, evaluate, 
assign, discipline, supervise, manage, transfer and terminate personnel necessary 
to carry out the Educational Services, the Administrative Services, the 
Supplemental Programs (if any) and all other services provided under this 
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Agreement, all within the financial constraints Of the Academy Budget approved 
by the Board. 
Another example of the contract contrasting the responses of the participants is seen in 
Contract B. It stated:  
 ARTICLE VI. 
PERSONNEL AND TRAINING 
Subject to Sections I .01 and 1.02 above, the Charter, the Code and other 
applicable laws and regulations, The correlating management company will have 
the sole responsibility and authority to provide qualified administrative, teaching 
and support staff to operate the System within the staffing levels approved by the 
Board in its annual budget, and to select, evaluate, assign, discipline, supervise, 
manage and transfer personnel necessary to carry out the Educational Services, 
the Administrative Services, the Supplemental Programs (if any) and all other 
services provided under this Agreement. 
A final example was extracted from Contract A that explained that the 
management company has the authority to make all hiring decisions. It stated:  
  
ARTICLE Vu 
PERSONNEL & TRAINING 
A. Personnel. The correlating management company shall select and hire 
qualified personnel to perform services at the Academy. The correlating 
management company shall have the responsibility and authority, subject to 
subparagraphs B, C and D below, to select, hire, evaluate, assign, discipline, 
transfer, and terminate personnel consistent with the Budget and applicable 
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law. Personnel working at the Academy shall be employees of the correlating 
management company unless otherwise agreed by the correlating 
Management Company and the Board.  
            Analysis of Hiring Charter School Personnel Convergence 
     The data from the quantitative surveys indicated role confusion and conflicts 
given the wide variance of responses indicating that the board should have a say in the 
hiring of staff including administrators and teachers. Data from the experiences of 
interview participants substantiated the quantitative results. The board members all 
indicated a desire to impact hiring, especially administrative roles such as 
superintendents, principals, and others. This is a particular source of conflict given the 
desire of the boards of directors to influence, if not select key positions.  
                   The quantitative and qualitative data regarding the issues of hiring personnel 
at Michigan charter schools contracting with full-service for-profit private management 
companies displays reinforcing patterns that substantiated the findings of each 
methodology. The findings and analysis of both designs illustrated role confusion and 
resulting conflicts; given the disparity of responses and lack of consensus in the 
quantitative and qualitative findings and analysis that indicated that all the board 
respondents believed that the board of directors should have a say in the hiring of staff. 
This especially resonated with the hiring of key administrative personnel, such as the 
superintendent, principal, and other top-level administrative roles; non-administrative 
roles such as teachers, paraprofessionals, etc., did not contribute as much to the hiring 
conflicts. 
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The subsequent in-depth analysis of the contract overtly indicated that the 
management company has sole unequivocal responsibility for hiring all personnel and 
employees of the charter school. As a matter of fact, the employees are viewed by the 
management company as specifically their employees who may be shifted, moved, and 
transferred at the beckoning of their sole employer; the full-service, for-profit private 
management company. The confusion manifested with what appears to be the lack of 
contractual awareness of the board and accelerated role conflicts when issues surface 
where the parties do not agree. The board is at a tremendous disadvantage and the 
management company has legal leverage given the content of the contract between the 
board of directors and the management company. The boards do not appear to realize, 
until circumstances of conflict arise, that they have zero say in who is hired or who is 
terminated in all positions of the charter school. This position is clearly stated in the 
signed contracts, which is the legal endorsement management companies have and 
present when personnel matters surface. 
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Transparency and Full Disclosure  
 Table 12 illustrates the convergence and triangulation of the qualitative and 
quantitative findings, along with the contractual analysis as it relates to transparency and 
full disclosure. It aligns to Research Question 3 that addresses the accountability and 
transparency of public funds and the effect when contracting with a full-service for-profit 
private management company. The effects are complex given the source of funding, 
which are primarily public tax dollars and the transfer of those funds to a private 
management company.  
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The data from the surveys indicated role confusion and potential conflicts given 
the lack of consensus and variance of responses indicating that many boards feel that 
transparency of public funds is affected when boards of directors contract with full-
service for-profit private management companies. The quantitative analysis provided the 
complexities of transparency given the ample functions that are conducive to 
transparency issues such as budgets, financial reporting, and data involving sub contracts 
and student performance. 
Data from the experiences of interview participants substantiated the quantitative 
data results. A significant percentage (71%) of the interview respondents indicated that 
public funds are affected when boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit 
management companies. The interview participants provided statements that inferred 
high levels of discomfort regarding the reports that are provided on costs, reporting 
finances, students’ performance, and most of all the transformation of public taxpayer 
dollars into the private accounting of management companies.      
Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service for-
profit private management companies. 
Part II 3. Transparency of public funds is affected when boards of 
directors contract with full-service for-profit private management 
companies. 
1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter 
school board of directors, what are the pros and cons relative to 
governing the school that occur as a result of contracting with a 
full-service management company 
2. Reflecting upon your board member experience in contracting 
with a for-profit management company, how would you describe 
the specific contractual relationship between the board and the 
management company 
4. Do you believe that accountability and transparency of public 
funds may have changed when contracting with a for-profit 
company, or do you believe this is not an issue 
46% of survey respondents selected strongly agreed or agree that 
transparency of public funds are affected when boards of directors 
contract with full-service for-profit private management companies; 
42% strongly disagree or disagree; and 12% were uncertain 
Based on inference from the interview data; 71% indicated they agree 
that accountability of public funds is affected when boards of directors  
contract with full-service for-profit private management companies; 
29% disagree.  
From a quantitative perspective; 46% of the survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that accounting of public funds is affected when boards 
of directors contract with full-service for-profit private management companies; and 42% disagreed or strongly disagreed. 12% were uncertain. 
Interview participants summarized their position as follows;   participant E summarized: Well, my question at the end of the day is, how much 
profit are you making, you don’t want to show me that, and if you don’t want to show me how much profit you are making then I am not quite 
sure that the children are getting what they are supposed to get; you can tell me anything, but I need to see the figures, I need to see the numbers, I 
need to see where the money is going.”  Participant E continues,” Oh absolutely, and the amount of money we are paying in rent and who is 
getting these contracts, are you putting the bids out there like you are suppose to and sharing it with the board; you tell me that you are spending 
millions of dollars on the school but I don’t see what you did, the children do not have a lunch room, they are eating in their rooms. They have no 
gymnasium, we are totally in the dark.” 

Table 12 
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The contractual analysis illustrated the ability of the management company to 
legally report on broadly required functions to meet the requirements of the state of 
Michigan. However, it does not explain these functions from a novice and detailed 
perspective. The average board member will be perplexed with these financial reports 
given its complexity, such as those from the Contract C, containing in its Article IV --- 
Financial Arrangements --- a detailed reporting of revenues and expenditures from the 
preceding month: 
a. Budget projections, Summary Actuals and Summary Budget 
b. Balance Sheet 
c. Academy account summary 
d. Historical Aged Trial Balance 
e. Monthly statement of actual and projected cash flow of Academy funds 
received and disbursed 
Other: 
a. Reports on other Academy operations and student performance 
b. Other information on a periodic basis to enable the board to monitor the 
management company's performance and the efficiency of its operation of the 
Academy. 
Analysis of Transparency and Full Disclosure Parallel Convergence  
Transparency and full disclosure issues cause role confusion, which creates 
conflicts due to the lack of reporting requirements placed in the obligation section of the 
contracts between the boards of directors and the management companies. For example, 
it is clear in the contracts that the management company will manage the finances and 
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budgets of the charter school. However, the specifics of the contracts allow a variance of 
interpretations as to what has to be reported out and to what degree. Role confusion 
results in conflicts due to the board of director’s inadequate knowledge of the contract 
between the two parties. The lack of knowledge of the financial information reported to 
the board of directors creates a situation where the board is not clear of their role and 
lacks an understanding of the management company’s role, thus resulting in conflicts.  
Many of the interview participants illustrated a concern that they are being told 
only what the management companies want to tell the boards of directors. To reiterate a 
perspective of one of the interview participants, she stated, “You tell me that you are 
spending millions of dollars on the school, but I don’t see what you did. The children do 
not have a lunchroom; they are eating in their rooms. They have no gymnasium. We are 
totally in the dark.” 
 Whereas the example of the contract meets the requirements of financial reporting 
standards for the state of Michigan, it does not provide financial information that is 
conducive for the average board member to comprehend. The management company has 
professionals with the appropriate education and training to understand the fiscal 
dynamics of charter schools, and the board may or may not have a member with a 
financial pedagogy to understand the details of formal and technical terms such as 
balance sheets, trial balances, and cash flow statements, to name a few. 
The complexity of these reports enables the management company to report based 
on minimal state requirements and not translate fiscal data into language of content that 
boards of directors would understand. When decisions have to be made on such data, it 
places the board of directors at a disadvantage where they must rely on the management 
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company for interpretation.  These issues of transparency not only exist for fiscal matters, 
but also include areas such as special education, expulsions, performance outcomes, and 
other compliance related reporting matters.   
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Everything Goes Back to the 
Contract Theme 
         Table 13 illustrates the convergence and triangulation of the quantitative and 
qualitative findings, along with the contractual analysis as it relates to awareness, 
familiarity, and understanding the contract. It aligns to Research Question 1, which asks 
do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of directors and 
full-service, for-profit private management companies contribute to conflict in 
governance, and Research Question 2 that states that assuming that parallel governance 
systems created in charter schools whose boards of directors contract with for-profit 
management companies contribute to governance conflict, what are the factors in the 
relationship that contribute to conflict in governance.    
 
Do the Contractual Relationships Between Michigan Charter School Boards of Directors and Full-Service For-Profit Private Management Companies 
Contribute to Conflict in Governance 
Part II 4. The board of directors understand the articles, terms, and 
content of the management contract between the board of directors 
and the full-service for-profit management company. 
1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter 
school board of directors, what are the pros and cons relative to 
governing the school that occur as a result of contracting with a full-
service management company 
2. Reflecting upon your board member experience in contracting with 
a for-profit management company, how would you describe the 
specific contractual relationship between the board and the 
management company. 
5. Given what you know about leadership and school governance, are 
there things that could be done contractually or legislatively to 
improve the governance of Michigan charter schools 
71% of survey respondents selected strongly agreed or agree that the 
board of directors understand the contract with the boards of directors and 
the full-service for-profit private management companies; 14% strongly 
disagree or disagree; and 15% were uncertain. 
Based on inference from the interview data; 57% indicated they agree that 
finances and resources are affected when boards of directors  contract with 
full-service for-profit private management companies; 43% disagree. 

From&a&quan+ta+ve&perspec+ve;&More&than&half,&71%&of&the&survey&respondents&agreed&or&strongly&agreed&that&the&board&of&directors&understand&the&
contract&with&the&boards&of&directors&and&the&fullAservice&forAprofit&private&management&companies;14%&disagreed&or&strongly&disagreed.&A&significant&
number&(15%)&were&uncertain.&Interview&par+cipants&summarized&their&posi+on&as&follows;&&&par+cipant&H&summarized:&”&I&would&say&contract&wise,&
anything&we&ask&for&is&provided&to&us.&If&we&get&into&a&shady&or&gray&area&our&aOorney&advises&us;&some+mes&even&the&aOorney&has&a&different&view&
than&we&have.&But&again&as&a&board&we&make&that&decision.&They&have&been&very&good&as&far&as&the&contract&and&following&it.&We&know&what&is&
expected&of&us&and&how&to&func+on.”&Par+cipant&B&stated,&“The&metrics&must&be&placed&in&the&contract&to&understand&what&are&the&targets&for&
everyone&including&the&esp.&iden+fy&in&the&contract&either&hit&these&marks&or&reap&the&consequences;&there&must&be&visibility&and&accountability&
around&everything&we&do;”&and&Par+cipant&F&said,”&contractually,&of&course&in&your&contract&you&hold&the&management&group&accountable&for&
maintaining&certain&academic&mile&stones&and&goals&and&growth.”&
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          Findings of Everything Goes Back to the Contract Parallel Convergence Theme 
            From a quantitative perspective, 29% strongly agree and 42% agree that the 
boards of directors understand the terms of the contractual agreement between the boards 
and the for-profit private management company; 15% were uncertain; and 15% selected 
strongly disagree or agree.  The data from the quantitative surveys illustrated discrepancy 
and a lack of consensus regarding how surveyed boards of directors feel about their 
understanding of the contract between the charter school boards and their full-service, 
for-profit management company. 
The qualitative data from the experiences of interview participants substantiated 
the quantitative data results and reinforced role confusion, which leads to conflicts in 
governance. Most of the interview participants conveyed an awareness of how important 
the contractual agreement is in terms of governance; however, many of the interview 
participants admitted that many board members are not aware and do not understand the 
dynamics of the contractual agreement between the board of directors and the for-profit 
private management company. Interview Participant F stated, “I think a lot of board 
members aren’t really aware that the contract governs the relationship. I just don’t think 
they quite understand it.” He continued to share his perspective regarding his board’s 
insufficient knowledge, not only of the board’s roles, but their insufficient understanding 
of what the management company’s role is; he added, “I really don’t think they know 
what is required and what the management company is supposed to do.”   
Participant G referred to the importance of utilizing the board’s lawyer for times when 
the contract was confusing or difficult to interpret. His experience is polarized to that of 
Participant F’s and appears to be positive, based on having legal counsel. He said,  
 If we get into a shady or gray area, our attorney advises us. Sometimes even the 
 attorney has a different view than we have. But again, we as a board make that 
 decision. They have been very good as far as the contract and following it. We 
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 know what is expected of us and how to function.”  Some of the interview 
 participants wanted to add provisions to their contracts with the management 
 company subsequent to signing the agreement. 
Participant E also indicated the need for the board of directors to have legal 
counsel. Her perspective is that it needs to be a lawyer or legal entity that is employed to 
what is in the best interest for the board. She expounded, “Well, if when the board comes 
in play, they should have their own attorney. Someone they trust who is looking out for 
their best interest and not the management company’s best interest. If it starts there, I 
think the rest will follow.” 
Participant B stated, “The way that we were structured with our prior 
management company, it actually worked well with exception to the educational 
component.” She elaborated on the lack of foresight during the point of negotiations. She 
continued, “My thought is if we had the foresight to change or put something in the 
contract so that we had some latitude in terms of the educational component, then I think 
it would have been a better contract.” 
The final qualitative example also resonates from Participant B. He stated what 
they would have done in retrospect. He said, “We would have placed a clause in the 
contract saying that we have the final decision on the selection of the school’s leadership 
team. I think that would have made a difference in how things would have progressed.” 
The previous quantitative and qualitative data enabled the researcher to converge 
the methodologies for comparison and relatedness. The following contract analysis 
explored elements of the contract that aligned with the theme of everything goes back to 
the contract. 
The macro findings of the sample contracts between the boards of directors and 
the full-service, for-profit private management companies uncovered many similarities 
and some differences in terms of content and style; however, it is obvious that most of the 
contracts are based off of a generic template. The contracts were clear and listed the 
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obligations of the board of directors and the management company. The contracts 
indicated the roles and responsibilities of the management company; and the limited 
roles, responsibilities, and obligations of the board of directors. The contracts with full-
service management companies overtly indicated that the management company has sole 
responsibility for important functions such as hiring, managing the budget and finances, 
responsibility for special education, and responsibility for managing the day-to-day 
operations. 
The macro findings also uncovered many areas of needed interpretation. For 
example, the contracts did not state who is responsible for taking board minutes and 
managing agendas; who is responsible for nominating board member candidates; and 
who is responsible for capital expenditures. These key functions and many others were 
left to interpretation often requiring knowledgeable legal counsel to navigate the 
challenges.  
Analysis of Everything Goes Back to the Contract Parallel Convergence 
The quantitative analysis provided evidence that boards’ awareness and 
understanding varies from board to board. The lack of consensus regarding the 
quantitative survey data is an indication that role confusion permeates many Michigan 
charter school boards and contributes to conflicts in governance.  
The lack of contractual awareness and understanding exacerbated role conflicts in 
many areas including fiduciary responsibilities, subcontracting, expulsions, compliance, 
student performance, etc. The interview participants also stated how important it is for 
boards of directors to receive specific training on the contract to increase awareness and 
understanding to minimize confusion and enable better and more effective governance. In 
addition, many participants referred to the importance of having legal counsel that has the 
board of directors’ best interest. 
The quantitative data and the qualitative data for everything goes back to the 
contract aligns and supports the concept that most, if not all, decisions goes back to the 
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contact between the board of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management 
company. It supports the position of the board’s role confusion and subsequent conflicts 
in governance. This convergence, along with the contract analysis lends credence to the 
findings and unveils the circumstances that exacerbate conflicts between the board and 
management company. It is clear that the contract contains parameters, definition of 
roles, and certain levels of recourse. However, if the contracts between the board of 
directors and the management companies are not understood, then board members will 
struggle to understand their roles and the roles of the management company. 
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of the Ultimate Responsibility 
  The convergence included the Figures 20 through 23, which illustrated the 
triangulation of multiple quantitative findings with the emerging theme of the board is 
ultimately responsible from the qualitative research findings. The contractual analysis 
was also presented as it relates to the quantitative and qualitative results and the 
implications that come from boards of directors contracting with full-service, for-profit 
private management companies. 
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Figure 20. The convergent parallel mixed methods of hiring key personnel and 
leadership.  
 
 
Figure 21. The convergent parallel mixed methods of the transparency of public funds.  
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Figure 22. The convergent parallel mixed methods of the board of directors 
understanding the contract.  
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Figure 23. The convergent parallel mixed methods of the board are ultimately 
responsible theme.  
Figures 20, 21,22, and 23 are reiterations of the previous tables, which illustrated 
the triangulation of data displaying findings in the research questions surrounding the 
following; data for hiring charter school personnel, data for transparency and full 
disclosure, and data for everything goes back to the contract. Figure 23 illustrated five 
contractual areas representing quantitative findings from the survey research and was 
aggregately converged with the theme of the boards’ ultimate responsibility. The 
convergence also included an analysis of the contract and how it relates to research 
findings. The five quantitative data areas included; hiring, managing day-to-day, 
awarding of contracts, managing contracts, and determining curriculum. 
Figure 20 specifically reiterated the findings regarding the responsibility of hiring 
charter school staff. It displayed the circumstances and confusion, which may cause 
impending role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter schools due to boards of 
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directors contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The 
convergence also included an analysis of the contract and how it relates to research 
findings. 
Figure 21 specifically reiterated the findings regarding the research question; is 
transparency and full disclosure affected when boards of directors contract with for-profit 
private management companies. Role conflicts resulted from the possibilities of 
confusion and lack of knowledge around understanding what and how the management 
companies are required to report. The contracts have room for interpretation that may 
require legal competence in order to effectively comprehend and enforce. The contractual 
analysis illustrated the contract and legal jargon that may be beyond novice 
interpretation. 
Figure 22 specifically reiterated the findings regarding how everything goes back 
to the contract. This theme is an indication of how imperative it is to have awareness and 
knowledge of the contract between the board of directors and the for-profit management 
company.  In many instances, the contracts clearly denote who is responsible for specific 
functions and operations of the charter school. The quantitative findings illustrated role 
confusion and role conflict, which resulted from a lack of contractual awareness that 
commensurately mirrors a lack of contractual understanding. The qualitative interviews 
displayed many examples of board members wanting to change structure and clauses in 
the contracts retrospectively. The contract analysis disclosed contracts that are in many 
ways clear and inclusive of role definitions for both the management company and the 
board of directors. 
Figure 23 illustrated a conglomerate of quantitative data aggregately triangulated 
with qualitative data and the contract analysis. The five areas from the quantitative data 
included: hiring, managing day-to-day operations, awarding of contracts, managing 
finance/budget, and determining curriculum. The theme that emerged from the qualitative 
data is described as ultimate responsibility. This theme summarized the feelings of the 
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interview participants who felt that regardless of the functions or circumstances; the 
boards of directors have ultimate responsibility. The previous quantitative data is 
converged with the qualitative data and the contract to confirm or disconfirm findings as 
it relates to role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter schools. 
Managing the Day-to-Day and the Theme of Ultimate Responsibility 
In terms of the survey question of who has the responsibility for managing the 
day-to-day operations of the school, the response did not have consensus. Instead, 
responses were spread over four possible selections: 73% indicated the management 
company, 17% mostly the management company, 8% selected the board of directors, and 
2% selected mostly the board of directors. 
The qualitative summary for the Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme surfaced 
in the majority of the interview transcripts of each board participant. Approximately 57% 
mentioned that the board is responsible for everything regarding the operations and 
functions of the charter school. 
The qualitative and quantitative findings both indicated a lack of consensus 
regarding day-to-day operations and functions. Both forms of data are an example of 
confusion, which leads to role conflicts. Participant A commented,  
From my perspective and a governance perspective, you can’t be there every day 
to ensure that the education is disseminated in classrooms, but we can ensure that 
the right level of resources and the right educational platform is being presented 
because we sign off on that. 
 His comments contain an acknowledgement that it is improbable for board 
members to be daily engaged in the operations of the charter school; however, he does 
indicate a desire to impact the routine operations by making resource decisions that 
prudently allocate resources to the benefit of the day-to-day activities. Participant A 
discussed how efficient it is to have an entity fully control the routine aspects of 
operations, however he re-emphasized that the board of directors have apex responsibility 
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when it comes to the charter school. He stated, “Contractually, we ask the ESP to handle 
those things for us, but we the board are ultimately responsible that the school’s 
milestones are met every month.” 
  The contract analysis illustrated the specifications of the contractual agreement. It 
is clear in the contracts that the full–service for-profit private management companies 
have the responsibility for the day-to-day operations and functions of the charter schools. 
Board members do not have the time and inclination to engage in the day-to-day 
operations of their charter schools. Also, a board mindset to engage in the day-to-day is 
counterintuitive with contracting with a full-service, for-profit private management 
company. 
Awarding of Contracts and the Theme of Ultimate Responsibility 
In terms of the quantitative question of who has the responsibility for awarding 
charter school contracts to various vendors and suppliers, the response lacked consensus. 
Instead, responses were spread over all five possible selections: 2% indicated the 
management company, 13% mostly the management company, 37% selected the board of 
directors, 15% selected mostly the board of directors, and 33% selected that the 
responsibility for awarding contracts should be equally shared between the board of 
directors and the management company. 
The qualitative summary for the Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme surfaced 
in the majority of the interview transcripts of each board participant. Approximately 57% 
mentioned that the board is responsible for everything regarding the operations and 
functions of the charter school. 
The qualitative and quantitative findings both indicated a lack of consensus 
regarding what entity should award contracts to suppliers and vendors. Both forms of 
findings contained examples of confusion, which leads to role conflicts. Participant F 
commented, “I think the best thing we can do at the end of the day is to ensure that we as 
a board have selected the very best whether it’s a management company, CPA, board 
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counsel, custodial services, you name it; that we select the best; the best professionals to 
assist us.”  He indicated the perspective that it is the board that hires suppliers and 
vendors. However, the findings illuminate an issue that develops given the perception of 
suppliers and vendors that their contracts are with the management company and not the 
board of directors. He exclaimed, “The prior management company, the head of it, told 
me on several occasions, ‘Oh that is our contract,’ well, that is not correct. These 
contracts are board contracts. They contract with us, but they tend to see it as the 
management company that they are actually contracting with, and that is just not 
accurate.” His comments acknowledged the potential for confusion and conflicts in 
governance as it relates to the selection and awarding of contracts to suppliers and 
vendors. 
Another qualitative example regarding confusion and conflicts in who is 
responsible for awarding contracts was found in the experience of Participant C. She 
stated,  
In our experience we had contracts that were made between the management 
company and the vendors that put liability on the board and school; which 
resulted in a lawsuit and other negative things…still the board is liable in the end 
and even though it was the management company making the deals.” From her 
perspective, the board was liable regardless of who made the contract with the 
specific supplier or vendor.  
She continued to elaborate on the issue of awarding contracts and stated, “The 
contracts were made by the management company and expected to be signed off by the 
board. Finances and contracts were set ahead of time and we were not fully grasping what 
we were doing at that time as board members.” She acknowledged her board’s confusion 
of not comprehending what was going on which appears to enable the management 
company to lead and guide the bidding process. She elaborated, “For example, since all 
of the contracts were prepared by the management company; and the bids were done by 
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the management company; they would tell the board who they wanted to select instead of 
allowing the board to make the decision.”    
  The contract analysis typically illustrated that, unless otherwise specified, the 
management company was responsible for bids and sub-contracting. For example, 
Contracts A and C between the for-profit management companies and the boards of 
directors stated, “The management company reserves the right to sub-contract any and all 
aspects of the services.” This may be interpreted as the management company has sole 
responsibility for awarding contracts. 
Managing Finance and Budget Matters and the Theme of Ultimate 
Responsibility 
In terms of the quantitative question of who has the responsibility for managing 
finance and budget matters of the school, the responses lacked consensus and varied 
according to these following metrics; 4% indicated the management company; 31% 
mostly the management company; 6% selected the board of directors; and 10% selected 
mostly the board of directors; 48% indicted that the responsibility for managing finance 
and budget matters should be equally shared between the board of directors and the 
management company.   
The qualitative summary for the Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme surfaced 
in the majority of the interview transcripts of each board participant. Approximately 57% 
mentioned that the board is responsible for everything regarding the operations and 
functions of the charter school. 
The qualitative and quantitative findings both indicated a lack of consensus 
regarding the responsibility for managing the financial and budgetary matters for the 
charter school. Both forms of findings comparably reinforced role confusion and 
resulting conflicts in governance relative to whether it is the board or management 
company that should be responsible for the charter school’s finances and budget. Boards 
of directors may monitor finances and budgets very differently. They are asking the 
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management company to adhere to specific reporting formats. For example, Participant B 
commented, “Historically, we would ask to be made aware of anything transferred over 
$25000.00.  We would want to know what got transferred and why? Sometimes small 
things would be done without board knowledge.” 
Participant E provided insight as to her board’s experiences regarding the 
responsibility for managing the finances and the budget. She conveyed a belief that the 
overall fiduciary responsibility resides with the board of directors. She said, “Overall it is 
the board, as far as the governance of the funding; we are responsible for that.” She 
continued providing examples of what the board should know in terms of stakeholder’s 
needs. “We should know, and we do as far as budgetary needs, what our needs are, what 
our student count should be, maintaining a healthy fund balance in case we need to move 
some monies around for instructional people to help the instruction of students.” She 
continued to place emphasis on the board’s ultimate responsibility regarding allocation of 
resources. Even though she acknowledged the management company’s involvement, she 
clearly believed that managing the finances and budget is the board’s responsibility. She 
said,  
Financial resources; there are always struggles as to how we are going to use 
these little bitty funds that we have and how we are going to distribute them and is 
it going to go to more teachers or getting school buses so we may bring more 
students in from outlying areas into our school district. 
Her comments reinforced the belief that she felt the board is ultimately 
responsible for finances and budgetary matters of the charter school. However, the 
potential for conflicts are great given the structure of the contract with the management 
company, which clearly states that they have the responsibility for managing these 
functions. Contracts A and C stated, “The management company shall be the chief 
administrative officer and be responsible for the sound financial operation of the academy 
within a budget approved by the academy board.”  
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Curriculum and Academic Programs and the Theme of Ultimate Responsibility 
In terms of the quantitative question of who has the responsibility for determining 
curriculum and academic programs of the charter school, the responses did not have 
consensus and varied according to the following metrics: 31% indicated the management 
company, 38% mostly the management company, 6% selected the board of directors, and 
6% selected mostly the board of directors; and 19% indicted that the responsibility should 
be equally shared between the board of directors and the management company.   
The qualitative summary for the Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme surfaced 
in the majorities of the interview transcripts of each board participant. Approximately 
57% mentioned that the board is responsible for everything regarding the operations and 
functions of the charter school. 
The qualitative and quantitative findings both indicated a lack of consensus 
regarding the responsibility for who determines the curriculum and academic programs 
for the charter school.  Both methodologies of findings comparably reinforced role 
confusion and resulting conflicts in governance relative to whether it is the board or 
management company that should be responsible for the charter school’s curriculum and 
academics. Participant E mentioned the implications of testing and how the board of 
directors is accountable for student performance. She mentioned the challenges of the 
board in terms of understanding the dynamics of improving test scores. She stated: 
The climate of accountability changed a lot in the state of Michigan; 
accountability to standardized testing, and holding the board and school 
accountable for how well their children performed. It became a lot more laborious 
for the board members to be aware of how academically astute our children are 
based on the standards put in place and then have to account for any shortfalls; 
either we have to do a lot of the research ourselves or put onus on our 
management group to provide us with the proper resources to keep us aware of 
where we are as far as the standards are concerned, and where we should be…so 
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it became a situation where having a full time job makes it difficult for me to give 
the attention needed to be effective. 
 She continued to discuss the challenges of tight budgets and how the 
management company is given leeway to provide sound curriculum and academics in 
order to improve testing: 
It is a challenge because you have to balance the student count right, that impacts 
what you are able to do; the cuts in state funding, it is a delicate balance, but we 
know that we are ultimately responsible for that and we give our management 
group the lee-way to make sure that they get the proper pieces or parties in place, 
so we can do what we need to do to maintain or help to improve the academic 
success of our students. 
Participant E reiterated the importance of having academic metrics in the contract 
between the management company and the board of directors. She stated: 
Contractually, of course in your contract, you hold the management group 
accountable for maintaining certain academic milestones and goals and 
growth…and that ties your authorizer [charter] contact as well; just making sure 
all parties are aware of what the agreed upon contracts are, making sure that they 
can be attainable, and that we strive towards obtaining those goals; at least we 
want to see growth and we don’t want to see that students are going backwards. 
In addition to the previous interview participant’s perspective, Participant B 
provided the importance of having the contract metrically fortified with academic goals. 
The metrics allow the board of directors to monitor academic performance. He 
expounded: 
Monitoring the components in the contracts such as (monitoring not necessarily 
making specific selections but monitoring); the staffing levels, the budget process, 
the maintenance, and this should have been number one, academic performance 
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of the school; in doing that we would have the leadership team have to provide 
information in terms of grades and performance on the academic side. 
Interview Participant A reinforced his position of the boards’ responsibility 
regarding the finances and academics of the charter school: “The board itself is ultimately 
responsible from a fiduciary perspective and academically responsibility to make sure 
students reach grade level.” 
Interview Participant F shared the frustration of not feeling empowered to affect 
academic outcomes regarding student performance. He said, “ Where my frustration 
comes in is where I see weaknesses here or there and both being empowered to make that 
academic change.” 
 
Summary of Triangulation of Research Designs and Contractual Analysis 
The quantitative and qualitative research methods were designed to provide a 
convergent opportunity to analyze and better understand the phenomenon of role 
confusion and resulting role conflicts in the governance of charter schools in the state of 
Michigan. The convergence of quantitative and qualitative data was subsequently 
triangulated with a contractual analysis, which provided a premise based on actual 
contracts between Michigan boards of directors and full-service, for-profit private 
management companies. As previously stated by Creswell (2014), the mixed method 
design enables a parallel convergence. Creswell stated, “The key assumption of this 
approach is that both qualitative and quantitative data provide different types of 
information –- often detailed views of participants qualitatively and scores on instruments 
quantitatively –-and together yields results that should be the same” (p. 219). 
The quantitative data was obtained through the implementation of surveys, both 
hard and electronic formats, to enable board presidents to provide the survey instruments 
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in optional manners conducive to their eligible board members. The survey consisted of 
two Likert Scale sections. Part I contained twelve questions focusing on if the board of 
directors or the for-profit private management companies was responsible for specific 
functions related to charter school operations, compliance, outcomes, and management. 
Part II focused on the polarized levels of strong agreement to strong disagreement. The 
qualitative portion of the mixed methodology consisted of a purposeful selection of 
interview participants whose selection criterion included a preference of fifteen years of 
experience as a Michigan charter school board member inclusive of officer roles such as 
president, vice president, and treasurer. 
The contract analysis was based on a review of five different contracts between 
five charter schools and five management companies. The contracts provided an ability to 
compare and contrast various forms of comprehensive management models, so that 
similarities and differences could be analyzed. In addition, the contract analysis also 
provided an opportunity to triangulate data with the quantitative and qualitative data from 
the surveys and interviews. 
The convergence and triangulation of data strengthened the analysis of the 
phenomenon of conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter school boards 
contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The quantitative 
and qualitative data provided evidence of role confusion, which resulted in role conflicts 
due to the lack of consensus in the quantitative data; and the experiences captured from 
the interview participants provided the foundation of the thematic development and 
analysis. The in-depth contract analysis provided a view of the complexities of charter 
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school management and the legal contractual premise from which the parties of the 
contract operate.    
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Chapter 7: Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations 
Introduction  
The governance of charter schools in the state of Michigan is a very complex 
phenomenon with multiple entities playing an integral part in this aspect of education 
reform. Three of the entities have significant roles in Michigan’s charter school system; 
they include authorizers, boards of directors, and full-service, for-profit private 
management companies. The interactions and inter-relational dynamics of these three 
parties impact charter school reform and governance from every perspective. It is 
therefore imperative that charter school boards of directors understand not only their role, 
but also the roles of authorizers and management companies. A lack of understanding of 
the governance roles will lead to board confusion and resulting conflicts within the client 
and agent relationship. The governance challenges and conflicts of Michigan charter 
schools were the impetus of the study: An analysis of role conflicts in the governance of 
Michigan charter schools when boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit 
private management companies. Full-service, for-profit private management companies 
are currently contracted with more than 80% of the charter schools in the state of 
Michigan. The penetration of full-service, for-profit private management companies in 
Michigan is by far much greater than any other state in the nation. In respect to Education 
Management Organizations (EMOs), Miron (2013) stated: 
Michigan is a real anomaly in terms of the extensive involvement in for-profit 
EMOs that open and operate charters schools. Seventy-nine percent of Michigan’s 
charter schools are operated by for-profit EMOs, and another 10% of these 
schools are operated by nonprofit EMOs. After Michigan, Missouri (37%), 
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Florida (34%), and Ohio (31%) follow in terms of prevalence of for-profit EMO 
involvement in the operation of charter schools. (p. 18) 
These for-profit private management companies may bring a plethora of skills, 
professionalism, and experience to the operations of their portfolios of charter schools 
and rely on economies of scale in order to achieve and maintain levels of profitability. 
Their primary purpose is to make a profit. The volunteer appointed boards of directors, 
on the other hand, bring a sense of community, goodwill and charity; their primary 
purpose is to give back to the community by volunteering to help the charter school 
achieve its mission of providing an educational alternative to the community in which it 
exists. The polarized philosophies set in motion dynamics that generate governance 
conflicts between the two parties.  
The volunteer and appointed board members will vary in terms of their 
awareness, understanding, and knowledge of the management contract and charter school 
operations. The greater the lack of contractual awareness and understanding turns into a 
commensurate level of confusion resulting in governance conflicts. As a result, 
governance conflicts emerge because of the blurring, overlapping, and confusion between 
the roles of the boards of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management 
companies. The confusion of roles results in conflicts that permeate the governance 
spectrum of charter school operations in the state of Michigan. 
Research Questions  
The three questions that framed the research of the analysis of conflicts in 
Michigan charter schools’ governance as a result of boards of directors contracting with 
for-profit private management companies are as follows: 
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1.) Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of 
directors and full service for-profit management companies contribute to conflict 
in governance? 
2.) Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose 
boards of directors contract with for-profit management companies contribute to 
governance conflict, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute to 
conflict in governance? 
3.) Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan 
charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit 
management companies? 
The three research questions provided an outline of conclusions from the mixed 
methodology approach. The approach provided both quantitative and qualitative data that 
was fortified with a supplemental analysis of five sample contracts between five different 
charter school boards of directors and their contracted full-service, for-profit private 
management companies. 
 Research Methodology  
The mixed methodology consisted of quantitative and qualitative designs. The 
findings from both designs were separately analyzed. Subsequently, the quantitative data 
from surveys and the qualitative data from interviews were converged and triangulated 
with the qualitative data from the contract analysis. 
The quantitative design encompassed hard copy and electronic formats of a two-
part Likert Scale survey. The first format included surveys that were provided to charter 
school board presidents to engage their board members who met the survey profile of 
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having a minimum of 12 months of board experience. Electronic survey access were 
randomly sent to various charter school boards in the state of Michigan in order to 
effectively and efficiently generate a significant number of responses from a diverse and 
broad range of charter school board members.  
The qualitative design encompassed a series of interview questions. The questions 
were presented to a purposeful selection of seven board members with a preferred ten to 
fifteen or more years of board service experience inclusive of participation in board roles 
such as president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary.  
The contract analysis consisted of two parts. Part I was a brief review of charter 
school contracts in order to provide insight into the development of the survey and 
interview questions. Part 2 was a post research in-depth analysis of sample contracts to 
provide an additional qualitative component as a third source of data. The post research 
contract analysis provided a detailed comparison of five contracts between Michigan 
charter schools’ boards of directors and full-service, for-profit private management 
companies. The qualitative findings from the in-depth contract analysis provided data to 
converge with the quantitative data from the surveys and the qualitative data from the 
interviews. The application of the mixed methodology allowed data exploration, 
gathering, findings, and analysis from three different sources around the phenomenon of 
conflicts in charter school governance. The convergence of all three sources of data 
provided opportunities to further strengthen research findings and increase understanding 
of the governance conflicts that occur when boards of directors contract with full-service, 
for-profit private management companies.  
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Conclusions Organized by Research Questions 
 Research Question One  
The conclusions are organized by the research questions that framed the analysis 
of potential role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter schools when boards of 
directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The first 
research question asked: Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter 
school boards of directors and full service, for-profit private management companies 
contribute to conflicts in governance? 
Contractual Relationships 
The contractual relationship between Michigan charter school boards of directors 
and for-profit private management companies set the parameters for the inter-relational 
dynamics between the two parties. A firm awareness and understanding of the contract is 
imperative for both parties and enables roles to be defined and acted out in a manner 
conducive to the expectations and obligations of the contracted parties. The client (board 
of directors) to agent (full-service, for-profit private management company) relationship 
and interactions are defined by the contractual elements, which are formalized when the 
entities sign.  The contract sets the premise for the relationship and affects the boards of 
directors’ ability to govern from a position of authority or a lesser position based upon 
the formal transfer of their power to the full-service, for-profit private management 
companies. 
The findings and analysis in chapter four presented exclusive and convergent 
evidence that the contractual relationships between the boards and the management 
companies contribute to conflicts in governance. These conflicts stem from the boards of 
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directors’ general and specific lack of collective awareness and understanding of the 
fundamental principles upon which the contract was based. The lack of contractual 
awareness and understanding is possibly perpetuated by boards’ turnover, which 
facilitates novice replacements that are not receiving effective overviews and training in 
the contractual governance roles. This overlooked training includes defining of the roles 
and responsibilities of both the boards of directors and the for-profit management 
companies.  
Contractual Relevance, Awareness and Understanding   
Given the scope and relevance of the contract, it does not typically receive the 
attention required by board members to effectively understand the roles of the boards of 
directors and also the roles of the full-service, for-profit private management companies.  
Therefore, when governance issues arise due to role confusion and conflicts, boards 
become frustrated and find themselves in a position with limited, and even possibly non-
existent, recourse. This is due to the contractual agreement, which gives the agent (full-
service, for-profit private management company) the latitude to comprehensively manage 
the operations of the client (charter school board of directors). Some pervasive examples 
from the findings included; selecting the charter schools’ leadership and staff, managing 
sub-contracts, allocation of resources, determining curriculum and academic programs, 
and facilities’ management.  
The contract analysis provided insights into the structural core elements of the 
management agreement. The sample contracts articulated the expectations, 
responsibilities, and obligations of the full-service, for-profit private management 
companies and the boards of directors. The articles of the contracts clearly indicated that 
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the management companies are “solely responsible” for all elements around hiring 
leadership and staff; budgeting, financial, and accounting responsibilities; curriculum and 
academic programming; sub-contracting, and some of the specific responsibilities for 
facilities management. 
Factors Contributing to Tension and Governance Conflicts  
One of the major factors that caused tension between the boards of directors and 
the full-service, for-profit private management companies were the responsibilities for 
hiring. The quantitative data illustrated a lack of consensus regarding the specific survey 
question of who is responsible for hiring charter school personnel. This question focused 
primarily on hiring administrative leadership positions. In the qualitative findings, 
interview participants from the board indicated that responsibilities for hiring became a 
major contention. The interview participants indicated that they thought the board of 
directors had input into hiring principals or they wanted to subsequently augment the 
contract with clauses enabling the boards of directors to affect hiring decisions. Both the 
quantitative and qualitative data provided evidence of role confusion and resulting 
conflicts relative to hiring charter schools’ personnel. The sample management contracts, 
on the other hand, clearly stated that the full-service for-profit management companies 
had the “sole responsibility” for hiring all of the charter schools’ staff. For example, 
language from the contracts clearly specifies that the management company, as stated in 
Contract D, “will have sole responsibility and authority to determine staffing levels, and 
to select, evaluate, assign, discipline, supervise, manage, transfer and terminate 
personnel.” The quote from Contract D confirms that the management company has sole 
responsibility for hiring and the peripheral elements that come along with it such as 
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evaluations, discipline, and termination. These contractual terms contrasted with the 
perceptions of the board member participants in the study who thought they had the 
ability to influence the hiring of charter school staff, especially leadership positions. That 
confusion is significantly part of the cause for tensions and conflicts due to board 
members’ misperceptions of their roles and responsibilities when they contract with full-
service for-profit private management companies.  
Research Question Two  
The second research question asked the following: Assuming that parallel 
governance systems created in charter schools whose boards of directors contract with 
for-profit private management companies contributes to governance conflict, what are the 
factors in the relationship that contribute to conflicts in governance? 
Parallel governance structures as defined by Alexia Stainer (2010, July) are as 
follows: “Parallel governance is closely related to the concept of institutional multiplicity, 
as both refer to situations where non-state actors perform state functions. These are 
associated with conflict situations and have impact on the processes of state formation.”  
Factors Contributing to Role Confusion  
In terms of the factors in the relationship that contributes to conflicts in 
governance, the boards of directors and the management companies have responsibilities 
that overlap due to industry practices, assumptions, and misperceptions from board 
members. Such factors include, but are not limited to the responsibility for 
recommending board candidates, responsibility for conducting student expulsion 
hearings, responsibilities for special education policies; and the responsibility for 
developing board meeting agendas and minutes. Some of the previous factors are 
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articulated in the contractual agreement, while others are left for interpretation. For 
example, it is clearly stated in the contract that management companies have 
responsibilities for special education policies, however, it is left for interpretation as to 
who has the responsibilities for recommending board candidates, student expulsion 
hearings, and the responsibilities for developing board meeting agendas and minutes. 
The convergence of quantitative and qualitative data provided evidence that there 
is confusion and resulting role conflicts regarding who is responsible for the development 
of special education policies. The lack of general consensus relative to all data fortifies 
the position of role confusion and resulting conflicts. The quantitative data lacked 
consensus and it may be inferred from the qualitative data that the board of directors 
believes that it has input in special education. The contract analysis clearly indicated that 
the management companies have responsibility for special education just as they do for 
general education students. 
The previous example of the responsibility for special education policies was 
stated in the contracts between the boards of directors and the management companies; 
however other factors that contributed to governance conflicts do not have contractual 
references and are left again to the interpretation of the two contracted parties.  
The survey question for who is responsible for the recommendations of board 
candidates did not have consensus; however, it was one of the few responses that had 
zero percent for the response of solely the responsibility of the management company. 
Interestingly, there was a small percentage that believed that the management company 
should have some shared responsibilities in recommending board candidates. Overall, the 
collective responses did not have consensus and indicated possibilities for confusion. 
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There is also potential for conflicts of interest when management companies have a say in 
determining who is selected to be a charter school board member. 
In terms of the survey question regarding who is responsible for student 
expulsions, the quantitative and qualitative data lacked consensus and indicated 
confusion as to whether the boards of directors or the management companies are 
responsible. The Michigan Department of Education empowers the school boards to 
establish their own guidelines regarding suspensions and expulsions. In a brief prepared 
by the Department of Education (2013), it stated,   
Suspensions and Expulsions in General: The Revised School Code provides each 
school board with the authority to establish a local discipline policy. Each local 
school board has the authority to make reasonable recommendations relative to 
anything necessary for the proper establishment, maintenance and management of 
the schools in the district. (p. 1) 
In reference to expulsions, Interview Participant A stated,  
Expulsion hearings are brought to the board for final disposition because the 
board is the only entity that can expel a student. We at times see that this is not 
taking place; and expulsions may occur unknown to us, which is a problem. Or 
kids leaving and the board has not had full disclosure of the circumstances of how 
and why they left. 
The final example of an area left for interpretation is who has the responsibility 
for the development of the board meeting agendas and minutes. The lack of consensus 
around board agendas and minutes emerged from the quantitative data and was 
inferentially apparent in the qualitative data. Many board members seem unaware as to 
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the legal implications of public board meetings, agendas, and minutes. These documents 
are critically important to the maintenance of the charter school’s history, policy 
resolutions, and the compliance as a public entity to federal and state mandates. The 
agendas and minutes are most often deferred as tasks for the management companies; 
however, if boards truly understood the legal implications of these public documents and 
the significance of board meetings they would maintain development and control of this 
critical element of their responsibility. 
Research Question Three  
The third research question stated the following: Are accountability and 
transparency of public funds affected when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors 
contract with full-service for-profit private management companies?  
Accountability and Transparency of Public Funds  
In terms of the question, if boards of directors contracting with full-service, for-
profit private management companies affect accountability and transparency, the findings 
demonstrated that both are impacted. Nearly half of the survey respondents indicated that 
the accountability and transparency of public funds are affected. The quantitative data 
resulted in a lack of board member consensus; and the qualitative responses also lacked 
consensus in terms of the responses from interview participants. Accountability was 
paired with transparency as a joint topic. However, where both were seen as an issue, 
transparency received most of the emphasis from the interview participants. The conflicts 
of transparency threaded through multiple topics including reporting around; budgets, 
finances, sub-contracts, and performance outcomes. The interview participants mentioned 
multiple times high levels of discomfort regarding transparency and full disclosure. The 
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previous concerns tied directly to the transition of funds from a non-profit public status to 
a private status once transferred to the full-service for-profit private management 
company.  
The qualitative findings provided multiple examples of the board members 
questioning how money is allocated, monitored, spent, and reported. The budgetary and 
financial reports prepared by the full-service, for-profit private management companies 
met the requirements of the state, however, the reports struggled to meet the expectations 
of the charter school boards in terms of being presented in a user-friendly manner and 
codified for novices, such as board members who do not have financial expertise.  
 Awarding of Contracts  
The findings from the quantitative data illustrated a lack of consensus regarding if 
the boards of directors or the management companies have responsibility for awarding 
contracts. One-third of the survey respondents selected the option that the responsibility 
for awarding contracts should be equally shared between the two parties. Many of the 
interview participants provided qualitative data, which indicated that the contracts should 
be directly between the board of directors and the vendors of the charter school. The 
majority of contracts in the contractual analysis indicated that the management company 
reserved the right to sub-contract the services provided to the charter school. The contrast 
is perpetuated by the perspectives of the board members, which are misaligned to 
contractual provisions between the boards of directors and the management companies. 
The findings indicated role confusion, which resulted in governance conflicts regarding 
critical aspects of the charter schools’ operations. 
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Transparency and Full Disclosure of Performance Outcomes  
The final example regarding accountability and transparency is in reference to 
performance outcomes. In terms of the quantitative findings and accountability, boards 
had mixed reviews, indicating feelings of being ultimately responsible for academic and 
non-academic outcomes, and many survey participants indicated that it is the 
management companies’ responsibility to provide the curriculum and academic 
programming. The qualitative findings illustrated a sense of ownership by the boards for 
performance outcomes; however, this position was tempered by an understanding that 
curriculum and academic programming are the core technology of what the management 
companies provide. The comprehensive contracts reviewed in the contract analysis 
indicated that it is the responsibility of the management companies to provide the 
curriculum and academic programming for the charter schools.   
Implications/Recommendations for Board Members 
 Professional Development for Officer Roles  
One of the key findings that permeated most of the interviews was the need for 
professional development in the areas of board members’ roles (individually and 
collectively), finances, and training on the contract with the full-service, for-profit private 
management company. It was clear in the qualitative data that the board members 
believed that the officer roles, such as president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary 
included expectations that required time to prepare, facilitate, and follow-up on board-
related activities in order to provide effective governance. There are major differences of 
time requirements between charter school board officers and general board members. 
Officers of the board are expected to understand the dynamics that come with their 
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specific roles. For example, the board president is considered a generalist and is expected 
to know something about all aspects of charter school governance. The board presidents’ 
most significant role is to facilitate the board meetings and manage all of the peripheral 
dynamics that public board meetings encompass. The board presidents must guide, 
collaborate, and lead the board members in an effective manner to meet the governance 
requirement outcomes of fiduciary, compliance, and academic performance.   The vice 
presidents’ most significant role is to fill in as needed for the president and provide 
support for committee development and general support to the board as a whole.  
The treasurers’ role is to be the financial expert for the board. The board treasurer 
is the most technical role and requires a base level of skills and knowledge in both 
financial and accounting management. Charter school board members, in the role of 
treasurer, is detrimental to the board if they lack the financial skills, knowledge, and 
capacity to effectively analyze cash flow statements, budgets, balance sheets, trial 
balances, and other basics of fiduciary reporting. The board secretaries’ most significant 
role includes keeping the board members collectively organized with compliance matters 
and signing key documents such as board resolutions, subsequently making sure that 
signed documents are recorded, and logged as permanent records of the public board 
meetings. General members have the least demands of their time; however, their most 
significant role is to provide input and objectively vote on important matters regarding 
the charter school and its obligation to deliver the purpose set forth in the articles of the 
charter. Each member must understand that the power of the board is embedded in its 
collective membership; and board members alone do not constitute the decision-making 
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for the charter nor wield any individual power and authority other than that granted to the 
board in its entirety as one group collectively.   
Charter school board members’ meticulous understanding of board roles and 
responsibilities is imperative to achieving effective governance. Boards cannot govern 
effectively if they do not understand their roles and the roles of the other key players in 
the charter system, specifically management companies, and authorizers. The selection of 
the management decision model that the boards of directors choose is of great relevance 
and impacts their ability to govern. There is tremendously polarized disparity between the 
models of self-management and opting for a full-service, for-profit private management 
company. The qualitative findings illustrated that the boards did not realize that once they 
chose a full-service management company, their power and authority becomes 
diminished and their ability to govern is impacted. When a standard full-service 
management contract is signed, the board of directors has transferred its power to effect 
key operational aspects such as hiring, financial reporting, vendor selection, and 
management of curriculum and academic programming.   
Need for Retaining Legal Counsel for the Boards of Directors 
The need for legal counsel surfaced in the qualitative data findings multiple times. 
Some of the interview participants expounded on the need for the charter school boards to 
have knowledgeable legal counsel to assist the board of directors with navigating the 
complexities of the legal, contractual, and legislative elements of the charter school 
system in the state of Michigan. The board members often referred to engaging legal 
counsel for objective advice, especially in terms of conflicting matters with the 
contracted management company. One of the interview participants specifically argued 
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that the attorney should be exclusively hired to represent the sole interest of the board of 
directors; and not be retained by any person or entity other than the board of directors.  
The rationale for legal counsel centers on the complexities of contractual 
management, legalities, and legislative matters. Contractual management is generally a 
difficult topic to comprehend. It requires in-depth analysis and attention to details given 
the importance and longevity of management agreements between charter school boards 
and management companies. Management companies have a distinct advantage over 
boards given the professional disposition of the management companies and their 
knowledge of the charter school industry. A legal professional or a law firm that is 
employed directly by the management company to manage risk and provide consultation 
on complicated legal issues often accompanies this knowledge. When governance 
conflicts arise, it is best managed between the agent and client. However, when complex 
issues emerge, it is prudent to have legal counsel engaged who are aware of charter 
school laws, policies and legislation.  
Legalities also occur and are most often spontaneous. Disputes happen given the 
number of formal and informal relations and the complex inter-dynamics of entities that 
work with the charter school boards of directors. Disputes between the boards of directors 
and the full-service, for-profit private management companies will lead to governance 
conflicts and boards that are not well equipped with legal capacity will be at a 
disadvantage and contractually inept to confront issues and pursue recourse.  
The final component that increases the boards’ need for legal counsel is the 
complexities of legislation. The legislative component also contains political implications 
that affect policy formation. Legislative and policy formation is typically driven by state 
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and federal agencies to monitor and regulate the charter school system.  Legal counsel 
provides insight and input for the volunteer appointed charter school boards of directors 
to be able to navigate complexities that could put them in a vulnerable position when 
working with management companies who have the professional and legal acumen to use 
these laws and policies to their advantage. The boards of directors’ action to secure 
effective legal counsel may prevent governance conflicts related to role confusion due to 
lack of awareness and understanding of the management contract.  
Board Professionalization 
Charter school boards of directors have a complicated and important role to play 
in terms of being appointed volunteers. A lot of responsibility is entailed with being a 
charter school board member, however, the scope of the commitment required to be an 
effective board member is seldom communicated with accuracy to board candidates; 
especially the roles of board officers which were previously discussed. Charter school 
board members are responsible for fiduciary, compliance, and performance outcomes; all 
three areas are demanding, especially the fiduciary responsibilities. The probability of 
being an effective board member includes basic skills of management, communications, 
leadership, community activism, and finance. The findings, especially from the interview 
participants, demonstrated that the experience and knowledge that board members bring 
to the role has an impact on their ability to provide effective governance. 
A focus on professionalization of the board could be achieved through a variety of 
means. This may include support from the authorizers to provide better processes to assist 
charter school boards of directors with attracting, selecting, and maintaining effective 
candidates and members to positively influence its composition and professionalization. 
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This could also be supported through universal board role definitions inclusive of 
descriptions of duties and training outlined by the Michigan Department of Education. 
The Michigan Department of Education could mandate certain requirements and 
qualifications for certain board roles, such as financial literacy for those holding the role 
of treasurer; and Robert’s rules of order training for board presidents, vice presidents and 
secretaries. A final recommendation would be to transform the mindsets and perceptions 
from boards of directors being volunteers to public officials with the collective authority 
to provide effective stewardship and governance of Michigan charter schools.  This 
transformation would require policy changes such as moving toward charter school board 
members being elected directly by the communities in which they serve similar to 
traditional public school boards. True empowerment of Michigan charter school boards is 
a step toward preventing role confusion and resulting conflicts in governance when 
boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies to 
comprehensively manage their operations.  
           Everything Goes Back to the Contract  
The quantitative and qualitative findings and analysis illustrated many issues 
related to the boards of directors’ lack of awareness and understanding of the contract 
with the full-service, for-profit private management companies. The summarization of the 
survey responses illustrated a consistent lack of consensus. It became apparent that board 
members had varying perspectives of which party (boards of directors or the full-service, 
for-profit private management companies) had or should have ownership of specific 
responsibilities relative to the operations of their charter schools. The perspectives from 
the quantitative findings were reinforced by the qualitative findings where the majority of 
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the interview participants made statements contrary to the parameters, expectations and 
obligations of the contractual agreements. The board of directors’ lack of contractual 
awareness emerged frequently in the areas of hiring charter school staff, awarding of sub-
contracts, transparency, and roles and responsibilities in general.  
The responsibility of hiring charter school staff is a quintessential example of 
conflict resulting from the boards of directors’ lack of awareness and understanding of 
the contract with the full-service, for-profit private management companies. In the survey 
results, nearly one-third of the survey respondents selected options that indicated that the 
board members had equally, partially, or full responsibility for hiring key charter school 
personnel. The majority of the board member interview participants indicated perceptions 
that boards of directors had or should have input in the decision-making process for 
hiring staff. Some of the interview participants wanted to subsequently augment their 
contract to have the superintendent and or principals chosen by and report directly to the 
charter school boards of directors. Other board interview participants felt comfortable 
with an ability to influence the decision of who is selected for key leadership roles in the 
charter school. All of the previous positions are misaligned and contrary to the findings in 
the contract analysis, which universally and emphatically included terminology such as 
the management company had “sole responsibility” for all aspects of hiring and 
terminating employees. These responsibilities included evaluating, re-deploying, and 
reprimanding employees as the management company saw necessary. This also included 
the mandatory and optional peripheral responsibilities of providing health insurance, 
retirement programs, and life insurance.  
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The responsibility for awarding sub contracts is a premier example of conflicts 
resulting from the boards of directors’ lack of awareness and understanding of the 
contract with the for-profit private management company.  There was disparity in the 
survey responses, which illustrated a wide range of board members’ perceptions as to 
who should be responsible for awarding contracts. Half of the respondents indicated that 
awarding sub contracts should be entirely or mostly the board of directors. The 
qualitative findings and analysis showed that some boards felt that they were only 
tolerated and seen as, “rubber stamps” in the process to award contracts and that the 
management company went through the motions of a selection process only to choose the 
subcontractor they wanted. Conflicts resulted as boards felt they should be responsible 
for subcontracts. The contract analysis disclosed that some contracts contain clauses that 
give the management companies the obligations of subcontracting. This is an area of 
conflict because it is not universally clear who has subcontracting authority; or if it is 
shared between the two parties.  
Another illustration of confusion is found with the intent from the Michigan 
Department of Education to facilitate transparency of the bidding and procurement 
processes to prevent the awarding of contracts based on subjectivity. The memorandum 
from the Michigan Department of Education on competitive bid thresholds (2015) stated: 
The purpose of this letter is to communicate changes to the base amount above 
which competitive bids must be obtained for remodeling, procurement of 
supplies, materials, and equipment. Sections 623a, 1267, and 1274 of the Revised 
School Code establish a base above which competitive bids must be obtained and 
provide an increase in the base that corresponds with increases in the Consumer 
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Price Index. The fiscal year 2015-2016 base for Section 1267, pertaining 
construction, renovation, repair, or remodeling and the new base for Sections 
623a and 1274, pertaining to procurement of suppliers, materials, and equipment, 
is $23,230. 
The memorandum presented intent to prevent the awarding of contracts 
subjectively. However, even though the state presents a mandate on bidding thresholds, it 
leaves it up to the boards of directors to decide how and what entity will handle the 
process. It is not stated in the contracts that were analyzed that a bid process is required 
for amounts more than $23,230.00. This discretion exacerbates the role confusion and 
perpetuates governance conflicts.  
The Contrast of Paradigms 
A clash of paradigms was discovered in the qualitative data. The interview 
participants illustrated a powerful sense of volunteerism in response to the opening 
interview question of why did they have a desire to become board members of a charter 
school. The response was unanimous in terms of their rationale for volunteering to be an 
appointed board member and was summarized as follows; the interview participants all 
felt a sense of community, charity, and student advocacy. They wanted to give to an 
effort that was providing opportunities for children who they felt were underserved by a 
strained education system that was falling short of providing quality education. Many of 
the interview participants indicated a philosophically opposing paradigm from the full-
service, for-profit private management companies. They expressed the concern of the 
management companies’ primary reason for its existence, to make a profit. The profit-
centric motives of the management companies and community-centric motives of the 
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volunteer charter school boards presented a clash of values, which created inherent 
governance conflicts.  
The interview participants’ rationale for becoming a board member had threads of 
consistency inclusive of altruism, making a difference in the community, and providing 
an alternative to status quo education for children in typically underserved school 
districts. These intentions clashed with those of the full-service, for-profit private 
management companies when conflicts arose from inherently different values. The 
boards were making decisions based on the desired outcomes of student performances 
and management companies were making decisions influenced by the ever-present 
requirement of making a profit.  
Another example of governance conflicts derived from opposing values are the 
challenges of transparency and full disclosure. The charter school board is a public non-
profit entity inclusive of non-profit values. Transparency is critical in terms of fiduciary 
planning, budgeting, and acquisitions. Finances are primarily from public tax dollars and 
accountability is to the funding sources and the constituents of the community served by 
the charter school boards’ stewardship. Transparency becomes compromised when public 
funds are transitioned to a private entity and the ability to track and monitor such funds 
becomes improbable if not impossible.  
The inherent conflicts are a result of the different, and somewhat opposing, 
paradigms, beliefs, and values of the charter school boards of directors and the full-
service, for-profit private management companies. The volunteer philosophy of the 
charter school board and the private corporate philosophy of the management company 
have different values and motivations. These forces result in role conflicts as each entity 
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pursues their organizational objectives within their distinctive paradigms, which impacts 
the responsibilities and requirements for operating charter schools in the state of 
Michigan.  
Policy Recommendation 
Universal	  Role	  Definition/Descriptions	  Many	  of	  the	  challenges	  in	  the	  charter	  school	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Michigan	  include	  the	  inconsistencies	  with	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  three	  of	  the	  primary	  stakeholders;	  charter	  school	  authorizers,	  charter	  school	  boards	  of	  directors,	  and	  full-­‐service,	  for-­‐profit	  private	  management	  companies.	  Boards	  of	  directors	  conduct	  their	  governance	  responsibilities	  differently	  from	  other	  boards	  of	  directors;	  charter	  school	  management	  companies	  manage	  very	  differently	  from	  other	  management	  companies;	  and	  authorizers	  conduct	  their	  oversight	  responsibilities	  differently	  from	  other	  authorizers.	  There	  are	  examples	  of	  inconsistencies	  throughout	  the	  practices	  of	  all	  three	  stakeholders;	  despite	  initiatives	  to	  regulate	  and	  standardize	  the	  fundamental	  practices,	  roles,	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  each	  of	  these	  critical	  three	  actors	  in	  the	  Michigan	  charter	  school	  system.	  The	  lack	  of	  universal	  practices	  permeates	  activities	  such	  as;	  how	  charter	  schools	  are	  awarded,	  monitored,	  evaluated,	  re-­‐authorized,	  placed	  on	  probation,	  and	  possibly	  revoked	  or	  discontinued.	  The	  inconsistencies	  of	  general	  practices	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  universal	  principles	  for	  all	  three	  actors	  contributes	  to	  role	  confusion	  and	  conflicts	  that	  impacts	  the	  governance	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Michigan.	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Universal	  Oversight	  and	  Governance	  Principles	  	  The	  literature	  review	  provided	  examples	  on	  how	  many	  of	  the	  practices	  of	  boards	  of	  directors,	  management	  companies,	  and	  authorizers	  are	  different	  in	  many	  functions	  and	  similar	  in	  others.	  The	  differences	  in	  practice	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  deploy	  oversight,	  governance	  accountability,	  and	  measure	  what	  is	  successful	  performance.	  As	  Frazier	  (2011)	  stated	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  “Charter	  school	  board	  accountability	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  in	  charter	  schools	  in	  part	  because	  sponsors	  and	  boards	  are	  making	  up	  the	  rules	  as	  they	  go	  along.”	  Frazier	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  variance	  in	  business	  practices	  and	  the	  variance	  of	  how	  authorizers	  and	  charter	  school	  boards	  are	  held	  accountable.	  This	  accountability	  factor	  is	  also	  applicable	  to	  the	  full-­‐service,	  for-­‐profit	  private	  management	  companies	  that	  really	  do	  not	  have	  a	  government	  agency	  to	  regulate	  them.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  market	  forces	  hold	  boards	  of	  directors	  and	  management	  companies	  accountable.	  However,	  when	  charter	  schools	  fail,	  the	  authorizers	  and	  management	  companies	  then	  move	  on	  to	  the	  other	  challenges	  while	  the	  boards	  of	  the	  directors	  and	  the	  charter	  school	  constituencies	  are	  left	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  ramifications	  of	  school	  closures.	  This	  leaves	  behind	  devastated	  communities,	  families,	  and	  students	  who	  had	  limited	  input	  from	  the	  beginning	  and	  no	  recourse	  in	  the	  end	  other	  than	  commencing	  the	  search	  for	  a	  different	  option	  for	  another	  public	  school.	  The	  results	  are	  the	  communities	  and	  families	  that	  were	  served	  by	  the	  charter	  schools	  are	  abandoned	  to	  face	  the	  residual	  consequences.	  	  
The strategy of deploying universal oversight and governance principles would be 
a significant step toward improving industry-wide expectations and practices. A tool that 
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would help boards of directors and other stakeholders is the development of a universal 
charter school governance manual. The reason for a universal governance manual would 
be to provide written guidelines that give consistency and a common criterion for issues 
such as: fiscal management, compliance, and outcome performance. This would assist all 
three of the actors by equipping them with a common perspective of requirements and 
guidelines created by a cross-section of representatives, versus myopic and incongruent 
perspectives from the individual actors alone. With boards of directors, management 
companies, and authorizers operating from a common source of guidelines, it would 
mitigate role confusion and governance conflicts. The universal manual would provide 
common languages, guidelines, standards and practices for all of the authorizers, 
management companies, and charter school boards of directors to follow in the state of 
Michigan. This action would also provide an additional means of standardizing oversight 
processes for authorizers to provide to all boards of directors regardless of their location 
in the state of Michigan. The manual would provide guidance for processes and 
procedures to hold all three actors accountable. In order to increase probable success and 
implementation, such an initiative should be led by a state agency to mediate 
disagreements and make decisions when consensus cannot be reached.  
When conflicts reach levels of urgency, boards of directors often times feel they 
do not have recourse regarding both the full-service, for-profit private management 
company they selected, and the authorizer that sponsored the charter of their school. The 
qualitative findings indicated the boards of directors’ feelings of lacking recourse 
regarding conflicts pertaining to transparency and full disclosure.  As one of the interview 
participants stated, “It is really hard; I think when we look at having someone work on 
your behalf and not getting full disclosure.” The conflicts arise from a lack of trust and a 
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feeling that if the management company does not cooperate, there is not much a board 
can do beyond idle threats. The exception is during the period where the contract is 
nearing an end, at which point the charter school boards may renegotiate for other 
resources and options for changing to a different management company or changing to a 
different management model altogether. 
Board of Directors Recourse for Major Conflicts 
Another area of governance conflicts, relative to transparency and full disclosure, 
was around student performance regarding academics and behavior. Many of the 
interview participants mentioned that it was difficult to obtain data from the management 
companies when the results are negative. For example,  
It is really easy to disseminate that into data and say everything is good, but when 
you dig deeper and pull back the layers of the onion you find out in many cases 
that the right level of visibility is not always disseminated to the board of directors 
and that things are being swept under the rug or hidden to make the overall 
picture look better than what it actually is.  
One of the interview participants even went as far to say, “Lip service is given to 
full disclosure, but there isn’t full disclosure.” Such feelings were pervasive in the 
qualitative data. Boards may respond differently and experience confusion, especially if it 
is a novice board of directors. The same interview participant did share an observation 
regarding empowerment or the lack of empowerment. He basically stated that the 
authorizer is key: “If you don’t have the support of the authorizer, there is not a lot you 
can do.” The previous statement is an indication that board members need support and 
empowerment from their authorizers to govern effectively.  
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The quantitative and qualitative research findings show that boards need 
assistance and support in obtaining transparency and full disclosure in the areas of 
operations, whether it is regarding fiscal matters, bid processes, and accurate reports of 
the success indicators for the school, including student performance and test results. The 
authorizer is one entity that may provide clarity in this area. Authorizers often times will 
work indirectly with a full-service, for-profit private management company. The 
management companies may have multiple contracts with different charter schools’ 
boards of directors who may share the same authorizer. A management company’s 
positive relationship with its board of directors may be an indication that they are 
functioning in an ethical manner inclusive of operating with transparency and full 
disclosure. The other entity that has an ability to provide recourse for charter school 
boards of directors is the Michigan Department of Education. It is ambiguous as to how 
much jurisdiction the Michigan Department of Education has and if boards of directors 
can consider them as a reference for recourse, clear protocol for the boards to file 
grievances, complaints, and concerns. This leaves charter school boards of directors 
feeling like they have little to no option when governance conflicts occur and authorizers 
do not step in to provide them with support.  
The clear choice for the boards of directors to ensure transparency and full 
disclosure is to insist that it is in the contract with clearly outlined metrics that the full-
service, for-profit private management companies must abide by or risk breach of the 
contract. This will require a level of contract proficiency and expertise that may be 
probable if the boards of directors select astute legal counsel who is aware of charter 
school laws and legislation. The period of contract negotiations is a time when the boards 
of directors can leverage their position to mandate systems of controls and objectives for 
the management company to achieve; such as tying the percentage of the management 
fee to achieving certain academic goals as one of the examples provided by an interview 
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participant. The Michigan Department of Education could also mandate or strongly 
suggest that boards of directors hire legal counsel that work strictly on behalf of the 
boards’ interests. 
Authorizers’ Recommendations and Practices  
The Authorizers’ Role and Impact on Conflicts in Governance  
The role and impact of the authorizers are arguably one of the most critical 
components to the success of the charter school system in the country. The authorizers in 
the state of Michigan have the added challenge of overseeing the highest penetration of 
charter schools managed by full-service, for-profit private management companies; by far 
more than double any other state. Their decision to remain neutral or engage in the 
conflicts between charter school boards of directors and the private for-profit 
management companies have reverberating ramifications. The authorizers’ primary 
relation is with the board of directors as defined by the charter agreement. The authorizer 
is the legal body that is granted the range of power to create or dissolve charter 
agreements. The authorizers have the power to grant, revoke and terminate the charter 
contracts along with singularly appointing every member of the charter school boards of 
directors. Vergari (2001) echoes the responsibility of the authorizer by stating, “Charter 
school authorizers occupy a critical position in the charter school system. Indeed, they 
serve as the public’s primary formal agent for holding charter schools accountable for 
performance” (p. 131). The legal contracts of the charters are specifically between the 
authorizing bodies and the governing boards of directors. The charter contract typically 
indicates that it is the board that has the comprehensive responsibilities to uphold the 
principles on which the charter was predicated and granted.  
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  Technically,	  the	  authorizer	  does	  not	  have	  a	  formal	  and	  contractual	  relationship	  with	  the	  management	  companies;	  however,	  informal	  relations	  with	  the	  management	  companies	  sometimes	  germinate	  and	  impact	  the	  formal	  and	  contractual	  relationships	  between	  charter	  school	  boards	  and	  for-­‐profit	  private	  management	  companies.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  authorizers	  provide	  tailored	  support	  strategies	  to	  boards	  given	  the	  unique	  and	  varied	  differences	  of	  boards	  of	  directors	  in	  their	  collective	  knowledge,	  skills,	  experience,	  and	  composition.	  Boards	  of	  directors	  must	  feel	  confident	  that	  the	  authorizer	  is	  a	  source	  of	  support	  and	  empowerment;	  existing	  and	  poised	  to	  oversee,	  develop,	  and	  assist	  with	  the	  charter	  schools’	  success	  in	  pursuing	  their	  missions	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  charter	  agreements	  with	  the	  boards	  of	  directors.	  	   
The ability to hold the players in the charter school system accountable is 
extremely difficult. Critics refer to the lack of accountability as a glaring issue in charter 
school practices. Despite the disposition of critics, it is clear that authorizers hold boards 
accountable. It is also apparent that boards of directors who choose the model of 
contracting with for-profit private management companies should be responsible for 
holding management companies accountable. However, the boards of directors’ ability to 
do so are impacted by the parameters of the contract and the empowerment of their 
authorizers. Issues inherent in the contract and lack of authorizers’ support may generate 
board confusion and predicate conflicts in governance. These issues were prevalent in the 
quantitative data and the qualitative data.  
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As previously mentioned in the literature review, the key actor in charter school 
oversight in Michigan is the authorizer. The Michigan Department of Education (2012) 
explained the authorizer role as the following:  
Pursuant to section 380.502(4): An authorizing body shall oversee, or shall 
contract with an intermediate school district, community college, or state public 
university to oversee, each public school academy operating under a contract 
issued by the authorizing body. The authorizing body is responsible for 
overseeing compliance by the board of directors with the contract and all 
applicable law. (p. 13) 
The authorizers’ control of the boards’ membership by appointment has been a 
source of conflict. There are no term limits for board members and they may continue 
service unless negative behavior or some kind of violation, conflict of interest, or 
member defect takes place. The authorizers have the power to take members off the 
board or simply allow their term to expire without renewal. They also have the power to 
pressure or coerce the board to vote members off or force them to resign. The 
authorizers’ sole power to remove members also contains elements of conflict as Dixon’s 
(2014a) Detroit Free Press investigation found examples where board members were 
threatened with removal by the authorizer for trying to obtain financial information from 
their management company.  Some of the qualitative data illustrated board members 
feeling a lack of effective systematic support from the authorizer led to some conflicts in 
governance.  
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Contributions To The Field  
The contributions to research manifests as a result of exploration in the 
governance of Michigan charter schools when their boards of directors contract with full-
service, for-profit private management companies. The literature review illustrated high 
levels of confusion regarding roles of board members, overlapping of roles and 
responsibilities with the full-service, for-profit private management companies, and 
resulting conflicts derived from such circumstances. The phenomenon of conflicts is clear 
and related to areas of operations where boards typically have jurisdiction and 
governance. However, when boards of directors opt to contract the services of full-
service, for-profit private management companies, their control and authority transfers to 
the private management companies. These actions appear somewhat subliminally and do 
not surface unless conflicts arise between the two parties; at which time the boards realize 
that they are disempowered due to contractual terms and obligations within the 
management agreement that empowers the management company to control operations 
and the peripheral responsibilities of managing charter schools. This subsequently 
perpetuates disempowered feelings within the board as some of the qualitative interview 
participants phrased as feeling like a “rubber stamp.” 
Michigan laws seem to favor management companies and not the boards of 
directors. Boards are the most disadvantaged of the three main actors in the state of 
Michigan; authorizers, charter school boards of directors, and full-service, for-profit 
private management companies. The complexities of the charter school industry are 
typically and understandably beyond the average citizen’s comprehension and therefore 
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require access to professional and legal counselors who may guide the charter school 
boards of directors into the practice of effective governance.  
The main discovery from the research is that all things lead back to the contract. 
The findings and analysis revealed that boards of directors are not aware of and do not 
understand the pertinence of the contract with the full-service, for-profit private 
management companies. In order for charter school boards of directors to govern 
effectively, they must invest the time and effort to become aware of and versed in the 
contractual dynamics. Boards of directors must also retain legal counsel who has the 
capacity and experience to guide them to contractual prudence. Such levels of contractual 
awareness will enable charter school boards of directors in the state of Michigan to 
consciously decide which management model to pursue. In this pursuit, they can 
objectively make informed decisions to contract with a full-service, for-profit private 
management companies or decide to maintain a level of authority and control of their 
charter schools and act out the governance purpose of the boards of directors. 
Suggestions for Further Study  
The quantitative and qualitative data yielded opportunities to discover 
phenomenon worthy of exploration regarding the evolution of charter schools in the state 
of Michigan and the country. Some pervasive challenges that warrant further analysis 
included the opposing forces of two business models (non-profit and for-profit) working 
side-by-side, how to improve transparency and full disclosure in charter school systems, 
testing the implementation of having elected boards for charter schools, comparative 
analysis of two polarized management models, non-profit charter management 
organization (CMOs), for-profit private management companies or education 
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management organizations (EMOs) and their impact on charter school governance, the 
impact of governance on charter school performance, who is ultimately accountable for 
charter school governance in the state of Michigan, and finally an analysis of the 
authorizers impact on the governance of charter schools in the state of Michigan. 
Researcher Reflections  
 The analysis of inherent role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter 
boards contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies provides 
many insights into the inner-workings of a different structure in public school education. 
It has reinforced what is working and what still needs to be restructured in order for 
charter schools to become what it was originally intended to be or make a conscious 
effort to accept what it has become and understand its position in the reform of education. 
The challenges of charter school boards of directors are vast and centered on their 
awareness and understanding of the contracts they sign to facilitate their vision of 
governance and leadership. Their range of decisions is between the extreme choices of 
self-managing, and choosing to contract with full-service, for-profit private management 
companies. If they choose the former, they maintain the full span of governance control 
and operational responsibility; empowerment is at its fullest. If they choose to contract 
with a full-service, for-profit private management company, then their control is 
diminished and authority transferred to the management company. However, despite the 
mitigation of control they still have full responsibility.  
One of the primary issues of the research is that boards of directors do not realize 
the inter-relational governance dynamics given the parameters of the contract due to a 
lack of awareness of the contract. This occurs for many reasons, such as new board 
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candidates and new members who may have never been trained on the elements of the 
contract. When new members become part of a board, they are excited to give back to the 
community and are given erroneous impressions that they have ultimate authority; this is 
not the case when they contract with full-service, for-profit private management 
companies. The state of Michigan has many examples of such instances given that private 
management companies manage four out of five charter schools.  
The implication of charter schools choosing a full-service, for-profit private 
management company affects how the schools are managed and operated. The decision 
infiltrates every part of the charter school including governance, leadership, operations, 
and finances. Governance becomes confusing because many of the boards’ 
responsibilities have become convoluted ranging from exclusive control to varying 
ranges of control given to the private management company. The best example is the 
responsibility for hiring charter school staff. Under the full-service management scenario, 
the private management company has sole responsibility for hiring everyone from top 
leadership to paraprofessionals and the board has no input into the process of selecting 
the school’s human resources. The determination of school leadership and the boards of 
directors’ inability to impact such decisions is a primary impetus of governance conflicts. 
The contractual analysis provided evidence that every contract reviewed indicated 
terminology phrased as; the management company has sole responsibility for hiring 
school staff and all of the peripheral responsibilities such as training, evaluating, 
placement and termination.  
Many aspects of governance are compromised under the models of education 
management organizations. However, the problem is not with the model; the problem is 
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with the charter school boards of directors not being aware of and not understanding the 
contracts. The importance of the contracts must be placed at the forefront of board 
training so that boards of directors may build their contractual acumen and make a 
conscious, purposeful, and strategically aligned decision in terms of how they want the 
school to operate. If they choose the model of having a full-service, for-profit private 
management company, then they make such a decision fully aware that their ability to 
govern is diminished and they relinquish significant parts of their responsibilities and 
authority to the management company. 
The governance roles of charter school boards of directors are crucial to the 
success of charter school reform. Board members have fiduciary, compliance, and 
performance outcome responsibilities for the charter schools. If these board roles are 
ambiguous, it will harness conflicts in governance that may negatively impact the charter 
schools. These conflicts may be identified and solved; however, it could also lead to 
negative scenarios that may result in school closure. As paraphrased by one of the 
references, governance of charter schools does matter, and so do charter school boards.  
Summary 
The analysis of inherent role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter 
school boards contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies 
provided quantitative and qualitative perspectives from experienced board members. 
These perspectives included their view of board governance and how responsibilities are 
divided and shared with for-profit private management companies. The responsibilities 
include the management of operations, compliance, and outcome components of charter 
schools. The analysis included three major sources of data generation: quantitative 
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research, qualitative research, and a qualitative contractual analysis that provided the 
essence of the contracts between charter school boards of directors and their contracted 
full-service, for-profit private management companies. 
 The data was triangulated and provided analysis to strengthen findings and 
galvanize perspectives on the causes of confusion that resulted in governance conflicts 
when boards contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies.  
The theoretical framework that grounded this analysis included three theories; 
agency theory, stewardship theory, and contract failure theory. These theories were 
collectively rooted in economic, psychological, and sociological foundations.  The 
theories synergistically illustrated a framework of potentially inherent conflicts in the 
agent-to-client relationships. The charter school boards (client) relationships with the 
full-service, for-profit management companies (agent) encompassed the complexities of 
non-profits entities working side-by-side with private for-profit entities. This relationship 
creates anomalies that contribute to confusion, tensions, and factors that result in 
governance conflicts, which affect the operations of charter schools. The anomalies 
included a phenomenon of parallel governance, which covertly impacts the governance of 
charter schools in the state of Michigan.  
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Appendix A: Quantitative Survey Questionnaire 
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 Please fill in the circle aligned to the columns with the ending that you 
feel bests completes the questions 
 Management 
companies’ 
responsibility 
Mostly 
management 
co. 
responsibility 
and some of 
the Board of 
Directors 
Shared 
responsibility 
equal 
between the 
Board of 
directors and 
the 
management 
co.  
Mostly board 
of directors’ 
responsibility 
and some of 
the 
management 
co. 
board of 
directors’ 
responsibility 
1. The 
responsibility 
for hiring key 
personnel such 
as 
superintendent, 
principal, and 
teachers should 
be 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
2.The 
responsibility 
for managing 
finance and 
budget matters 
should be 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
3.The 
responsibility 
for managing 
the day-to-day 
operations of 
the school 
should be 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
4.The 
responsibility 
for awarding 
contracts should 
be 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
5.The 
responsibility 
for 
recommending 
board 
candidates 
should be 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
6.The      
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responsibility 
for state and 
federal 
compliance 
should be 
O O O O O 
7.The 
responsibility 
for determining 
curriculum and 
academic 
programs should 
be 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
8. The 
responsibility 
for conducting 
student 
expulsion 
hearings should 
be  
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
9. The 
responsibility 
for special 
education 
policies of the 
school should 
be 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
10. The 
responsibility 
for developing 
board meeting 
agendas and 
board minutes 
should be  
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
11. The 
development of 
the contractual 
agreement 
between the 
board and 
management 
company should 
be 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
12. The 
acquisition of 
real estate, 
facilities, and 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
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capital projects 
for the school 
should be 
 Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the 
statements on the by filling in your response. 
 Strongly Disagree 
1.The 
management of 
funds and 
resources is 
affected when 
boards of 
directors 
contract with 
full-service for-
profit 
management 
companies 
 
(1) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly 
Agree 
2.Accountability 
of public funds 
is affected when 
boards of 
directors 
contract with 
full-service for-
profit 
management 
services 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
3.Transparency 
of public funds 
is affected when 
boards of 
directors 
contract with 
full-service for-
profit 
management 
services 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
4. The board of 
directors 
understand the 
articles, terms, 
and content of 
the management 
contract 
between the 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
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board of 
directors and the 
full-service 
management 
company 
   
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
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Appendix B: Qualitative Interview Questions  
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Qualitative Interview Questions – Board of Directors 
 
1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter school board of directors, 
what are the pros and cons relative to governing the school that occur as a result of 
contracting with a full-service management company? 
 
2. Reflecting upon your board member experience in contracting with a for-profit 
management company, how would you describe the specific contractual relationship 
between the board and the management company? 
 
3. Considering that the relationship between the board of directors and the management 
company is a critical element in the successful operation of the school, what do you think 
are factors that might contribute to tension in governance as a result of this relationship? 
 
4. Do you believe that accountability and transparency of public funds may have changed 
when contracting with a for-profit company, or do you believe this is not an issue? 
 
5. Given what you know about leadership and school governance, are there things that 
could be done contractually or legislatively to improve the governance of Michigan 
charter schools? 
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Appendix C: IRB Approval Letter 
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Appendix E: Management Contracts from Contractual Analysis  
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Comparative Contract Analysis Between Five Michigan Charter School Boards and 
Their Management Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contract; 
C
on
tra
ct
 A
 
C
on
tra
ct
 B
 
C
on
tra
ct
 C
 
C
on
tra
ct
 D
 
C
on
tra
ct
 E
 
 
 
 
 
Comments 
Note: (MC denotes 
Management 
Company) 
Template/Format of Contract  
Is in standard 
format 
(boilerplate or 
common with 
other 
management 
companies) 
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü v 
 
 
ü  
 
 
¢ 
Three of the five 
MC’s call the 
contract a 
management 
agreement (A, B, 
D) while 
companies C and 
E call it a service 
agreement. Other 
that MC “E”, there 
appears to be little 
to no real 
difference except 
for the title 
terminology.  
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Is unique in 
comparison to 
other 
companies 
     
ü  
MC “E” has an 
agreement that is 
titled differently 
and lays out its 
contract in an 
unique manner 
than the other four 
MCs. MC “E”’s 
service agreement 
specifies tasks, 
deliverables, 
budgets and fees 
associated with 
each category.  
 
 
 
 
 
Recitals  
References the 
authorizer 
 
 
 
 
ü  
 
ü  
 
ü  
 
ü  
 
ü v 
 
Four of the 
management 
companies (A,B, 
C, D) clearly 
mention the 
authorizer while 
MC “E” mentions 
the authorizer in 
the scope of the 
work.  
Contractual /service relationship  
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Indicates 
comprehensiv
e educational 
programming 
and 
management 
 
 
ü v 
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
¢ 
Two of the five 
MC’s ( B and C) 
use the words 
“comprehensive 
educational 
program” while 
MC’s(A and D) 
state they will 
provide adaptable 
and flexible 
programs that are 
not prescriptive. 
MC “E” says it 
will provide a 
presentation for 
the board to pick a 
curriculum.  
Indicates that 
the facility is 
owned or 
acquired by 
the 
management 
company  
 
 
ü  
 
 
¢ 
 
 
ü  
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
Only MC “A” 
indicates their 
capacity to provide 
facilities and 
facilities’ 
management for 
the board. 
Therefore, having 
the board lease 
from the MC. All 
others do not 
mention provisions 
for facilities.  
Indicates that 
the 
management 
company has 
sole 
responsibility 
for hiring and 
terminating all 
employees 
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
All management 
contracts/agreeme
nts clearly indicate 
that the 
management 
company is soley 
responsible for the 
hiring and 
termination of all 
employees. This 
also includes 
management of 
payroll health care 
benefits, 
insurance, etc.  
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Indicates that 
the 
management 
company will 
provide start-
up funds for 
charter school 
boards 
 
 
ü  
 
 
¢ 
 
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
Management 
companies A and 
C are the only 
MCs that will 
provide startup 
funds for the 
charter schools 
they manage. The 
MCs will be 
reimbursed 
through the school 
revenues. MC A 
and C make 
provisions for the 
boards to apply for 
financing.  
Indicates that 
the 
management 
company has 
the right to 
subcontract 
any and all 
services  
 
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
Three of the MCs 
(A, B, C) reserve 
the right to 
subcontract all 
services it provides 
to the charter 
schools. MC “D” 
states that they 
may subcontract in 
coordination with 
the board of 
directors; MC “E” 
does not indicate 
provisions for 
subcontracting 
except for using 
subcontractors to 
find facilities to 
which they will be 
reimbursed 
$10,000.00 for site 
research and 
selection.  
Terms and Terminations  
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Indicates that 
the 
management 
company has 
responsibility 
for special 
education 
services 
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
The contracts for 
three of the MCs 
indicate that the 
management 
company is 
responsible for 
special education 
services. MC “D” 
and “E” do not 
clearly specify 
their roles in 
special education 
except in a general 
statement that they 
will provide 
general 
supplemental 
service as required 
by law.  
Specifies the 
compensation 
to the 
management 
company  
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü v 
 
 
ü v 
All of the contracts 
and service 
agreements 
between the MC 
and the board of 
directors indicate 
the MC’s 
compensation. 
However, each 
compensation 
structure is 
different.  
Obligations of the management company  
CONFLICTS	  IN	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  OF	  MICHIGAN	  CHARTER	  SCHOOLS	  	   	  421	  
Indicates the 
management 
company has 
the 
responsibility 
for curriculum 
and academic 
programs  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü v 
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü  
All of the contracts 
specify that the 
MC has 
responsibility for 
the curriculum and 
academic 
programs. MC “B” 
has significant cost 
and proprietary for 
its curriculum 
programs. MC’s A 
and C also have 
proprietary rights 
to their curriculum 
and academic 
programs 
including 
materials.  
Indicates that 
the 
responsibility 
for board 
agendas and 
minutes is 
provided in 
the contract 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
None of the 
contracts specify 
whether the boards 
of directors or the 
management 
companies have 
the responsibility 
for board meeting 
agendas and 
minutes.  
Obligations of the Board  
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Clearly 
specifies the 
roles of the 
board 
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
ü v 
 
 
 
ü  
 
¢ 
 
¢ 
All of the contracts 
and agreements 
except for MC “D” 
and “E” specify 
the obligations of 
the boards of 
directors. MC “B” 
does not indicate 
obligations but 
uses the phrase 
“relationship of the 
parties” and MCs 
D and E says 
words and phrases 
synonymous to 
partnerships and 
alliances with the 
board of directors.  
Clearly 
specifies the 
roles of the 
management 
company 
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
The roles of the 
management are 
clearly specified in 
the contracts 
regarding key 
areas such as 
hiring; day-to-day 
operations; 
financial and 
budget 
management; 
curriculum and 
academic 
programs.  
Financial Arrangements  
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Clearly states 
that the board 
retains the 
school’s fund 
balances  
 
 
¢ 
 
 
ü  
 
 
¢ 
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
Three of the MC’s 
leave the fund 
balances with the 
school, however 
two make the 
charter school’s 
fund balance part 
of their 
management fee. 
The remainder of 
the balance after 
the operational 
cost becomes the 
profit of  MC “A” 
and “C.”  
Expulsions, capital acquisitions, academic performance and day-to-day 
operations 
Indicates who 
is responsible 
for expulsions 
and behavior 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
None of the 
contracts indicate 
whether the board 
of directors or the 
management 
company have 
responsibility for 
student expulsions.  
Indicates that 
the board or 
the 
management 
company is 
responsible 
for capital 
acquisitions  
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
 
ü  
 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
 
¢ 
None of the 
contracts indicate 
whether the board 
or the management 
company is 
responsible for 
capital acquisitions 
except for MC “A” 
and “C” who 
provides startup 
funds and 
financing to the 
board, which is 
later reimbursed 
from their charter 
schools’ revenues.  
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Indicates who 
is responsible 
for academic 
performance 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
¢ 
 
 
ü  
 
 
¢ 
MC “D” is the 
only contract that 
has metrics 
regarding 
academic 
performance. In 
MC “D”’s 
contract, there are 
financial 
incentives for the 
attainment of 
academic goals 
agreed upon with 
the boards of 
directors.  
Indicates that 
the 
management 
company is 
responsible 
for the day-to-
day operations  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
 
 
ü  
The contracts do 
indicate that for all 
MCs  that the day-
to-day operations 
of the school are 
the responsibility 
of the MC.  
Notes: The v denotes a slight difference from the common format of the specific item. 
The checkmark indicates that the attribute is applicable to the identified contract.  The ¢ 
indicates that the attribute is not applicable to the identified contract. The abbreviation 
“MC” represents, “the management company” in the comments sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
